AMBASSADOR URGES IRAQI LEADERS TO STEP UP AFTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR URGES IRAQI LEADERS TO STEP UP AFTER
PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH


Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: On the morning of January 11, the
Ambassador met seriatim with Iraq's parliament (Council of
Representatives - CoR) Speaker Mashadani (Sunni),and Vice
Presidents Hashemi (Sunni) and al-Mehdi (Shiite) to highlight
key aspects of President Bush's speech, urge public
statements in support for PM Maliki's Baghdad security plan,
and encourage them to move forward with key political
benchmarks. The Ambassador singled out the need for
legislation on hydrocarbons, provincial elections and
de-Ba'athification, the Constitution, and for a timeline for
action. The Ambassador noted that the U.S. will be taking
action to counter negative Iranian and Syrian influences.
End Summary.

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The Ambassador's Message
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2. (C) The Ambassador told Speaker Mashadani and VPs Hashemi
and al-Mehdi, all of whom had read the President's speech,
that Iraqi action is central to the success of the new Iraq
strategy. Iraq's leaders should not miscalculate: the U.S.
Congress and public will not understand the commitment of
American lives and resources if Iraqis do not act, and this
would lead to a very serious recalibration of U.S. policy.
He urged all three to rise above sectarian concerns and
exercise leadership.


3. (C) The Ambassador singled out legislation on
hydrocarbons, provincial elections, the Constitution, and
de-Ba'athification reform as priority items. The Ambassador
urged each to immediately publicly support principles
enunciated by PM Maliki for the new Baghdad security plan: no
distinction with regard to sect in operations; no sanctuary
anywhere in Baghdad for killers and other lawbreakers; no
political interference in security operations.


4. (C) The Ambassador also urged each to move to consolidate
moderate political forces in support of political and
security goals.

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Speaker Mashadani
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador urged Speaker Mashadani's to use his
broad powers in the CoR. Mashadani expressed concern that
the Baghdad security plan to would start in Sunni areas; the
Ambassador said it would be pushed in all areas. Mashadani
said he had publicly supported the new plan on January 10 in
the CoR; the Ambassador urged Mashadani to issue another
public statement to follow up on the President's speech,
which occurred in the early morning hours of January 11 in
Baghdad. Mashadani said that hopefully he would convoke a
press conference within the next day.


6. (C) Mashadani, with the President's speech playing on
Arabic-language television in his office, said "we have no
alternative" but to support the new strategy. He claimed
that he had been speaking with Syrian officials who assured
him that Syria would be supportive of the GOI. The
Ambassador said that the U.S. is looking for concrete actions
from Syria, and noted that Syria and the GOI had been unable
to conclude the security agreement Syria promised to make.


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the CoR was consistently
failing to reach quorum. Mashadani blamed the Shiite Sadrist
boycott, the Sunni Hewar bloc, the cross-sectarian secular
Iraqiyya bloc, and delays at checkpoints. (Note: Mashadani's
Tawafuq bloc also has a spotty attendance record. End Note.)


8. (C) Mashadani said that if moderate elements from the
PM's Shiite Dawa, SCIRI parties, the Iraqi Islamic Party and
Kurds united, he would form the rest of the parties into a
"loyal opposition." The Ambassador urged him instead to
gather CoR bloc leaders on the key legislative issues, and
come to a timeline for legislative action.

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VP Hashemi
--------------


9. (C) VP Hashemi promised he would urge Tawafuq bloc
legislators to attend the CoR and find out who had been
failing to attend. Hashemi was optimistic about the
prospects for agreement on a hydrocarbons law but doubted
that High National De-Ba'athification Commission chairman

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Chalabi was serious about reform; the Ambassador pointed out
that Sunni members of the Commission were failing even to
appear at hearings.


10. (C) Hashemi told the Ambassador the PM had not given him
a written copy of the new Baghdad security plan but had only
briefed it to him orally. Hashemi complained that the PM did
not consult with him or even with Shiite VP al-Mehdi on key
decisions. He said that if the PM has a problem with him, he
would be willing to work through an intermediary or even
resign to make room for someone with whom the PM could work.

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VP al-Mehdi
--------------


11. (C) VP al-Mehdi told the Ambassador that SCIRI bloc
leader al-Hakim had briefed Ayatollah Sistani. He urged that
the U.S. consider expanding the International Zone as a sign
of improved Baghdad security. However, al-Mehdi acknowledged
that it would take time to see results from the new security
plan.


12. (C) The Ambassador noted that PM Maliki had put al-Mehdi
in charge of the political aspects of the new plan. Al-Mehdi
complained that the PM had only told him "a few sentences"
about what his role is to be. The Ambassador suggested that
al-Mehdi meet with the PM to flesh out the details of his
role.
KHALILZAD