AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON SCIRI CHAIRMAN ABDUL AZIZ AL HAKIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001231

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2027
TAGS: PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON SCIRI CHAIRMAN
ABDUL AZIZ AL HAKIM

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Ambassador called on SCIRI chair Abdul
Aziz Al Hakim April 5 at SCIRI headquarters. After an
introductory discussion comparing the Sufism in Iraq and
Pakistan, Hakim provided an overview of Iraq's situation.
He expressed enormous pride in the achievement of the Iraqi
people and argued for finding better ways to harness the
popular base to achieve security and progress. He cited a
legislative agenda to realize the federal nature of the new
Iraq; he decried the failure of the elements of the
National Unity Government to support the agreed upon
government plan. He complained of problems with Iraq's
neighbors, focusing on fatwas allowing the killing of Shia
issued by members of the Saudi Ulema Council. He expressed
concern that upcoming conferences not be used as platforms
for interfering in Iraqi affairs. He complained that not
enough effort was being brought against takfiris who
threaten Shia security. He concluded by reminding the
Ambassador of his concern about CF arrests of his
"citizens." End Summary

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Introductory Call
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2. (C) SCIRI Chairman Abdul Aziz Al Hakim warmly welcomed
the Ambassador's return to Iraq after nearly three and a
half years. He was joined by senior Badr and SCIRI
officials and staff. Hakim shared the Ambassador's
commitment to engage in frank, candid strategic dialogue
and felt such talks could set a foundation for the future.
The Ambassador and Hakim spoke for awhile about Pakistan,
where Hakim revealed his family had ties going back 60-70
years, including during the time of his father. His
martyred brother had spent a year in a Pakistani seminary,
although ties had lapsed for some time. He hoped to accept
invitations to visit. The Ambassador drew a comparison
between the religious balance in Pakistan and Iraq, noting
that more Shia lived in Pakistan than Iraq. Hakim observed
that Pakistan also shared a similar threat from terrorism,
even though its numerous sects had co-existed peacefully
for many years. He recalled that Saddam elementshad even
sent an
envoy to Pakistan's sufi leadership. The Ambassador cited
the Bahawalpur region (in Pakistan) where extremist groups
such
as Jamaat-e-Islami and Taliban have moved into a heavily Sufi
area known for the tombs of Sufi saints at Uch Sharif.
Hakim said it reminded him of Khadimiya, a neighborhood of
Baghdad, known for its popular celebrations for the
Prophet's Birthday. Baghdadis of all religious affiliation
used to attend the street fairs to enjoy the events. Now,
for the first time, Khadimiya had canceled the celebrations
due to intimidation from takfiris who have labeled the
events as unIslamic. He insisted that Iraq's Sunni
scholars had to meet in Jordan out of fear--not of the
Shia, but of the takfiris.

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Hakim's Overview
--------------

3. (C) The Ambassador sought Al Hakim's assessment of
prospects for Iraq's future and its political and security
situation. Al Hakim said Iraq has just come through a
"great transformation" -- a development almost beyond
description. Genuine authority had passed to the Iraqi
people through elections. Wealth would benefit the
people. No precedent for this existed in the region. Iraq
generated a budget of $40 billion, even though almost all
productive activity was frozen. Eight to ten million visits
were made to the Imam Hussein mosque during recent Ashura
celebrations. He insisted that Iraq's transformation
rested on a broad base of popular support: 90% of all
Iraqis supported the new Iraq, including most Sunnis. Al
Hakim believed Iraq could advance quickly if it could
figure out how to rely on this base and to establish "real
forces capable of defending and supporting the new
regime." Although overall the public lacked faith in the
police, there were areas, such as Najaf, where the police
were capable and enjoyed public confidence. He also
believed that popular committees should be organized so
that people could defend themselves. He described at
length how the citizens of Karbala and the south had
organized effective, voluntary security for the Ashura
celebrations, protecting the processions to Karbala all the
way from Basrah. He insisted that Iraq needed to find a
suitable formula to use the people.

4. (C) Moving on to other issues, he touched on the need
to move forward on a number of issues that could contribute

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to reconciliation. He urged rapid progress to "establish
federalism" by enacting a group of laws, including the law
on provincial powers. He decried the failure of the
"national unity government" to live up to its collective
agreement to fulfill a 33 point national agenda. Everyone
signed, but little had been done. Perhaps it was time to
reexamine the agenda.

5. (C) Al Hakim had harsh words for many of Iraq's
neighbors. He said they did not respect Iraq's government
nor its people. More talks and pressure were needed as
some neighbors wanted to control or to divide Iraq. He
called the Ambassador's attention to a fatwa allowing the
killing of Shia he alleged had been signed by 30 Saudi
scholars associated with the Kingdom's Ulema Council. Al
Hakim laughed when he quoted the official Saudi response
that the government could not intervene since it was a
"free country." The Ambassador pointed to the upcoming
Expanded Neighbors Conference as an opportunity to improve
Iraqi neighbors cooperation with the Iraqi government. He
promised that the U.S. would contact them all before the
conference to work for a positive outcome. He suggested
that Al Hakim certainly had more access to the Iranians
than we did, and he did not know who actually had any
influence over the Syrians. Al Hakim said he would be
hopeful about the results but admitted to fears that others
would use the conference to raise inappropriate issues.
The participants had to accept the Iraqi political process
could not be overturned. He pointed to Amre Moussa's
"strange statements" as well as Saudi King Abdullah's claim
that the coalition presence was an illegal occupation. How
could it be illegal when it was at the Iraqi government's
request? Al Hakim said that the PCNS had encouraged the
Prime Minister to make regional trips before the
conference.

6. (C) Al Hakim said he had recently had "frank talks"
with Shaykh Khalifa in Bahrain and Shaykh Mohammad bin
Rashid in Dubai, asking them to focus relations in a
positive way. No government in the region rests on such a
broad, popular base as the Iraqi government, he repeated.

7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Hakim
acknowledged that the situation with the Sunni coalition,
Tawafuq, was not good. He was disturbed by their
withdrawal from the PCNS and insisted that SCIRI wanted
them to continue in the government so that Iraq could move
forward. Regarding the Baghdad Security Plan, Al Hakim
focused on the lack of progress against Al Qaeda,
complaining that not enough was being done to confront
them. Although sectarian violence was down, he urged that
more be done to confront the terrorists in the "hot areas"
in Karkh. The Ambassador described his recent visit to the
Doura market. Al Hakim was pleased to hear that a degree
of normalcy had returned but wondered how long the expanded
forces could stay in the streets of Baghdad and what would
happen when they had to withdraw. He returned again to his
theme of employed the people themselves in organized
self-defense units tied to the police stations. He
described a couple of recent popular events in Iraq, in
mixed Sunni and Shia neighborhoods with no problems, just
like in the old days in Baghdad. They concluded
discussions with a hope that the good days return to the
city.

8. (C) Before his departure, Al Hakim did make a point of
reminding the Ambassador of his ongoing concern for CF
arrests of his people and repeated his commitment to take
care of matters if the problems and the evidence were
presented to him.
CROCKER