UIA OFFICIALS DISCUSS POSITION ON DE-BAATH REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001356 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2017 TAGS: IZ KDEM KJUS PGOV SUBJECT: UIA OFFICIALS DISCUSS POSITION ON DE-BAATH REFORM Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Margaret Scobey for reaso ns 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 15 meeting, VP Mehdi told A/DCM that the UIA leadership had discussed the PM-President de-Baathification reform draft law at length, and accepted the general principles of the draft. He stressed that the Shia leadership's main concern was security implications of allowing certain security service members to return to service. He believed current attacks on Shia civilians would make the work of reaching consensus of a draft more difficult, but was overall optimistic that UIA would support the draft, provided that adequate measures could be included in the law to prevent members of Fedayeen Saddam and other oppressive agencies from returning to their positions. In an April 16 meeting, Deputy Badr Commander Tahsin Al-Azawi told poloffs that the UIA was working on a paper which would summarize their redlines in negotiations with other blocs. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- VP Mehdi: Principles Accepted, but Security Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) A/DCM thanked VP Adil Abdel Mehdi for his contributions to the compromise draft that was signed by the PM and President on March 26. She said that de-Baathification reform was an important step in the reconciliation process, and noted that it would be a clear signal of the government's commitment if the Presidency Council could present the draft to CoR before the upcoming International Compact and Expanded Neighbor's conferences. ¶3. (C) VP Mehdi said that the UIA accepted the draft in principle, but harbored serious concerns about security in the wake of attacks on political leaders, such as himself, DPM Salam Zobaie, and CoR members. These attacks demonstrated how individuals infiltrated the political process and used it to wage terror. Mehdi noted that he had tried to address this issue in his previous de-Baathification draft by preventing former Baathists from returning to key posts in the foreign affairs, security and economic ministries. ¶4. (C) Mehdi said that UIA accepted the idea of moving criminal cases to the judiciary and allowing the provincial councils to adjust the provisions of the law to local conditions. He expressed willingness to work with VP Hashimi on amendments to the existing draft, but stressed the importance of the PM's continued engagement on the issue in order to gain broader support from UIA. Mehdi acknowledged that UIA's desire to exempt positions at certain ministries from the reinstatement process may not be acceptable to the Sunnis, but noted that a compromise could be found starting from that position. ¶5. (C) A/DCM stressed the need to ensure transparency in all de-Baathification procedures. She noted that the terrorists were afraid of progress and sought to spread distrust amongst political leaders. However, if the political leaders could come together over hard issues like de-Baathification, she reasoned, it would prove to the terrorists that GOI will not back away from progress. Mehdi agreed and said that he was willing to work on the draft with the President and PM, but said that he would await President Talabani's invitation to do so. -------------- Deputy Badr Commander Lays Out UIA Position -------------- ¶6. (C) On April 16, Deputy Badr Commander and Deputy Chair of the CoR De-Baathification Committee Tahsin Al-Azawi repeated Mehdi's concerns about the security implications of Debaathification reform, noting that terrorism in Iraq was largely perpetuated by former high ranking Baathist officials. He also expressed concern at returning rights to former Baathists, when victims of the previous regime had yet to receive proper compensation. Poloffs reminded Al-Azawi that separate legislation addressing victims' compensation had been passed by the Transitional National Assembly, and that committees were being organized in accordance with those laws to begin compensating political prisoners' and martyrs' families. He was aware of progress on compensation issues, but noted that the de-Baath law needed to acknowledge the victims, perhaps by reiterating the government's commitment to compensation. He also suggested that the law should reaffirm constitutional prohibitions against the return of the Baath Party, addressed in Article 7 of the Iraqi constitution. ¶7. (C) Al-Azawi affirmed that the UIA accepted and even supported the concept of de-Baathification reform, and said BAGHDAD 00001356 002 OF 002 that they were working on a paper which would summarize their position on key issues. He said they agreed that criminal allegations against individuals should be referred to the Iraqi judicial system, and they supported restoration of pension benefits for most individuals, to exclude convicted criminals and members of Fedayeen Saddam. Al-Azawi stressed the importance of allowing for provincial government to adjust regulations by one membership level in their own governorates, both on the blanket level, per a vote by the Provincial Council, and on the individual level, per a decision by the Governor. He added that the PM should have the ability to reinstate anyone at any time, based on needs and skills. ¶8. (C) On the PM-President draft, Al-Azawi echoed VP Mehdi's comments, noting that there needs to be better definition regarding how and who can return to the foreign affairs, security and economic ministries "in order to protect democracy." He said that the UIA agreed that the current de-Baathification commission should finish its work, and felt that one year was sufficient to do so. However, he noted that there were some functions that would need to continue once the identification and vetting work was done. For example, he reasoned, there would need to be a committee of some kind that would continue to track the assets of former Baathists, including money, property, companies and other assets that may be located both inside and outside Iraq. He said that the UIA also disagreed with the provision that would allow the public a three month period to produce evidence against former Baathists, noting that there should be no statute of limitations on litigation against individuals and institutions of the former regime. -------------- Chalabi Draft Dismissed as "Strategy" -------------- ¶9. (C) Al-Azawi confirmed that the CoR De-Baathification Committee had approved Chalabi's draft, but said the move was based on "strategy" rather than actual support for the proposal. He noted that the UIA could not put forward a first draft that contained everything they wanted, as they needed a base from which to negotiate. For example, he said that he had attended the meeting organized by Akram Al-Hakim, Minister of Dialogue and Reconciliation, where the de-Baathification reform draft had been discussed. The draft set the level for sanctions at Fira (Branch member),which he said would be a "BIG problem!" As such, he recommended that the UIA call for the level to remain at Firqa (Group or Division member),according to current practices, in order to reach a compromise in the middle at Shu'aba (Section member). However he acknowledged that the UIA had not yet reached a decision on the levels, and that more discussion would be needed to reach internal agreement. ¶10. (C) NOTE: Post previously reported that Ministry officials had distributed and discussed the PM-President draft, based on a conversation with Ministry of Dialogue and Reconciliation Advisor Saad Al-Muttalibi. Al-Azawi gave poloffs a copy of the actual document discussed at the meeting. It was the March 21 compromise draft that ex-TNA speaker Hajim Al-Hassani had sent to Emboffs during negotiations between the VPs. Higher National De-Baathification Commission Chairman Ahmed Chalabi, who distributed the text at this meeting, was well aware of the origins of the draft, which he told participants was the "final text" that had been drafted and given to him by Ambassador Khalilzad. END NOTE. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Both VP Mehdi and Deputy Commander Al-Azawi delivered similar messages regarding UIA concerns and policy positions. Both expressed optimism that their bloc would participate in and support amendments to the PM-President draft. Although Al-Azawi dismissed Chalabi's draft, claiming that it had little support within the CoR, post will continue to push the Presidency Council and to monitor the progress of Chalabi's draft. Chalabi's bait-and-switch at the ministry sponsored meeting shows that he is still very much in the game, and capable of underhanded maneuvering to advance his personal agenda. CROCKER