RAMADI RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE: TRIBES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000130 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM IZ SUBJECT: RAMADI RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE: TRIBES WITH FLAGS REF: A. BAGHDAD 0040 ¶B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4654 (U) Classified by PRT Anbar Team Leader James Soriano, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the &Awakening Council of Anbar,8 a group of anti-insurgent tribes in the Ramadi area, hosted an unprecedented meeting at his residence on Jan. 10 to discuss local reconstruction and to urge greater cooperation in the fight against Al-Qaeda. It was the largest such meeting with MNF-West commanders since the beginning of the war. The event was a tribal affair; the provincial council played no role. The Awakening Council has urged Anbari youths to join the police force with apparent success. Over 1,000 applicants have come forward so far in January, compared to a few dozen who answered police-recruitment drives last summer. Ramadi is still a violent city, but several trends indicate progress against the enemy. Al-Qaeda is still present, but has been driven from large parts of the city. The purpose of the reconstruction meeting was to ensure the quick transition to post-battle recovery. A problem on the near-term horizon is the widespread Anbari suspicion of the GOI,s purported ill will towards the province. Those suspicions affect virtually every aspect of Anbar,s relationship with the GOI. The fact that the provincial council was irrelevant to the Ramadi reconstruction meeting illustrates its illegitimacy in the eyes of many Anbaris. A push for local elections, way overdue, would allow Anbaris to start afresh in selecting their own local leaders. End Summary. -------------- Ramadi Reconstruction Conference -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the &Awakening Council of Anbar8 (Sahawat Al-Anbar, SAA),the group of anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the Ramadi area, hosted an unprecedented gathering of local sheikhs and notables at his Ramadi residence on January 10 to urge greater cooperation among Anbaris in the fight against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to discuss the post-battle reconstruction. Over 150 Anbaris attended, including the sheikhs or their representatives from as many as 17 tribes, one coming from as far away as the Euphrates town of Hit. The fact that such a large number of local figures assembled in Anbar,s most volatile city suggests a weakening in AQI,s ability to thwart such gatherings. Such a meeting could not have taken place as recently as last summer because of insurgent threats (see Ref B). ¶4. (U) The event was a tribal affair. Anbar,s Provincial Council, which fled Ramadi for Baghdad last April amid insurgent threats, played no role. Anbar Governor Ma,amoun Al-Alwani was traveling abroad. He was represented by Deputy Gov. Awad, who did not address the assembly. Also attending were MNF-West CG MGen. Zilmer, PRT members, and several US news reporters. ¶5. (U) MNF-West,s 1st Brigade Combat Team made short presentations, with Arabic translation, on CERP projects in Ramadi. This was followed by breakout session where local contractors and conference participants discussed project specifics with civil affairs teams. -------------- Tribes With Flags -------------- ¶6. (U) In his opening remarks, Sattar called on Anbaris to confront the terrorists and to start the process of reconstruction. He insisted on displaying the American flag behind the podium, along with the flag of Iraq and the newly unveiled flag of the SAA. The latter is a black on yellow affair of crossed swords with the scales of justice suspended from the sword blades. The inscription reads: &The Tribes of the Awakening of Al-Anbar.8 Sattar made no reference to Anbar,s provincial council or to the central government in his public remarks. -------------- Private Remarks -------------- ¶7. (C) We spoke with Sattar privately in his office before the event got underway. During the course of that discussion, he made the following points: BAGHDAD 00000130 002 OF 003 -- Ramadi is still unstable. AQI is deeply rooted in several central city neighborhoods and in Tameem, a large slum of decrepit workers, housing in the city,s southwestern quarter. As if to punctuate that observation, an insurgent rocket landed with a loud report a short distance from the meeting site as Sattar was later giving a press conference. Nonetheless, Sattar was upbeat about the prospects of rooting out the enemy. &The thorn of the insurgency is gone,8 he said. -- Anbaris have made a two-fold political mistake: their first was their near-universal boycott of the January 2005 national poll, and the second was their later acceptance of AQI, believing the group would be the protector of Sunni interests. Public opinion has now turned against AQI, Sattar said, in revulsion to its murder and intimidation campaign. He added that Anbaris now long for a return to normalcy in their daily lives. -- At the same time, Anbaris are today fighting a two-front war: one against AQI and the other against the §arian8 (Shia-dominated) central government. Sattar signaled that Anbaris believe the GOI is encouraging Shia militant pressure against Sunni interests (see Ref A). -- Sattar has spurned overtures from Ansar Al-Sunna, a Sunni insurgent group also active in the province. The latter apparently sounded out Sattar on forming a common front against AQI, with Ansar Al-Sunna styling itself as an &honorable resistance,8 one that would proscribe the murder and intimidation of Anbari citizens, but undertake violence against Coalition Forces (CF). Sattar said that he rejected the offer, maintaining that all types of Sunni attacks against the CF were &unacceptable.8 (Note: Sattar has long referred to the CF as &friendly forces,8 and addresses his written correspondence to MNF-West in those terms. His stance on this issue puts him at odds with many in the Sunni religious establishment. See Ref A.) -- Sattar speculated on the connection between the battles of Baghdad and Anbar. If foreign insurgents can be interdicted in Anbar, violence in Baghdad would be reduced, and that in turn would help stabilize Anbar. -- Sattar advocated a Ba,athist reconciliation conference, which in his view would help undermine AQI,s appeal. -------------- The SAA and the Police -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The emergence of the SAA in Ramadi last September was perhaps the most important battlefield development in the past year (Ref B). The SAA is a backlash phenomenon, a tribal reaction to AQI excesses. Sattar himself lost his father and a brother to AQI assassins in the past two years. ¶9. (SBU) SAA comprises some twenty to thirty tribes, although the distinction between tribe and clan is often blurred and a strict enumeration of the SAA,s tribal reach is subjective. Not all tribes have jumped on the SAA bandwagon. Many tribal leaders are wary of joining the SAA, either unsure of its prospects for success, or jealous about adding to Sattar,s prestige, or too weak too openly advocate collaboration with the SAA. ¶10. (SBU) Since its founding, the SAA has urged the youth in the Ramadi area to join the police force. As recently as September, only a few dozen Anbaris answered the call of police-recruitment drives. Since then, monthly applicants have risen to several hundred a month, and to 1,200 so far in January. Moreover, the SAA is behind a move to raise some seven to fifteen &emergency response units8 (ERUs) for the province. The plan is still vague, but some of the recruits for these units would be integrated into the regular police force; others would become a part-time reserve force. No doubt many youths are signing up for ERUs with the expectation of making easy money for little work. Nonetheless, their stepping forward is an act of defiance against AQI that would not have been possible as recently as last summer. -------------- Ramadi Trends -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Police recruitment points to other positive trends in Ramadi: BAGHDAD 00000130 003 OF 003 -- AQI is on the defensive. The enemy is still present, but has been pushed out of large parts of the city. -- There are 14 police stations in the city today, compared to three last July. Eight additional stations are in the planning stage. -- The number of attacks against CF in the Ramadi has fallen to about nine a day, compared to 20 last July. -- The number of IED attacks in Ramadi has fallen to about four a day from nine a day last July. -- The number of reconstruction projects is increasing. Because of the high-threat environment last July, MNF-West forces in Ramadi had only five CERP projects underway. But as more neighborhoods are reclaimed from AQI influence, locals are more willing to cooperate. As security improved, MNF-West forces in Ramadi were able to start 10 new CERP projects in November and 25 new projects in December. -------------- PRT Anbar Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Although Anbar province is still a violent area, it is not too soon to begin to contemplate the post-war environment. The purpose of the Jan. 10 reconstruction conference was to ensure that economic recovery initiatives, taken at the local level, begin just as soon as the security environment permits. ¶13. (C) The reconstruction conference, and Ramadi,s anti-insurgent tribal movement, did not happen merely because of a spontaneous spark of local initiative. They happened because the Coalition made them happen. CF security operations, and the spreading presence of regular police forces in Ramadi, helped to create conditions for local citizens to take control of their daily lives and to move forward on the long process of reconstruction. ¶14. (C) Also on the post-war horizon is the issue of Anbar/Baghdad relations. A combination of GOI neglect, administrative snafus, and Sunni perceptions of Baghdad,s ill will towards Anbar have long hindered the provision of GOI financial and policy support to the province. The situation nurtures a suspicious view within Anbar of the central government,s priorities and intentions towards the province. Both MNF-West and PRT Anbar have sought to mend these broken lines of communication. But unless Baghdad and Ramadi can establish constructive ties, the GOI might one day find its western province free of AQI, but with restive tribes bearing a grudge against perceived Shia domination (see Ref A). ¶15. (C) Finally, one missing piece in our counter-insurgent strategy has long been the absence of local elections. Like reconstruction, elections need stability. Nonetheless, in the eyes of Anbari citizens, the provincial council today simply does not have legitimacy as an effective and legal body. A tangible sign of that disconnect was council,s irrelevancy at the Jan. 10 reconstruction conference, arguably the most important event of its kind in recent memory. The council,s absence from the scene may have been okay for the sheikhs of Ramadi, but it is not okay for us. The Coalition has a responsibility for building capacity in provincial governments, and there is a point where Coalition support Anbar,s anti-insurgent tribal leaders works at cross purposes with democratic reform. ¶16. (C) That is why local elections are so important. A vote would put in place new municipal and provincial councils, bodies needed for making key decisions on reconstruction. Moreover, local elections would save American lives. They would give our troops in the field a tactical advantage over the enemy. Evidence suggests that contested areas with functioning local governments tend to be more stable than those without them. But ultimately, local elections would allow Anbaris themselves to search for their own political accommodations and have a voice in the future of their province. KHALILZAD