CG'S APRIL 5 MEETING WITH THE PM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001236

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS: IZ MOPS PTER PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CG'S APRIL 5 MEETING WITH THE PM


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Margaret Scobey. Reasons
: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: On April 5, MNF-I Commanding General
Petraeus and DCM Speckhard met with PM Maliki and discussed
the following issues:

-- Engagement: Maliki discussed his meeting with the
commander of an insurgent group which now wanted to join the
fight against Al Qaeda;

-- Detentions: Maliki said that rising tensions, including
complaints from Grand Ayatollah Sistani, justified a slow
down in detention operations, particularly against Shia
militia such as the Sadrists. He also asked that the case
files of a number of long-term detainees be reviewed to
determine whether they could be released;

-- Qais Khazali: Maliki asked for information about how
recently Khazali had been engaged in violent activities,
noting that he had believed Khazali a moderate he could use
to split the Sadrist movement;

-- Possible Political Crisis: Maliki said that Tawafuq was
discussing withdrawing from the government. The withdrawal
might coincide with the Neighbors Conference. He discounted
the possibility that this would lead to the collapse of the
government, but did express concerns about how the press
would react. He speculated that former interim PM Ayad
Allawi might support the Tawafuq withdrawal, arguing that it
was obvious that he was trying to create problems for the
government;

-- Neighbors Conference: Maliki said that he had agreed to a
ministerial-level meeting in Egypt. When the DCM asked
whether Secretary Rice should send an envoy to the region
now, he said that he would think about the issue and get back
to us with an answer (Note: PM COS later called DCM to
confirm that the PM was comfortable with an U.S. envoy
traveling to key capitals in advance of the conference. End
note.);

-- BIAP/CAB Compromise: Maliki agreed that his Chief of
Staff, Tariq Abdullah, would accompany a Coalition team to
the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) to work out final
details about the use of the airport by the incoming
Coalition Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). At the same time,
he made clear that the deployment needed to be done in such a
fashion that those using the commercial, civilian terminal
would not think they had entered an armed, U.S. military
base;

-- Diwaniyah: Maliki rejected Petraeus' suggestion that he
call the Diwaniyah governor to seek his support for the
upcoming operation, adding that if the governor opposed the
operation he would be replaced by a state of emergency.
Maliki said he wanted Iraqi Special Operations Forces to
target three to six key individuals in Diwaniyah after the
8th Iraqi Army Division had surrounded the city;

-- Site 4: Petraeus pressed Maliki to take action against MG
Mehdi. Maliki promised to review the evidence against Mehdi;

-- Al Qaim Border Point: Maliki agreed to travel to Al Qaim
in early May to reopen the border point there, if he could be
convinced that sufficient forces existed to protect the
border; and

-- Delivery of U.S. weapons: Petraeus reported that 2,400
U.S. M-4 carbines had arrived in Iraq and said that 2,500
M-16s would arrive in two weeks. Maliki pressed him to
accelerate other weapons shipments, as well. END SUMMARY

Maliki On Engagement and Reconciliation
--------------


2. (S) PM Maliki said that he had recently met with an
insurgent commander with ties to Al Qaeda. He said that the
commander -- who admitted his group had been involved in the
torture and killing of 55 Shias -- had come to see Al Qaeda
as the primary threat to Iraq, although he still wanted to
fight the Coalition. Maliki said that he had told him that
since the Coalition was in the country at the invitation of
the GOI it would be a betrayal and a violation of religion to
continue to fight against it. Maliki said that he went on to
tell the commander that if he would stop fighting Iraqis and
the Coalition, and would fight Al Qaeda instead, he would

BAGHDAD 00001236 002 OF 004


support him. Maliki said that the commander was now asking
for equipment he could use in the fight against Al Qaeda.
Maliki said that he was going to forgive him for killing the
55 Shia (admitting that if this came out his own life might
be at risk),adding that perhaps other insurgent groups could
be turned by the example. (Note: The commander came alone to
Maliki, escorted by a GOI officer. Maliki said he told him
that he need not worry about being harmed or followed because
"in our tradition" if you come alone, you can leave alone.)


3. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus agreed that other
groups might followed, but cautioned that it was important to
think through how groups such as this could be used. As an
example, Petraeus said that the tribes in Anbar were working
with the police and army, resulting in some degree of civil
control over them. Petraeus warned against the dangers of
creating a "tribal police." Maliki agreed, adding that he
had told Minister of Interior Bolani to redistribute the
police in Anbar so that each tribe would not have its own
police force.

Detention Concerns; Slow Down Requested
--------------


4. (S) Noting that military operations needed to be
conducted with the political environment in mind, Maliki said
that the number of detentions and deaths was creating a tough
situation for the government. He said that tensions were
escalating and that -- if something was not done to alleviate
them -- they might lead to an explosion. He said that Grand
Ayatollah Sistani had called him to complain about the
situation. Maliki said that he thought a slow down,
particularly against Shia targets such as the Sadrists, was
necessary. He was quick to add that there were still several
Shia targets he wanted to move against. He asked Petraeus to
meet with the Sadrists, arguing that they were weakened and
"had gotten the message." In addition, he asked Petraeus if
he would review the case files of some detainees who had been
held a long time to determine whether they could be released.
Maliki predicted that if efforts at reconciliation bear
fruit, the GOI would engage in a "big time" amnesty program.


5. (S) Agreeing to review some of the case files, Petraeus
said that he wanted to help Maliki navigate Iraq's political
waters. At the same time, however, he pointed out that the
Coalition was taking relatively little action against Shia
militias when compared to the number of operations it was
carrying out against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

Qais Khazali
--------------


6. (S) Noting that he had believed Qais Khazali a moderate
he could use in his political strategy to split the Sadrist
movement, Maliki asked Petraeus about the dates of the most
recent operations that Khazali could be linked to. He said
he wanted to determine whether Khazali had continued engaging
in violent activities even after Maliki had begun engaging
him. Petraeus showed Maliki some information relating to the
case that indicated Khazali had probably at least been
involved in the planning of violent activities as recently as
late February or early March 2007. Petraeus said the
Coalition wanted to reinforce Maliki's efforts to engage true
moderates among the Sadrists.


Political Crisis Looming?
--------------


7. (S) PM Maliki said that Tawafuq had missed the April 4
Policy Council for National Security (PCNS) because the party
had been meeting to discuss whether it should withdraw from
the government. He said that the withdrawal might be timed
to coincide with the ministerial-level Neighbors Conference
meeting (see below). Noting that some members of Tawafuq had
obviously come to him about this discussion, Maliki said he
was not worried about the government falling. He said he was
concerned, however, about the impact any such attempt would
have on how the government is viewed in the world's press --
particularly if it happens when the world is watching the
Neighbors Conference.


8. (S) Maliki said that former interim PM Ayad Allawi might
support Tawafuq's withdrawal. He argued that Allawi was
"obviously" trying to create problems for the government,
citing as evidence Allawi's call for the constitution to be
canceled. He said that he thought Allawi was trying to take

BAGHDAD 00001236 003 OF 004


advantage of the charged political climate in Washington
(which he said was damaging to Iraq). He added that Allawi
might have some support within the Shia coalition,
particularly from the Al-Fadhila Party.

Neighbors Conference
--------------


9. (S) Maliki said that he had agreed to hold the
ministerial-level Neighbors Conference in Egypt. Noting that
Secretary Rice was prepared to send an envoy to the region to

SIPDIS
obtain the guarantees sought by the PM, the DCM asked Maliki
if the envoy could be sent right away. Maliki said that he
would think about the issue and get back to the DCM with an
answer. Maliki used the discussion of the Neighbors
Conference to stress the need for improved U.S. relations
with Iran and Syria.

BIAP/CAB Compromise on the Horizon
--------------


10. (S) MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus said that Tariq
Abdullah, Maliki's Chief of Staff, had been very helpful in
working out a compromise on the use of the Baghdad
International Airport (BIAP) by the incoming U.S. Combat
Aviation Brigade (CAB). Maliki said that Abdullah would
accompany a Coalition team to BIAP to work out final details.
Maliki stressed, however, that he wanted the CAB to be as
invisible as possible to the airport's civilian traffic. He
noted the recent Saudi statement against the continuing
"foreign occupation" of Iraq, arguing that the statement had
been aimed at him as much as at the Coalition. He said that
as a result he did not want those using the civilian airport
to feel that it had been occupied by the U.S. military. In
addition, Maliki said he was concerned that military
operations might interfere or cause delays with civilian
traffic. He also expressed concerns that companies providing
needed services at the airport might not want to operate
there, fearing that the military presence would make the
airport a more attractive target.


11. (S) While on the subject of the airport, Maliki asked
Petraeus if he could take actions to improve its commercial
viability. Noting that the cork-screw landing approach
required scared off commercial traffic, Maliki asked whether
the Coalition could improve security around the airport
sufficiently to allow for a more normal approach. He also
asked about flight routings that cause flights to be much
longer than should reasonably be expected. The DCM and
Petraeus said that many of these issues were properly
civilian aviation issues, but undertook to look into the
issue of air space control.

Diwaniyah
--------------


12. (S) Noting that operations in Diwaniyah might start
later that night, Petraeus suggested that Maliki might want
to call the governor to inform him and ask him for his
support. Maliki was not inclined to do so, arguing that if
the governor -- who he described as "very weak" -- did not
support the plan he would remove him and institute a state of
emergency.


13. (S) Maliki cited one of his commanders, General Othman,
as stating that he thought the situation in Diwaniyah could
be significantly changed for the better with the capture of
only three to six key individuals. As a result, the PM said
he wanted the Iraqi 8th Army Division to surround the town
and the Iraqi Special Operations Forces to launch targeted
raids against these individuals. The PM also said he paid
seven billion Iraqi dinars to the Facility Protection Service
in Diwaniyah in order to guarantee their loyalty.

CG Presses on Site 4
--------------


14. (S) Congratulating Maliki for the April 2 investigative
hearing into one of the Ministry of Interior officers accused
in the infamous Site 4 torture case, Petraeus asked Maliki
when he intended to go after MG Mehdi Sobiah. Maliki told
Petraeus that Minister of Interior Bolani had told him on the
phone that Mehdi had been investigated and cleared. Petraeus
and the DCM told Maliki that this was not the case, adding
that Mehdi had ordered and participated in the torture. When
Maliki offered to bring him the file on the case, Maliki
promised to review it.

BAGHDAD 00001236 004 OF 004



Al Qaim Border Point
--------------


15. (S) Petraeus asked Maliki if he would be interested in
traveling in early May to Al Qaim to reopen the border there,
pointing out that the trip would be great outreach to the
Sunnis in Anbar. Maliki said he would go, but would need to
be convinced that sufficient forces were located in the area
before he would agree to reopen the border.

U.S. Weapons for Iraq
--------------


16. (S) Petraeus reported 2,400 U.S. M-4 carbines had
arrived and were being delivered to Iraqi Security Forces,
adding that 2,500 M-16 assault rifles and ammunition would
arrive in approximately two weeks time. When Maliki asked
him to look into accelerating further deliveries of
Iraqi-ordered U.S. weapons and equipment, Petraeus promised
that American factories were building the weapons as fast as
they could.
CROCKER