APRIL 8 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001253

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017
TAGS: IZ MOPS PTER PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: APRIL 8 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

REF: BAGHDAD 1160

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: During the April 8 meeting of the
Ministerial Council on National Security, ministers discussed
the following issues:

-- April 9 Security: A ban on cars will be instituted in
Baghdad on the 4th anniversary of the toppling of Saddam's
statue. The day will also be a holiday (except for
government workers).

-- Detainee holding time limits: Positive discussion about
the need for GoI and MNF-I discussion on what to do with
detainees held by CF after the statutory 36 month timeline
expires. GoI looking for a coordinated, legal authority to
deal with these detainees.

-- Diyala: Minister of Defense Abdul Qader said that the
Diyala Operations Command was still in the process of being
set up. He said that the 1920 Revolution Brigade had been
fighting Al Qaeda, leading to a discussion of how the split
between Sunni Arabs and Al Qaeda could be exploited. MNF-I
Commanding General Petraeus cautioned that Al Qaeda was not
the only threat in Diyala, adding that the province also
needed food, fuel, and pesticides.

-- MEK: Ministers were united on the need to take action to
resolve the issue of the MEK, blaming them for supplying
weapons to terrorists and undermining the security of Iraq.
Petraeus agreed that a solution needed to be found, promising
to work with Ambassador Crocker and Washington on the issue.
The Ambassador asked if there was anyway to increase security
around the MEK, perhaps by breaking the group and separating
the members into different camps. Barham Saleh stated that
the "minimally acceptable" solution is joint CF-Iraqi
security control of the camp.

-- Kirkuk: Noting recent terrorist attacks in Kirkuk, Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Salih said that the situation in the
city deserved watching. Petraeus said that Al Qaeda was
trying to sow ethnic conflict in Kirkuk and suggested
consideration by ISF and CF of the feasibility of turning the
city into a "gated" community. Salih liked the idea and
asked that officials be brought down from Kirkuk to discuss
it.

-- Basra: Ministers rejected a request from the Basra
Emergency Security Committee to have two Border Enforcement
"Commando" units transferred from the MOI to the control of
the Security Committee. Petraeus suggested having the local
Iraqi and Coalition commanders brought to Baghdad to discuss
alternatives.

-- Crisis Cell Membership: The Iraqi National Intelligence
Service pressed for inclusion on the Crisis Cell. National
Security Advisor Rubaie pushed back, arguing that
intelligence personnel were not appropriate for the
high-level cell.
-- April 1 Follow Up: Rubaie said committees were meeting to
discuss two of the issues raised at the previous week's MCNS:
detainees and security at the Council of Representatives.
END SUMMARY

Security on April 9 Anniversary
--------------


2. (S) At the April 8 meeting of the Ministerial Committee
for National Security (MCNS),Deputy Prime Minister Barham
Salih (who chaired the meeting in the Prime Minister's
absence) said that security for the April 9 anniversary of
the toppling of Saddam's statue needed to be discussed.
National Security Advisor Rubaie noted that competing
demonstrations were planned -- some celebratory, others
calling for the end of the "occupation." Given the
significance of the day and the large numbers of people
likely to be on the streets, Salih warned that terrorists
might try to take advantage of the situation. The Iraqi
National Intelligence Service (INIS) agreed, reporting that
the INIS had intelligence indicating that Al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) would try to smuggle Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices into Najaf and Diywaniyah. Over FM Zebari's
objection that it would create the impression of a government
afraid, the MCNS agreed to a car ban in Baghdad for the day.
A similar ban for Najaf was discussed, but it was revealed
that -- except for government vehicles -- a ban was already

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in place. After some initial confusion, the MCNS agreed that
a decision had also already been taken to make April 9 a
holiday, except for government workers. LTG Aboud left the
meeting at the direction of the DPM to announce the curfew to
the media and Baghdad Operations Center.

Diyala Update
--------------


3. (S) Minister of Defense Abdul Qader said that although a
site for the new Diyala Operations Command Center had been
found, the Center was still being put together. He said that
drawing upon the recent experience in Baghdad, the Command
Center would include MoD, MoI, and MNF-I personnel, as well
as local police. Qader said that terrorist groups in the
area were trying to control the main roads, setting up fake
checkpoints and conducting kidnappings. At the same time, he
said overall terrorist activities in the area were down by 33
percent.


4. (S) Qader reported that there had been clashes between
AQI and the insurgent 1920 Revolution Brigade, forcing AQI's
retreat. Qader said that an investment needed to be made to
further drive a wedge between these two groups. Rubaie
agreed, noting a larger trend for Iraqi Sunni Arabs to reject
AQI. He called for a committee consisting of the security
inistries and MNF-I to look into the issue of how best to
exploit this trend, adding that it should include a media
plan emphasizing to the public that AQI was the enemy. FM
Zebari -- speaking as a former insurgent -- said that
intelligence would be a major factor in being able to exploit
this wedge.


5. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus said that he
thought violence in Diyala could be brought under control,
but that it would take time. He said it was important to
remember that the AQI/1920 Revolution Brigade conflict was
only one element to the violence in Diyala, arguing that
inter-tribal fighting, some Peshmerga activity, and rogue
Shia militias also collided in the province. He said that
while it was good that the 1920 Revolution Brigade was
willing to fight AQI, it should do so only within Iraqi
uniforms -- not as civilians. Petraeus pointed out that the
Coalition was engaging the tribes, citing as an example the
town of Buhriz where three of the four tribes had agreed to a
ceasefire. He stressed that the province needed fuel, food,
and pesticide, adding that the Minister of Agriculture had
told the Provincial Governor that Diyala's pesticide
allotment had been stolen.

Mujahedin e-Khalq
--------------


6. (S) During the discussion on Diyala, Qader said that the
Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) terrorist organization was providing
weapons to the terrorists in the province. Minister of State
for National Security Waeli agreed, adding that the MEK's
activity was dispersed throughout the provinces and that they
had access to large weapons caches. He said that the MEK was
conducting a media campaign in the country and was calling
Iraqi officials repeatedly. He noted that a government
decision had already been made giving the MEK six months to
leave the country, but that that deadline had passed and
nothing had happened, which he said damaged the government's
credibility. Minister of Interior Bolani noted that some MEK
members were wanted on criminal charges and should be forced
to face the Iraqi legal and justice systems. Barham Salih
referred to the MEK as a "recurring problem," stressing the
importance of needing to find a solution to the issue. He
noted that Iran had said that, with the exception of a
handful of the leaders, MEK members could return to Iran
without fear of reprisals, adding that there was precedent
for this. Zebari said that the Foreign Ministry had held
discussions with a number of countries to determine whether
they would be willing to take the MEK, adding that Australia
and New Zealand had expressed a willingness to do so. (NOTE:
It is our understanding that no country has thus far been
willing to accept the MEK, or even the 178 MEK defectors who
qualify for refugee status. END NOTE) Zebari also said that
he would engage the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to find a solution. Barham Salih said that the GOI
should meet with the Coalition to discuss proposals on how to
move forward. Abdul Qader and Minister of Justice Safa
al-Safi said that -- at a minimum -- Iraqi and MNF-I forces
should jointly search and guard the MEK.


7. (S) Petraeus agreed that the MEK were detrimental to

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security in Iraq, although he admitted that direct evidence
of their activities was sparse. He said that he had asked
the Ambassador's help in working with Washington to develop a
clearer U.S. policy on the MEK. The Ambassador asked whether
anything could be done to improve security at the camp,
suggesting that perhaps the MEK could be broken up and moved
to separate facilities. DPM Barham Saleh stated that the
minimally acceptable solution would be a joint CF-Iraqi
security force controlling the MeK compound. MoI Bulani
added that if the MeK are breaking the law then they should
be investigated.

Kirkuk
--------------


8. (S) Noting recent terrorist attacks in Kirkuk, Barham
Salih argued that the ministers should pay attention to the
political and security situation in the city. Petraeus
agreed, adding that it was clear AQI was trying to ignite
ethnic violence in Kirkuk. He suggested that perhaps Kirkuk
could be made into a gated-city -- one giant Green Zone.
Salih liked the idea, tasking Rubaie with inviting the
governor and senior security officials to Baghdad to discuss
the idea.

Basra
--------------


9. (S) Minister of Justice al-Safi argued in favor of a
request from the Basra Security Emergency Committee to have
two Department of Border Enforcement "Commando" units
transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Basra
Governorate Police Directorate under the command of the
security committee. He said that this would allow them to be
used for security operations in the city. Minister Bolani
strongly opposed this suggestion, noting that border forces
were not properly trained for internal security missions. He
also criticized the operation of the security committee,
suggesting that it should be replaced with a joint command
similar to the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC). Deputy
National Security Advisor Safa'a said the Basra proposal
would create command and control/chain of command problems,
as well as federalism problems. He said that on a reserve
basis border troops might sometimes be used for internal
security, but only with the minister's approval. Petraeus
also spoke against the proposal, arguing that it could create
conflict between the police chief and the security committee.
He suggested that the Coalition and Iraqi commanders be
brought to Baghdad for discussions on an appropriate way
forward, and Minister Bolani agreed to study the issue.
Ministers decided against the Basra Emergency Security
Committee's proposal.

INIS and the Crisis Cell
--------------


10. (S) MG Naveed of the INIS complained that there was no
intelligence representation on the Crisis Cell. Rubaie
pushed back, noting that there were four intelligence
officers assigned to the Baghdad Operation Command. (NOTE:
Baghdad Commander Aboud later clarified that there were only
three assigned to the BOC. END NOTE) Rubaie went on to argue
that intelligence officials would be inappropriate as
standing members of the high-level, policy-making Crisis
Cell. He said that even LTG Aboud was only invited when
Baghdad security operations were on the agenda. Rubaie said
that the ESC was not the place for detailed military updates
but rather for the service and supporting committees to give
their updates. CG concurred and asked for detailed updates
from the ministers at these meetings, focusing on specific
shortcomings/needs and describing the solutions to be
pursued. He said he would provide DPM Salih lists of, e.g.,
deficiencies in the operatins of banks, food warehouses, fuel
distribution, medical facilities, and trash collection.

Following Up on the April 1 Meeting
--------------


11. (S) Rubaie noted that committees were meeting to work
through issues raised at the previous week's MCNS meeting
(reftel),including security for the Council of
Representatives and the future of detainees. The
Intelligence Coordination Cell, for example, had met with
MNF-I lawyers.
CROCKER