PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT TALKS START, STOP AGAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001304 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT TALKS START, STOP AGAIN REF: BAGHDAD 754 Classified By: PRT Team Leader Jim Bigus for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) This is a PRT Kirkuk reporting cable ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Negotiations to end the Arab-Turkoman boycott of the Kirkuk Provincial Council began in earnest in February and March, focusing on division of top provincial positions, security and the return . However, talks have stopped as key players travel outside of Iraq, and several factors -- especially Arab leaders' anxiety about their community's role in Kirkuk,s future -- could prevent final resolution. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) As reported in reftel, since November 2006, most Arab and Turkoman Kirkuk Provincial Council (PC) members have boycotted its weekly sessions and select committee meetings. Without the boycotting members, only PC members elected on the Kurdish-dominated Kurdish Brotherhood List (KBL) which in addition to its 20 Kurdish members includes two Arabs, two Turkoman, and one Assyrian, have participated in PC business. On February 12, at a CF-called meeting, the three blocs agreed to resume formal negotiations and, on March 15, their representatives adopted a five-point negotiating agenda, agreeing to discuss the division of high-level provincial positions among the blocs, corruption, security, occupation of government and private property by Kurdish returnees, and the allocation of 2006 reconstruction projects. ¶3. (SBU) On March 26, the Arab bloc representative, Rakan Saed Al-Jabouri, told PRT officer that two additional points regarding Iraqi Constitution Article 140 had been put aside for now because the representatives of each bloc felt that including them would block progress on other points. -------------- LET,S GET DOWN TO BUSINESS... -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On March 29, fifteen members of the Kirkuk Provincial Council (PC) from all three blocs gathered in the first of a planned series of talks on the five points. Discussion centered on the division among the blocs of top provincial positions: governor, PC chairman, and Kirkuk city mayor, all of which are held now by Kurds. KBL members, noting that the governor and PC chairman had been chosen through a democratic process, refused to consider conceding these positions, and Arab and Turkoman bloc members finally seemed to accept the point. However, KBL members appeared �00A;willing to concede the Kirkuk city mayor job. The Kurdish incumbent was appointed by the governor, rather than in an election, and is generally considered weak. The Turkoman bloc wants this position, believing that, as the MoI representative formally in control of IP within Kirkuk city, the position could become more powerful. Also, because the province's Turkoman population is concentrated in Kirkuk city, the position is important to that community. ¶5. (SBU) Participants also discussed division of second-tier provincial positions: deputy governor, chair and deputy chair of the yet-to-be-formed Kirkuk City Council, and the deputy chairman of the province's planning and development committee. KBL participants appeared to be open to conceding these positions as well. However, when discussion of lower-level positions arose, they resisted assertions of Kurdish domination, pointing out that most of the positions at the North Oil Company (NOC) and affiliated petroleum-sector entities are held by Arabs and Turkomen. -------------- ...UNLESS YOU HAVE SOMETHING BETTER TO DO. -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Participants covered only the first of the five points, agreeing to meet again on April 2 to resume discussion of the first point and take up the second. That meeting was canceled, however, because key Arab bloc participants were abroad to participate in "future of Kirkuk" conferences. The PC chairman has since gone abroad as well, and discussions likely will not resume until he returns at the end of April. Until then, the boycott remains, leaving key positions )- such as the deputy governor )- unfilled. -------------- COMMENT: A GOOD START, BUT PITFALLS AHEAD -------------- ¶7. (C) The tone of the March 29 meeting was generally open and constructive, with little grandstanding, and the outlines of a possible KBL-Turkoman bloc deal were apparent. Turkoman bloc members were very active and focused on gaining particular positions, which seems to be an end in itself for them. This is a change from the February 12 meeting, at which Turkomen did not appear to be negotiating seriously. BAGHDAD 00001304 002 OF 002 This could be due to the absence abroad of influential Turkoman bloc member Ali Mehdi, who is known for his ideological inflexibility. ¶8. (C) In contrast, Arab bloc members remained aloof from the horse-trading, engaging only sporadically, and then only with abstract concerns about increasing the Arab share of Kirkuk government positions at all levels. This reflects Arab leaders' anxiety about their community's waning status and influence in Kirkuk. While Arabs dominated during Saddam's reign and Kurds were second-class citizens, Kirkuk is increasingly Kurdish-populated and controlled. Its accession to the KRG under an Article 140 referendum would cement this current reality. On March 28, influential sheik Hussein al-Jubouri (a.k.a. Abu Saddam) )- who likely will be one to bless any boycott agreement reached by Arab bloc representatives -- told PRT officer that the main issue is "the future of Kirkuk," not "division of administrative positions," and that increasing Arab participation in the Kirkuk government is but a means to secure that community's place in Kirkuk,s future. ¶9. (C) Though the March 29 meeting was an encouraging step, pitfalls await. On the KBL side, key KDP PC members )- who tend to take a harder line than their PUK colleagues )- were absent, and their approval will be necessary for any deal. On the Turkoman side, Ali Mehdi's return could encourage an inflation of Turkoman demands beyond what the KBL is willing to accommodate to end the boycott. On the Arab side, Abu Saddam's warning means that any deal will be contingent on the Arabs community's perception that it has gained some real authority and preserved its place in Kirkuk. CROCKER