RAMADI RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE: TRIBES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000130

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RAMADI RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE: TRIBES WITH
FLAGS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0040


B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4654

(U) Classified by PRT Anbar Team Leader James Soriano,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the
&Awakening Council of Anbar,8 a group of anti-insurgent
tribes in the Ramadi area, hosted an unprecedented meeting at
his residence on Jan. 10 to discuss local reconstruction and
to urge greater cooperation in the fight against Al-Qaeda.
It was the largest such meeting with MNF-West commanders
since the beginning of the war. The event was a tribal
affair; the provincial council played no role. The Awakening
Council has urged Anbari youths to join the police force with
apparent success. Over 1,000 applicants have come forward so
far in January, compared to a few dozen who answered
police-recruitment drives last summer. Ramadi is still a
violent city, but several trends indicate progress against
the enemy. Al-Qaeda is still present, but has been driven
from large parts of the city. The purpose of the
reconstruction meeting was to ensure the quick transition to
post-battle recovery. A problem on the near-term horizon is
the widespread Anbari suspicion of the GOI,s purported ill
will towards the province. Those suspicions affect virtually
every aspect of Anbar,s relationship with the GOI. The fact
that the provincial council was irrelevant to the Ramadi
reconstruction meeting illustrates its illegitimacy in the
eyes of many Anbaris. A push for local elections, way
overdue, would allow Anbaris to start afresh in selecting
their own local leaders. End Summary.

--------------
Ramadi Reconstruction Conference
--------------


3. (SBU) Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the &Awakening
Council of Anbar8 (Sahawat Al-Anbar, SAA),the group of
anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the Ramadi area, hosted an
unprecedented gathering of local sheikhs and notables at his
Ramadi residence on January 10 to urge greater cooperation
among Anbaris in the fight against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
to discuss the post-battle reconstruction. Over 150 Anbaris
attended, including the sheikhs or their representatives from
as many as 17 tribes, one coming from as far away as the
Euphrates town of Hit. The fact that such a large number of
local figures assembled in Anbar,s most volatile city
suggests a weakening in AQI,s ability to thwart such
gatherings. Such a meeting could not have taken place as
recently as last summer because of insurgent threats (see Ref
B).


4. (U) The event was a tribal affair. Anbar,s Provincial
Council, which fled Ramadi for Baghdad last April amid
insurgent threats, played no role. Anbar Governor Ma,amoun
Al-Alwani was traveling abroad. He was represented by Deputy
Gov. Awad, who did not address the assembly. Also attending
were MNF-West CG MGen. Zilmer, PRT members, and several US
news reporters.


5. (U) MNF-West,s 1st Brigade Combat Team made short
presentations, with Arabic translation, on CERP projects in
Ramadi. This was followed by breakout session where local
contractors and conference participants discussed project
specifics with civil affairs teams.

--------------
Tribes With Flags
--------------


6. (U) In his opening remarks, Sattar called on Anbaris to
confront the terrorists and to start the process of
reconstruction. He insisted on displaying the American flag
behind the podium, along with the flag of Iraq and the newly
unveiled flag of the SAA. The latter is a black on yellow
affair of crossed swords with the scales of justice suspended
from the sword blades. The inscription reads: &The Tribes
of the Awakening of Al-Anbar.8 Sattar made no reference to
Anbar,s provincial council or to the central government in
his public remarks.

--------------
Private Remarks
--------------


7. (C) We spoke with Sattar privately in his office before
the event got underway. During the course of that
discussion, he made the following points:

BAGHDAD 00000130 002 OF 003



-- Ramadi is still unstable. AQI is deeply rooted in several
central city neighborhoods and in Tameem, a large slum of
decrepit workers, housing in the city,s southwestern
quarter. As if to punctuate that observation, an insurgent
rocket landed with a loud report a short distance from the
meeting site as Sattar was later giving a press conference.
Nonetheless, Sattar was upbeat about the prospects of rooting
out the enemy. &The thorn of the insurgency is gone,8 he
said.

-- Anbaris have made a two-fold political mistake: their
first was their near-universal boycott of the January 2005
national poll, and the second was their later acceptance of
AQI, believing the group would be the protector of Sunni
interests. Public opinion has now turned against AQI, Sattar
said, in revulsion to its murder and intimidation campaign.
He added that Anbaris now long for a return to normalcy in
their daily lives.

-- At the same time, Anbaris are today fighting a two-front
war: one against AQI and the other against the §arian8
(Shia-dominated) central government. Sattar signaled that
Anbaris believe the GOI is encouraging Shia militant pressure
against Sunni interests (see Ref A).

-- Sattar has spurned overtures from Ansar Al-Sunna, a Sunni
insurgent group also active in the province. The latter
apparently sounded out Sattar on forming a common front
against AQI, with Ansar Al-Sunna styling itself as an
&honorable resistance,8 one that would proscribe the murder
and intimidation of Anbari citizens, but undertake violence
against Coalition Forces (CF). Sattar said that he rejected
the offer, maintaining that all types of Sunni attacks
against the CF were &unacceptable.8 (Note: Sattar has
long referred to the CF as &friendly forces,8 and addresses
his written correspondence to MNF-West in those terms. His
stance on this issue puts him at odds with many in the Sunni
religious establishment. See Ref A.)

-- Sattar speculated on the connection between the battles of
Baghdad and Anbar. If foreign insurgents can be interdicted
in Anbar, violence in Baghdad would be reduced, and that in
turn would help stabilize Anbar.

-- Sattar advocated a Ba,athist reconciliation conference,
which in his view would help undermine AQI,s appeal.

--------------
The SAA and the Police
--------------


8. (SBU) The emergence of the SAA in Ramadi last September
was perhaps the most important battlefield development in the
past year (Ref B). The SAA is a backlash phenomenon, a
tribal reaction to AQI excesses. Sattar himself lost his
father and a brother to AQI assassins in the past two years.


9. (SBU) SAA comprises some twenty to thirty tribes, although
the distinction between tribe and clan is often blurred and a
strict enumeration of the SAA,s tribal reach is subjective.
Not all tribes have jumped on the SAA bandwagon. Many tribal
leaders are wary of joining the SAA, either unsure of its
prospects for success, or jealous about adding to Sattar,s
prestige, or too weak too openly advocate collaboration with
the SAA.


10. (SBU) Since its founding, the SAA has urged the youth in
the Ramadi area to join the police force. As recently as
September, only a few dozen Anbaris answered the call of
police-recruitment drives. Since then, monthly applicants
have risen to several hundred a month, and to 1,200 so far in
January. Moreover, the SAA is behind a move to raise some
seven to fifteen &emergency response units8 (ERUs) for the
province. The plan is still vague, but some of the recruits
for these units would be integrated into the regular police
force; others would become a part-time reserve force. No
doubt many youths are signing up for ERUs with the
expectation of making easy money for little work.
Nonetheless, their stepping forward is an act of defiance
against AQI that would not have been possible as recently as
last summer.

--------------
Ramadi Trends
--------------


11. (SBU) Police recruitment points to other positive trends
in Ramadi:


BAGHDAD 00000130 003 OF 003


-- AQI is on the defensive. The enemy is still present, but
has been pushed out of large parts of the city.

-- There are 14 police stations in the city today, compared
to three last July. Eight additional stations are in the
planning stage.

-- The number of attacks against CF in the Ramadi has fallen
to about nine a day, compared to 20 last July.

-- The number of IED attacks in Ramadi has fallen to about
four a day from nine a day last July.

-- The number of reconstruction projects is increasing.
Because of the high-threat environment last July, MNF-West
forces in Ramadi had only five CERP projects underway. But
as more neighborhoods are reclaimed from AQI influence,
locals are more willing to cooperate. As security improved,
MNF-West forces in Ramadi were able to start 10 new CERP
projects in November and 25 new projects in December.

--------------
PRT Anbar Comment
--------------


12. (C) Although Anbar province is still a violent area, it
is not too soon to begin to contemplate the post-war
environment. The purpose of the Jan. 10 reconstruction
conference was to ensure that economic recovery initiatives,
taken at the local level, begin just as soon as the security
environment permits.


13. (C) The reconstruction conference, and Ramadi,s
anti-insurgent tribal movement, did not happen merely because
of a spontaneous spark of local initiative. They happened
because the Coalition made them happen. CF security
operations, and the spreading presence of regular police
forces in Ramadi, helped to create conditions for local
citizens to take control of their daily lives and to move
forward on the long process of reconstruction.


14. (C) Also on the post-war horizon is the issue of
Anbar/Baghdad relations. A combination of GOI neglect,
administrative snafus, and Sunni perceptions of Baghdad,s
ill will towards Anbar have long hindered the provision of
GOI financial and policy support to the province. The
situation nurtures a suspicious view within Anbar of the
central government,s priorities and intentions towards the
province. Both MNF-West and PRT Anbar have sought to mend
these broken lines of communication. But unless Baghdad and
Ramadi can establish constructive ties, the GOI might one day
find its western province free of AQI, but with restive
tribes bearing a grudge against perceived Shia domination
(see Ref A).


15. (C) Finally, one missing piece in our counter-insurgent
strategy has long been the absence of local elections. Like
reconstruction, elections need stability. Nonetheless, in
the eyes of Anbari citizens, the provincial council today
simply does not have legitimacy as an effective and legal
body. A tangible sign of that disconnect was council,s
irrelevancy at the Jan. 10 reconstruction conference,
arguably the most important event of its kind in recent
memory. The council,s absence from the scene may have been
okay for the sheikhs of Ramadi, but it is not okay for us.
The Coalition has a responsibility for building capacity in
provincial governments, and there is a point where Coalition
support Anbar,s anti-insurgent tribal leaders works at cross
purposes with democratic reform.


16. (C) That is why local elections are so important. A
vote would put in place new municipal and provincial
councils, bodies needed for making key decisions on
reconstruction. Moreover, local elections would save
American lives. They would give our troops in the field a
tactical advantage over the enemy. Evidence suggests that
contested areas with functioning local governments tend to be
more stable than those without them. But ultimately, local
elections would allow Anbaris themselves to search for their
own political accommodations and have a voice in the future
of their province.
KHALILZAD