BARZANI DISCUSSES DE-B'ATHIFICATION, HYDROCARBONS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR TU IZ
SUBJECT: BARZANI DISCUSSES DE-B'ATHIFICATION, HYDROCARBONS,
TURKEY, IRAN WITH AMBASSADOR

REF: BAGHDAD 1256

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani, also attended by
KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, on April 12 in Erbil,
the Ambassador pressed for action on de-Ba'athification,
hydrocarbons legislation, and improvements in relations with
Turkey. President Barzani discussed his attempts to foster
reconciliation and gave his opinion of Maliki's "evil"
advisers. Nechirvan claimed that hydrocarbons negotiations
should go smoothly, but told Embassy staff privately that the
Kurds would need to "hold their ground" as the legislation
passed through the Council of Representatives (CoR).
President Barzani claimed to want good relations with the
Turks, but blamed Turkey's "hysterical" behavior for the rise
in rhetoric. He said there was little he could do militarily
on the PKK issue but promised to engage with the PKK on
holding to the ceasefire. Finally, Barzani discussed Iranian
interference in Iraq and called out Ahmed Chalabi as Iran's
main agent here. END SUMMARY.

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Help with De-Ba'ath, Support for Maliki
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2. (C) The Ambassador remarked on the changing landscape in
Erbil as a result of greatly increased construction, noting
that he recognized only one building from four years earlier.
He thanked Barzani for being a good friend to the U.S. and
offered greetings from President Bush. He said that the U.S.
needs Barzani's help in Baghdad. He told Barzani that the
KRG cannot exist on its own - if Iraq fails the KRG will
fail. For this reason staying isolated from national-level
affairs would be a grave mistake.


3. (C) The Ambassador asked Barzani to use his influence with
both Sunni and Shia to help bring de-Ba'athification forward
and also reiterated U.S. support for the Maliki government.
He said the government is not perfect but now is not the time
to make changes. Barzani responded with a history of Iraq.
He said "it's all about fear:" the Sunnis fear the future,
the Shia fear the past, and the Kurds fear both. He thought
that people in the West do not understand the depths of the
Shia fear of a Sunni return to power. He said part of the
problem is with the neighbors, asserting that Iran was the
worst, followed by the Saudis and other Arabs. He reminded
the Ambassador that he asked "the Abdullahs" in March not to
stoke sectarianism. He briefly discussed the attempts late
last year and early this year to form a moderate front, but
he said in the current climate it is very difficult.


4. (C) In Barzani's opinion, Maliki is "good," but the
problem is that there are "hundreds of Prime Ministers down
there" in Baghdad. By this, he said he meant that the PM has
"evil advisers", especially Sami al-Askari and Sadiq
al-Ricabi, who "even hate other Shia." He declared that
there must be a reorganization of the political system
because the current one will not work in the long-term. He
mentioned his efforts to convene meetings in Erbil to discuss
these issues.

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Hydrocarbons
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5. (C) The Ambassador pressed both Barzanis for quick
progress on the draft hydrocarbons law, especially on revenue
sharing. He told them that the negotiators from the KRG who
were in Baghdad from April 8-10, including Natural Resources
Minister Ashti Hawrami, must come back to Baghdad for as long
as it takes to reach agreement. He explained that the Kurds
would benefit from a completed hydrocarbons deal because they
would receive 13 percent of all Iraq's oil revenue, including
that from the south.


6. (S) Nechirvan told the Ambassador that he understands the
importance of oil to the U.S. and he believes that they can
make the hydrocarbons package work. He agreed to send
negotiators back to Baghdad and promised to follow them
himself. (Note: in a private conversation with Embassy staff
during the same visit, Nechirvan said the Kurds intended to
dig in more than last time on the oil law. He thought they
had given up too much already. He told staff that 17 percent
of oil revenues was the minimum they were prepared to accept.)

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Turkey
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7. (C) The Ambassador also asked Barzani to stop making

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inflammatory statements that incite the Turks and to take
positive action against the PKK. He proposed that Barzani
send the Turks a message of friendship, ensure that the PKK
adheres to the ceasefire, move PKK elements out of one camp
near the border, and remain engaged on Makhmour with a view
toward repatriation of its inhabitants and closure of the
camp. Barzani claimed to want good relations with Turkey,
but blamed Turkey's "hysterical" behavior since the fall of
Saddam in 2003 for much of the problems. He said they
invited Nechirvan to Ankara earlier in the year and then
cancelled their meeting with him. He said since then they
have had no contact with the Turks for months, and he had
last met the Turkish Ambassador to Iraq in the fall. He said
that the KRG wants to emphasize to Turkey that they are
profiting from trade with northern Iraq and that eventually
they will want to run a pipeline through Turkey that will
further enrich them.


8. (C) They know we are against the PKK and they are against
us, he continued. He admitted that sometimes he lets his
frustration with the Turks get the better of him and he says
some things that he should not. He said the controversial
interview in which he asserted that the KRG would respond to
any threat from Turkey (reftel) took place at a time when
Turkey was making statements on this issue "three times a
day." He explained that the PKK are too dug into the
mountains to be defeated militarily by any army, telling the
Ambassador, "You've seen the Kandil area." He did think that
the PKK could be whittled to a small hard core. He said when
dealing with them we have to keep in perspective that they
want to keep the PKK from turning to Ansar al-Sunnah,
Al-Qaeda, or Iran. Both Barzanis agreed to issue a statement
of friendship with Turkey and
President Barzani agreed to send an emissary to the PKK to
convince them to stop their talk about the abrogation of the
ceasefire.


9. (C) President Barzani said removing the PKK from one camp
on the border is difficult because the PKK do not live in
camps - they live in caves - and questioned the efficacy of
moving them from one cave to another, particularly as no one
is sure where they are anyway. He agreed to stay engaged on
the Makhmour issue but refused to force anyone out of the
camp or to limit humanitarian aid to the camp.


10. (C) Comment: Discussions underscored continuing lack of
effective communication between Iraq and Turkey over the PKK
issue. The trilateral process has not worked so far,
hampered by Turkish intransigence about meeting with the
Kurdish member of the Iraqi team, and by general lack of
engagement or interest shown by the Iraqi team leader
Minister of State for National Security Shirwan Wa'ili.
Ambassador will explore whether or not the Turkish Ambassador
to Iraq could play a more active role. Absent effective
communication, we see little chance for progress on the PKK
issue. End Comment.

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Iran
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11. (S) Barzani dwelled on the malevolent Iranian influence
in Iraq and explained how they are moving in to Iraq
economically. He also claimed that they are dealing with
Sunni extremists and using the Iraqi Shia for their own
purposes. He called Ahmed Chalabi the Iranian's main agent
in Iraq.


12. (S) He told the Ambassador that in 1970 two sources told
him that a deputy from the Iranian MOIS offered to trade the
Hakim family to Saddam in exchange for the Rajabis (NFI).
Asked if he had ever relayed that story to SCIRI leader
Abdelaziz Hakim, he said no. The Ambassador commented that
telling him might be effective.

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Latest Statements
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13. (U) Since the trip north, Nechirvan issued a statement on
April 14 that was carried on Kurdistan Satellite TV in which
he said the KRG "extends the hand of friendship to Turkey."
He also called for the U.S. to play a role in bringing the
two "allies" together. On April 15 Nechirvan gave an
interview to Al-Jazirah in which he reiterated his desire for
good relations with Turkey, his view that Turkey has no right
to interfere in the issue of Kirkuk, and his belief that
Kirkuk should be decided within the timeframe specified in
the Iraqi Constitution. He also called the PKK an internal
Turkish affair but condemned any armed group that uses the
KRG as a base for attacking other countries. In a meeting on
April 16, the Kurdistan Leadership Council, led by President

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Barzani, called for an immediate implementation of the
decisions passed by the GOI Article 140 Committee. According
to Kurdistan TV, the Kurdistan Political Council held a
meeting on April 17 in which it announced that the Kurdistan
Region will
not interfere in the affairs of "regional countries," nor
will it accept any interference. It also announced that the
KRG is prepared to improve relations and deal with
neighboring countries on the basis of mutual respect and
common interests.
CROCKER