KARKH COMMAND: OPERATIONS IMPROVING, DETENTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001245 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS: PINR PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IZ SUBJECT: KARKH COMMAND: OPERATIONS IMPROVING, DETENTION POPULATION SURGING Classified By: A/POL-MIL COUNSELOR APAR SIDHU FOR REASONS 1.4 (A/B/D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Karkh Area Command (KAC) is one of the Baghdad Operational Command,s two subordinate commands and is responsible for Fardh al Qanoon operations in west Baghdad. It houses Iraqi army and national police, as well as Coalition forces. Unfortunately, EmbOffs found little coordinated activity between these forces during an April 5 visit. Iraqi forces were watching cartoons, playing video games, and surfing the internet. U.S. forces spent most of their time in a closed-off room working on classified computers. According to multiple sources, tension exists between the police and army personnel located at the facility, including between the national police commander and his army deputy. Command and control needs to be improved, with Iraqi personnel taking and receiving orders by telephones and disregarding agreed chains of command. While some in the Iraqi Security Forces view the growing detainee population at the associated detention facility as a sign of their success, at least one investigative judge told us that it instead reflects a troubling and unsustainable situation where people are rounded up either in an undifferentiated manner without proper evidence against them or because of their sectarian affiliation. (NOTE: From February 1 to April 1, the detainee population had grown from about 250 to just below 800). END SUMMARY. Karkh Area Command Facility -------------- ¶2. (C) The Karkh Area Command (KAC) serves as one of the Baghdad Operational Command,s (BOC) two subordinate commands. (Note: The other subordinate command is in Rusafa.) The KAC is staffed by Iraqi army, Iraqi national police and U.S. forces. Four subordinate security posts in west Baghdad -- including Kadamiyah, Mansour, West Rashid, and East Rashid -- report to the KAC. The KAC is co-located with the 2nd Division National Police Headquarters. Little Coordinated Activity on Visiting Day -------------- ¶3. (C) During an April 5 visit, Emboffs noted a significant lack of coordinated activity within the KAC. The most impressive aspect of the one-room facility was the state-of-the-art equipment, including: flat screen televisions, computers, and large wall-size maps of the area. Unfortunately, there was no indication that this equipment was being put to good use by the Iraqi forces at the facility. The one television that was on was being used to watch cartoons, while the Iraqi Army personnel used the computers to play video games and surf the internet. The national police did not even bother sitting at their computers, preferring instead to sit at a table and chat while drinking chai (tea). The seven U.S. soldiers were working on their classified computers, but doing so required them to spend significant amounts of time in a closed-off room separated from the Iraqi forces. ¶4. (C) According to one U.S. soldier, cooperation and coordination between the Iraqi police and army -- especially at the higher ranks -- was strained. He said that the KAC Commander, 2nd division national police Major General Abas Aziz Maskour, and the KAC deputy commander, Iraqi army Major General Abdul Al-Amir Rashid Yaralah, did not get along and that the U.S. forces spend a significant amount of time acting as the go-between for the two men. A local Iraqi translator said the tension between the two forces stems--at least partially -- from the disparity in pay between the national police and army, with the military receiving the higher salary. He also said that the national police objects to the army,s superior airs and condescending attitude. Improving Command and Control is a Priority -------------- ¶5. (C) According to both Iraqi and U.S. sources at BAGHDAD 00001245 002 OF 002 the facility, command and control between the Baghdad Operation Center (BOC),the KAC, and the four area security posts needs to be improved. For example, a U.S. soldier said the Iraqi forces continued to give and take directions by their personal cell phones. Moreover, the BOC commander would often bypass the KAC, directly tasking a brigade commander on the ground. At other times, ground commanders have directed one of his units to carry out an operation without informing the BOC or anyone else, leaving the embedded U.S. unit uninformed until minutes before the operation. Surging Detention: A Sign of Operational Success? -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) According to two Iraqi army members of the KAC, Fardh al Qanoon was having a positive impact on the security situation in their area of operations. They were particularly pleased with the increased number of successful joint operations, especially in the volatile Ghazaliyah neighborhood. One Iraqi soldier pointed to the surging detainee population in the KAC,s adjacent detention facility as evidence of this achievement. (NOTE: From February 1 to April 1, the detainee population had grown from about 250 to just below 800.) Or Sign of Problems? -------------- ¶7. (C) Not everyone we spoke with believed that the detainee surge was a sign of progress. The local investigative judge told Pol-MilOff that the growth in detainees is troubling and unsustainable. He attributed the trend to a combination of factors, including: unjust ethno-sectarian captures of Sunni by Shia; poor targeting by the Iraqi forces; broad house and neighborhood sweeps; and poor investigative skills. He said that many of the case files he reviews require further investigation because they are so hastily put together. He complained that Iraqi forces tended to engage in large, un-targeted detention sweeps, building case files only after the fact. He said the KAC and other commands, as well as the ministries, should being do more to address these deficiencies. (NOTE: Additional information about the detainee situation at the KAC is to be reported in septel). CROCKER CROCKER