NINEWA: TAL'AFAR'S BELEAGUERED SUNNI TURCOMANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001283 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREF PTER PBTS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: NINEWA: TAL'AFAR'S BELEAGUERED SUNNI TURCOMANS DISCUSS SECURITY SITUATION, EMPHASIZE NEED FOR PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS REF: 06 BAGHDAD 04583 Classified By: Ninewa PRT Leader James Knight: 1.4 (B) and (D). This is a Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) message. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Tal'Afar Iraqi Turcoman Front (ITF) officials met Team Leader Knight 5 April in the aftermath of the widely-reported 27 March Tal'Afar bombings and reprisal killings of Sunni Turcomans which followed. The ITF represents Sunni Turcomans; ITF representatives acknowledge that insurgents based in Tal'Afar are Sunni and operate from Sunni Turcoman neighborhoods, but that security operations against insurgents are systematically used to terrorize non-insurgent Sunnis. ITF representatives report that Sunni Turcomans are leaving Tal'Afar in large numbers since the 27 March incident, for which the ITF largely blames Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) expansion efforts. ITF representatives also indicate support is rising for Shi'a Jaish al-Mahdi and Badr Corps militias among Tal'Afar's Shi'a Turcomans, and that the ITF is fearful of the consequences of ongoing Sunni exclusion from the political process in Ninewa. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) ITF/Tal'Afar Chair Dr. Yashar Abdulla Mahmoud and three senior Sunni Turcoman sheikhs -- Adil Said, Hasan Mahmud, and Tahir Abdullah -- met Team Leader Knight and IPAOs Holtsnider and Polacheck at PRT offices in Mosul, at ITF's urgent request. Hasan Mahmud is also Chair of the recently-formed Tal'Afar Sunni Council detailed para (8). -------------- INSURGENTS ARE AMONG US . . . -------------- ¶3. (C) Hasan opened the meeting by acknowledging that many insurgents in Tal'Afar are Sunni, adding that many Turcoman Sunni have 'joined the resistance or al-Qaeda. Most Sunni Turcomans are not, but all Sunnis in Tal'Afar are targeted by the city's predominantly Shi'a Iraqi Police (IP). Citing a recent well-publicized rape of a Sunni woman in Tal'Afar in which Shi'a security forces were implicated, Hasan emphasized that Tal'Afar's Shi'a police cannot be trusted. ¶4. (C) Note: 600 local Shi'a were recently directed to be recruited for the Tal'Afar IP on the direct order of Minister of Interior Bulani, over the strident objections of Ninewa PDOP MG Wathiq, Governor Kashmoula, and Coalition commanders. About 400 on the list appear to have been actually recruited. Recruits were specified by name in the MOI hiring order; most were reportedly unqualified by normal IP standards and included a number with criminal records. The 27 March incident spectacularly justified fears expressed by PDOP Wathiq when this order was received -- that these new police recruits would be a threat to order in Tal'Afar, not its guardians. End note. ¶5. (C) Hasan insisted that Tal'Afar's Sunni Turcomans need the protection of Coalition forces given the ongoing repression by Tal'Afar IPs. He suggested that replacing the IPs now manning checkpoints in Tal'Afar with Iraqi Army personnel would also reduce tension in Sunni neighborhoods. ¶6. (C) When Team Leader Knight requested details of Tal'Afar's current security situation as perceived by its Sunni Turcomans, Tahir noted that rising Shi'a Turcoman sympathy for Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and Badr Corps militias is Tal'Afar's most pressing security issue. Tahir added that flags of both groups had been flown openly in Tal'Afar for the first time during the recent Shi'a Arba'een holiday (10 March). Tahir reported that a video widely distributed in Tal'Afar included an order for two companies of JAM militia to move to Tal'Afar from Baghdad. -------------- . . . DISTRICT OFFICIALS ARE ANTI-SUNNI . . . -------------- ¶7. (C) Hasan complained at length about MOI interference in Tal'Afar from Baghdad. In addition to the recent order directing that 600 named Shi'as be hired BAGHDAD 00001283 002 OF 003 as IPs, Hasan insisted that the Shi'a- dominated GOI has filled most senior government positions in Tal'Afar with Shi'a sectarian proponents who have abused their powers. Sheik Yashar underscored that Tal'Afar's Mayor Najim, although a Sunni Arab, offers no protection to Tal'Afar's Sunni Turcomans and has no political influence in Ninewa or Baghdad (Reftel A). ITF representatives agreed that all affairs in Tal'Afar are managed directly from Baghdad, skipping both Ninewa provincial authorities and Tal'Afar District officials. -------------- . . .SO WE'VE FORMED A SUNNI COUNCIL . . . -------------- ¶8. (SBU) As the meeting opened, Hasan introduced himself as Chair of the Tal'Afar Sunni Council. Responding to Team Leader Knight's query, Hasan noted that the Council was established in January 2007 to address Sunni issues with both Ninewa and Tal'Afar's District governments. He emphasized that the Sunni Council is not linked to the Muslim Scholar's Association or the Sunni Endowment. The Council's current 20 members were selected from a group of about 150 tribal and civic leaders of Tal'Afar's Sunni Turcomans. Hasan underscored that the Council's formation was endorsed by Ninewa's Provincial Governor and Provincial Director of Police (PDOP). -------------- . . . BUT PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS NEEDED NOW -------------- ¶9. (C) Dr. Yashar then spoke at length to emphasize that 'the ITF may not be able to sustain further participation in the political process' if Sunni lack of political representation in Ninewa is not quickly addressed. Dr. Yashar estimates that when provincial elections are eventually held, the ITF will win 25 per cent of the seats in the Provincial Council since believes that Turcomans are the second largest ethnic group after Arabs in Ninewa -- eclipsing Kurds. Although the ITF and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran on a joint list together in the last national election, Dr. Yashar indicated that the ITF will run separately in the future. ¶10. (C) Adil identified Kurdish ambitions for Tal'Afar as the primary reason for Tal'Afar's continued insecurity, which he linked (without elaboration) to the situation in Kirkuk. Answering a Team Leader question about the origins of sectarian tension in Tal'Afar's Turcoman community, Adil insisted that 'Turcomans lived in peace until the Kurdish, Shi'a, and al-Qaeda agendas intersected'. Objecting to Kurdish 'imperialism', Adil rejected the Iraq Constitution's Article 140 process for KRG expansion and all regional divisions within Iraq. Dr. Yashar clarified that the ITF supports federalism, but not federalism based on religion or ethnicity. -------------- TAL'AFAR'S DEMOGRAPHICS -------------- ¶11. (C) Team Leader Knight noted the wide range of views concerning Tal'Afar's population and its composition, and asked for ITF's perspective. Adil detailed that 261,000 individuals are listed by the Public Distribution System (PDS) for the city of Tal'Afar, although many have been displaced. (Note: Most population estimates in Ninewa are based on PDS food entitlements, which allocate food to households based on the number of persons reported per household. End note.) Adil estimated Turcomans remaining in Tal'Afar at about 200,000. (Note: It is not clear how many of the missing 61,000 are Turcomans. End note.) ¶12. (C) Adil insisted that all residents of Tal'Afar are culturally Turcomans since they speak Turcoman and observe Turcoman customs, they are in fact Turcoman. Hasan later noted that he believes Tal'Afar is evenly split between Turcomans proper and ethnic Arabs. Tahir estimated that 75 per cent of Tal'Afar's population is Sunni, regardless of ethnicity. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) ITF's complaint that anti-insurgent operations BAGHDAD 00001283 003 OF 003 oppress all Tal'Afar's Sunni Turcomans rings true, particularly in view of the 24 March events and Shi'a dominance of the city's security forces. ITF representatives did not answer Team Leader queries how this might be mitigated, except to suggest that the Iraqi Army would be less repressive than the IP has been as Tal'Afar's primary security force. ¶14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The most efficient way to redress political imbalances in Ninewa arising from the Sunni boycott of the 2005 provincial elections would be to hold new ones as soon as possible. In Tal'Afar this issue is especiall urgent since Sunni Turcomans also believe Kurd territorial ambitions are the basic driver of insecurity in Tal'Afar as in Kirkuk. Early provincial elections will temper impact of the current Kurdish Alliance control of Ninewa's provincial government as the Article 140 process goes forward and give a legitimate political voice to Ninewa's Sunni majority -- including Tal'Afar's Sunni Turcomans. END COMMENT. CROCKER