APRIL 8 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001253 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017 TAGS: IZ MOPS PTER PREL PGOV SUBJECT: APRIL 8 MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REF: BAGHDAD 1160 Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During the April 8 meeting of the Ministerial Council on National Security, ministers discussed the following issues: -- April 9 Security: A ban on cars will be instituted in Baghdad on the 4th anniversary of the toppling of Saddam's statue. The day will also be a holiday (except for government workers). -- Detainee holding time limits: Positive discussion about the need for GoI and MNF-I discussion on what to do with detainees held by CF after the statutory 36 month timeline expires. GoI looking for a coordinated, legal authority to deal with these detainees. -- Diyala: Minister of Defense Abdul Qader said that the Diyala Operations Command was still in the process of being set up. He said that the 1920 Revolution Brigade had been fighting Al Qaeda, leading to a discussion of how the split between Sunni Arabs and Al Qaeda could be exploited. MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus cautioned that Al Qaeda was not the only threat in Diyala, adding that the province also needed food, fuel, and pesticides. -- MEK: Ministers were united on the need to take action to resolve the issue of the MEK, blaming them for supplying weapons to terrorists and undermining the security of Iraq. Petraeus agreed that a solution needed to be found, promising to work with Ambassador Crocker and Washington on the issue. The Ambassador asked if there was anyway to increase security around the MEK, perhaps by breaking the group and separating the members into different camps. Barham Saleh stated that the "minimally acceptable" solution is joint CF-Iraqi security control of the camp. -- Kirkuk: Noting recent terrorist attacks in Kirkuk, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih said that the situation in the city deserved watching. Petraeus said that Al Qaeda was trying to sow ethnic conflict in Kirkuk and suggested consideration by ISF and CF of the feasibility of turning the city into a "gated" community. Salih liked the idea and asked that officials be brought down from Kirkuk to discuss it. -- Basra: Ministers rejected a request from the Basra Emergency Security Committee to have two Border Enforcement "Commando" units transferred from the MOI to the control of the Security Committee. Petraeus suggested having the local Iraqi and Coalition commanders brought to Baghdad to discuss alternatives. -- Crisis Cell Membership: The Iraqi National Intelligence Service pressed for inclusion on the Crisis Cell. National Security Advisor Rubaie pushed back, arguing that intelligence personnel were not appropriate for the high-level cell. -- April 1 Follow Up: Rubaie said committees were meeting to discuss two of the issues raised at the previous week's MCNS: detainees and security at the Council of Representatives. END SUMMARY Security on April 9 Anniversary -------------- ¶2. (S) At the April 8 meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS),Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (who chaired the meeting in the Prime Minister's absence) said that security for the April 9 anniversary of the toppling of Saddam's statue needed to be discussed. National Security Advisor Rubaie noted that competing demonstrations were planned -- some celebratory, others calling for the end of the "occupation." Given the significance of the day and the large numbers of people likely to be on the streets, Salih warned that terrorists might try to take advantage of the situation. The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) agreed, reporting that the INIS had intelligence indicating that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) would try to smuggle Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices into Najaf and Diywaniyah. Over FM Zebari's objection that it would create the impression of a government afraid, the MCNS agreed to a car ban in Baghdad for the day. A similar ban for Najaf was discussed, but it was revealed that -- except for government vehicles -- a ban was already BAGHDAD 00001253 002 OF 003 in place. After some initial confusion, the MCNS agreed that a decision had also already been taken to make April 9 a holiday, except for government workers. LTG Aboud left the meeting at the direction of the DPM to announce the curfew to the media and Baghdad Operations Center. Diyala Update -------------- ¶3. (S) Minister of Defense Abdul Qader said that although a site for the new Diyala Operations Command Center had been found, the Center was still being put together. He said that drawing upon the recent experience in Baghdad, the Command Center would include MoD, MoI, and MNF-I personnel, as well as local police. Qader said that terrorist groups in the area were trying to control the main roads, setting up fake checkpoints and conducting kidnappings. At the same time, he said overall terrorist activities in the area were down by 33 percent. ¶4. (S) Qader reported that there had been clashes between AQI and the insurgent 1920 Revolution Brigade, forcing AQI's retreat. Qader said that an investment needed to be made to further drive a wedge between these two groups. Rubaie agreed, noting a larger trend for Iraqi Sunni Arabs to reject AQI. He called for a committee consisting of the security inistries and MNF-I to look into the issue of how best to exploit this trend, adding that it should include a media plan emphasizing to the public that AQI was the enemy. FM Zebari -- speaking as a former insurgent -- said that intelligence would be a major factor in being able to exploit this wedge. ¶5. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus said that he thought violence in Diyala could be brought under control, but that it would take time. He said it was important to remember that the AQI/1920 Revolution Brigade conflict was only one element to the violence in Diyala, arguing that inter-tribal fighting, some Peshmerga activity, and rogue Shia militias also collided in the province. He said that while it was good that the 1920 Revolution Brigade was willing to fight AQI, it should do so only within Iraqi uniforms -- not as civilians. Petraeus pointed out that the Coalition was engaging the tribes, citing as an example the town of Buhriz where three of the four tribes had agreed to a ceasefire. He stressed that the province needed fuel, food, and pesticide, adding that the Minister of Agriculture had told the Provincial Governor that Diyala's pesticide allotment had been stolen. Mujahedin e-Khalq -------------- ¶6. (S) During the discussion on Diyala, Qader said that the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) terrorist organization was providing weapons to the terrorists in the province. Minister of State for National Security Waeli agreed, adding that the MEK's activity was dispersed throughout the provinces and that they had access to large weapons caches. He said that the MEK was conducting a media campaign in the country and was calling Iraqi officials repeatedly. He noted that a government decision had already been made giving the MEK six months to leave the country, but that that deadline had passed and nothing had happened, which he said damaged the government's credibility. Minister of Interior Bolani noted that some MEK members were wanted on criminal charges and should be forced to face the Iraqi legal and justice systems. Barham Salih referred to the MEK as a "recurring problem," stressing the importance of needing to find a solution to the issue. He noted that Iran had said that, with the exception of a handful of the leaders, MEK members could return to Iran without fear of reprisals, adding that there was precedent for this. Zebari said that the Foreign Ministry had held discussions with a number of countries to determine whether they would be willing to take the MEK, adding that Australia and New Zealand had expressed a willingness to do so. (NOTE: It is our understanding that no country has thus far been willing to accept the MEK, or even the 178 MEK defectors who qualify for refugee status. END NOTE) Zebari also said that he would engage the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to find a solution. Barham Salih said that the GOI should meet with the Coalition to discuss proposals on how to move forward. Abdul Qader and Minister of Justice Safa al-Safi said that -- at a minimum -- Iraqi and MNF-I forces should jointly search and guard the MEK. ¶7. (S) Petraeus agreed that the MEK were detrimental to BAGHDAD 00001253 003 OF 003 security in Iraq, although he admitted that direct evidence of their activities was sparse. He said that he had asked the Ambassador's help in working with Washington to develop a clearer U.S. policy on the MEK. The Ambassador asked whether anything could be done to improve security at the camp, suggesting that perhaps the MEK could be broken up and moved to separate facilities. DPM Barham Saleh stated that the minimally acceptable solution would be a joint CF-Iraqi security force controlling the MeK compound. MoI Bulani added that if the MeK are breaking the law then they should be investigated. Kirkuk -------------- ¶8. (S) Noting recent terrorist attacks in Kirkuk, Barham Salih argued that the ministers should pay attention to the political and security situation in the city. Petraeus agreed, adding that it was clear AQI was trying to ignite ethnic violence in Kirkuk. He suggested that perhaps Kirkuk could be made into a gated-city -- one giant Green Zone. Salih liked the idea, tasking Rubaie with inviting the governor and senior security officials to Baghdad to discuss the idea. Basra -------------- ¶9. (S) Minister of Justice al-Safi argued in favor of a request from the Basra Security Emergency Committee to have two Department of Border Enforcement "Commando" units transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Basra Governorate Police Directorate under the command of the security committee. He said that this would allow them to be used for security operations in the city. Minister Bolani strongly opposed this suggestion, noting that border forces were not properly trained for internal security missions. He also criticized the operation of the security committee, suggesting that it should be replaced with a joint command similar to the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC). Deputy National Security Advisor Safa'a said the Basra proposal would create command and control/chain of command problems, as well as federalism problems. He said that on a reserve basis border troops might sometimes be used for internal security, but only with the minister's approval. Petraeus also spoke against the proposal, arguing that it could create conflict between the police chief and the security committee. He suggested that the Coalition and Iraqi commanders be brought to Baghdad for discussions on an appropriate way forward, and Minister Bolani agreed to study the issue. Ministers decided against the Basra Emergency Security Committee's proposal. INIS and the Crisis Cell -------------- ¶10. (S) MG Naveed of the INIS complained that there was no intelligence representation on the Crisis Cell. Rubaie pushed back, noting that there were four intelligence officers assigned to the Baghdad Operation Command. (NOTE: Baghdad Commander Aboud later clarified that there were only three assigned to the BOC. END NOTE) Rubaie went on to argue that intelligence officials would be inappropriate as standing members of the high-level, policy-making Crisis Cell. He said that even LTG Aboud was only invited when Baghdad security operations were on the agenda. Rubaie said that the ESC was not the place for detailed military updates but rather for the service and supporting committees to give their updates. CG concurred and asked for detailed updates from the ministers at these meetings, focusing on specific shortcomings/needs and describing the solutions to be pursued. He said he would provide DPM Salih lists of, e.g., deficiencies in the operatins of banks, food warehouses, fuel distribution, medical facilities, and trash collection. Following Up on the April 1 Meeting -------------- ¶11. (S) Rubaie noted that committees were meeting to work through issues raised at the previous week's MCNS meeting (reftel),including security for the Council of Representatives and the future of detainees. The Intelligence Coordination Cell, for example, had met with MNF-I lawyers. CROCKER