APRIL 15 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2017
TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: APRIL 15 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: During the April 15 meeting of the
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS),ministers
discussed the following issues:

-- Reactions to the April 12 Attacks: MNF-I Commanding
General Petraeus argued that security at the Council of
Representatives may have been breached due to the culture of
exempting GOI officials from security scans. PM Maliki and
DPM Barham Salih asked for Coalition assistance in setting up
temporary bridging to compensate for the destruction of the
Sarafiya Bridge, but Petraeus said he did not think Coalition
bridging supplies were large enough to span the necessary
gap. Maliki ordered an investigation into how security
checkpoints near the bridge were breached.

-- Karkh and Doura: Maliki expressed frustration that
clearing operations were not going on in the areas of Karkh
and Doura, suggesting that perhaps troops should be moved
from Rusafa. Petraeus argued forcefully that Maliki should
not use the MCNS to order troop movements, adding that even
if the entire U.S. Army were deployed there would never be
enough troops to engage in clearing operations across all of
Baghdad simultaneously. He argued that there was a
prioritized plan for clearance of areas and before ordering
any changes, the BOC commander should be given the
opportunity to assess and report back on the risks involved
in changing the plan.

-- Umm Qasr: Iraqi Joint Headquarters Commander General
Babakr said that the Iranians were creeping more and more
into Iraqi territorial waters. The PM said the GOI needed to
tell the Iranians to stop; Petraeus agreed. Babakr also said
the Port of Entry facilities were under the control of
parties and militias. Acting Justice Minister Safa al-Safi
was tasked with reporting to Maliki on the situation.

-- Basra: Maliki decided to lift the license for a planned
April 16 demonstration in Basra against Provincial Governor
Waeli. Despite the suggestion of Minister of Interior
Bolani, he decided against a curfew. Al-Safi blamed the
entire situation on Waeli. Maliki said he had no power to
remove Waeli.

-- National Security Strategy: National Security Advisor
Rubaie asked for security ministry participation in a working
group tasked with drafting a National Security Strategy.
Petraeus said the Strategy would be a good opportunity to
raise and address certain issues within Iraq's national
security architecture, such as intelligence agencies and the
role of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief.

-- MOI/MOD Friction: Bolani said friction sometimes existed
in the field between the ministries of Interior and Defense.
He cited the case an MOI officer arrested by someone from the
MOD. He said a committee had been set up to resolve such
issues. GEN Petraeus reiterated that much of this friction
is due to the culture of senior leaders feeling that they are
immune from normal checkpoints and searches. The PM agreed
that we should support the soldiers and police and change
this cultural sense of privilege.

-- Pesticides: Minister of Agriculture al-Abudi asked for
MNF-I security during the transportation, storage, and aerial
spraying of pesticides. Petraeus agreed to provide whatever
support was required.

-- Detainees: After Deputy National Security Advisor Safaa
outlined a process for GOI-MNF-I work on detainees, al-Safi
complained about what he described as flaws in the current
Combined Review and Release Board process.

-- MEK: The Bolani-chaired committee on the MEK has been
reactivated. The April 22 MCNS will discuss the situation
with the MEK in more detail.

-- Housing and Land Issues: Bolani argued that Maliki needed
to take action to resolve the situation of those without
housing, noting that they often create a security situation
by taking up residence illegally in public places. Maliki
said that those living someplace illegally should be removed.
He said the larger issues of housing and land were more
appropriate for the Cabinet than for the MCNS. END SUMMARY


Reactions to the April 12 Attacks

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--------------


2. (S) At the April 15 meeting of the Ministerial Committee
for National Security (MCNS),MNF-I Commanding General
Petraeus argued that one of the reasons terrorists had been
successful in carrying out the April 12 bombing at the
Council of Representatives was that far too many people in
Iraq think that they are too important to do what is required
of everyone else. Petreaus said that he was happy to be
searched and so should Iraqi leaders, adding that they should
set the example. He said that it was time to quit taking the
side of Iraqi officials whose feelings get hurt because they
were subject to a search, adding that these same Iraqi
officials should be applauding the security officials for
doing their jobs. Maliki agreed, pointing out that
harassment of soldiers or police by officials discouraged the
security forces from wanting to do their job properly.


3. (S) Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih reported that the
destruction of Baghdad's Sarafiya Bridge on April 12 had led
to large traffic problems in the city. He said that he had
talked to MNF-I to see whether it could put up temporary
bridges. Noting that he had heard that repairs on the bridge
would take at least two months to complete, PM Maliki also
asked whether the Coalition could help in any way. Petraeus
said that he did not believe the Coalition had temporary
bridging material large enough for the span, but promised to
check into the issue further.


4. (S) Maliki said that an investigation would be conducted
into how the driver of the Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised
Explosive Device (SVBIED) had been able to get past
checkpoints and onto the bridge. Minister of Interior Bolani
said that the security personnel who let the bomber and his
vehicle through the checkpoint were being held for further
investigation.

Karkh and Doura
--------------


5. (S) Maliki expressed frustration that clearing operations
were not taking place in Karkh and Doura. He said that Karkh
was a well-known "incubator for terrorism." He said the
number of troops in Karkh seemed insufficient for the threat,
suggesting that perhaps some should be moved from Rusafa.
Petraeus countered that there were not enough troops to do
clearing and security operations simultaneously across all of
Baghdad, adding that that would be true even if the entire
U.S. Army were dispatched to Iraq, and thus the reason for
the prioritized plan for the clearance of all the
neighborhoods in Baghdad. Petraeus told Maliki that the MCNS
should be a strategic level meeting and that he should not
use it to say that troops should "go here or there."
Petraeus said that such decisions should happen within the
Crisis Action Cell, where an evaluation could be conducted of
the risks and benefits of pulling units from one place for
use someplace else. Petraeus used the opportunity to point
out the importance of having all Iraqi units at full strength.

Umm Qasr: Iranian Incursions and Party Control of POE
-------------- --------------


6. (S) Iraqi Joint Headquarters Commander General Babakr
said that the Iranians were creeping more and more everyday
into Iraqi territorial waters around Umm Qasr. Minister of
Interior Bolani said that his ministry was preparing a report
on the issue for the Prime Minister. Babakr pointed out that
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior was responsible for security
along the Shaat al Arab, while the Ministry of Defense
handled security in the Persian Gulf, adding that the GOI
needed to coordinate closely with the MNF-I on this issue.
Maliki said that the GOI needed to tell the Iranians to stop
these incursions; Petraeus agreed that a demarche was in
order. Maliki said that the MFA must make some communication
with the Iranians on this issue.


7. (S) Babakr also said that facilities at the Umm Qasr Port
of Entry were under the control of various political parties
and their militias. Maliki asked acting Minister of Justice
Safa al-Safi to report to him on the situation, adding for
emphasis that if it was true the people involved should be
"dumped in the water."

Basra Demonstration Threat
--------------


8. (S) Bolani reported on the planned April 16 demonstration

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in Basra against Provincial Governor Waeli, arguing that it
was really a fight over power in the province. He said that
there had been an increase in threats to the governor and
that the security situation was deteriorating. He
recommended that a curfew be imposed. DPM Barham Salih
argued that the GoI should decide on the side of caution and
pull back the demonstration permit. Maliki decided against
the curfew -- arguing that it would look bad for the
government to issue a curfew every time there was a threat --
but agreed to lift the license for the demonstration, as well
as more fully examining those who had applied for the
license. He said that he would cite the security situation
as the reason for the license suspension. Petraeus and MNF-I
Deputy Commanding General Lamb argued that a public
announcement of the suspension include language indicating
what the government planned to do to address the underlying
concerns of the demonstrators.


9. (S) Al-Safi blamed the whole situation on Waeli, arguing
that "all parties" wanted to get rid of the governor, but
acknowledging that they did not have the required two-thirds
vote on the provincial council to remove him. He said the
situation left Waeli feeling above the law. Al Safi said
that in contrast the Basra Emergency Committee was seen as a
"neutral" entity. Al Safi claimed that MNF-I retracted a
targeting of Waeli's brother. Petraeus said that he did not
necessarily agree with al-Safi's analysis of the situation.
Maliki said that he did not have the power to remove Waeli,
but had stripped him of his security responsibilities through
the formation of the Emergency Committee.

National Security Strategy
--------------


10. (S) National Security Advisor Rubaie and Deputy
National Security Advisor Safa'a said that Maliki should form
a working group consisting of the "smartest brains" from the
security ministries in order to draft a National Security
Strategy (NSS) by July 14. Bolani and Minister of Defense
Abdul Qader each said that their ministries already had
long-term Strategies and thus such an NSS was unnecessary.
Rubaie stressed that this was to be a strategy for the entire
country, providing all ministries with an overarching
framework of where the country is heading. Petraeus added
that the NSS should help raise and address certain
architectural issues within the Iraqi national security
structure, such as competing intelligence services and the
role of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief. He said that
this would allow everyone to know who does what.

MOI/MOD Friction
--------------


11. (S) Bolani said friction sometimes existed in the field
between the ministries of Interior and Defense. He cited the
example of an MOI general that was arrested by the MOD. He
said that a joint MOI-MOD committee had been formed to
resolve incidents of this type. Maliki ordered an
investigation into the arrest. GEN Petraeus commented that
this was the same issue as with security at the CoR and
involved the sense of senior leader entitlement. He argued
that we all should applaud the soldiers and police who uphold
standards of inspection at checkpoints rather than deride
them for hassling senior leaders.

Pesticide Needs
--------------


12. (S) Minister of Agriculture al-Abudi asked for
Coalition assistance to secure the transportation and storage
of pesticides, confirming Petraeus' April 11 statement
(reftel) that Diyala's pesticide supply had been stolen. He
also asked for air and ground cover for his two crop-dusting
planes, noting that he was risking his pilots' lives every
time he sent them up. Petraeus said MNF-I was ready to
supply whatever support was needed and would participate in
an 16 April meeting to coordinate this support at MoD.

Detainees
--------------


13. (S) Following up on the previous week's discussion of
detainees (reftel),Safa'a displayed a chart in Arabic
purporting to show the process by which MNF-I and the GOI
work together on the issue. Safa'a said that a joint
committee should review detainees to determine whether: to
transfer them to the judicial system, release them on

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conditions, or continue holding them based on the strength of
the intelligence (not criminal evidence) against them. Al
Safi complained that the current Combined Review and Release
Board process was flawed, arguing that there were no real
investigations, few documents were in Arabic, and the
Coalition had the final say regardless of the vote of the
Board. It was agreed to continue to study this issue.

MEK
---


13. (S) Rubaie said that the Bolani-chaired joint committee
on the MEK had been re-activated. He said that the topic of
the MEK would be discussed more fully at the April 22 MCNS
meeting.

Housing and Land Issues
--------------


14. (S) Bolani raised the issue of people who do not have
housing. He said many people face high rents, but have only
low wages. He said this creates a security issue because
these people will often take over, build, and live in public
spaces. He said he hoped Maliki would develop a policy to
show that the government was concerned about the need of
everyone to have a home. Rubaie said the issue would require
careful study before an an intelligent discussion of the
issue could occur. Maliki said steps needed to be taken to
remove people from public spaces, but that the larger issue
of housing and land issues was more appropriate for a meeting
of the Cabinet, not the MCNS.
CROCKER