AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON SCIRI CHAIRMAN ABDUL AZIZ AL HAKIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001231



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2027

TAGS: PREL, IZ

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON SCIRI CHAIRMAN

ABDUL AZIZ AL HAKIM



Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Ambassador called on SCIRI chair Abdul

Aziz Al Hakim April 5 at SCIRI headquarters. After an

introductory discussion comparing the Sufism in Iraq and

Pakistan, Hakim provided an overview of Iraq's situation.

He expressed enormous pride in the achievement of the Iraqi

people and argued for finding better ways to harness the

popular base to achieve security and progress. He cited a

legislative agenda to realize the federal nature of the new

Iraq; he decried the failure of the elements of the

National Unity Government to support the agreed upon

government plan. He complained of problems with Iraq's

neighbors, focusing on fatwas allowing the killing of Shia

issued by members of the Saudi Ulema Council. He expressed

concern that upcoming conferences not be used as platforms

for interfering in Iraqi affairs. He complained that not

enough effort was being brought against takfiris who

threaten Shia security. He concluded by reminding the

Ambassador of his concern about CF arrests of his

"citizens." End Summary



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Introductory Call

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2. (C) SCIRI Chairman Abdul Aziz Al Hakim warmly welcomed

the Ambassador's return to Iraq after nearly three and a

half years. He was joined by senior Badr and SCIRI

officials and staff. Hakim shared the Ambassador's

commitment to engage in frank, candid strategic dialogue

and felt such talks could set a foundation for the future.

The Ambassador and Hakim spoke for awhile about Pakistan,

where Hakim revealed his family had ties going back 60-70

years, including during the time of his father. His

martyred brother had spent a year in a Pakistani seminary,

although ties had lapsed for some time. He hoped to accept

invitations to visit. The Ambassador drew a comparison

between the religious balance in Pakistan and Iraq, noting

that more Shia lived in Pakistan than Iraq. Hakim observed

that Pakistan also shared a similar threat from terrorism,

even though its numerous sects had co-existed peacefully <br />
for many years. He recalled that Saddam elementshad even

sent an

envoy to Pakistan's sufi leadership. The Ambassador cited

the Bahawalpur region (in Pakistan) where extremist groups

such

as Jamaat-e-Islami and Taliban have moved into a heavily Sufi

area known for the tombs of Sufi saints at Uch Sharif.

Hakim said it reminded him of Khadimiya, a neighborhood of

Baghdad, known for its popular celebrations for the

Prophet's Birthday. Baghdadis of all religious affiliation

used to attend the street fairs to enjoy the events. Now,

for the first time, Khadimiya had canceled the celebrations

due to intimidation from takfiris who have labeled the

events as unIslamic. He insisted that Iraq's Sunni

scholars had to meet in Jordan out of fear--not of the

Shia, but of the takfiris.



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Hakim's Overview

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3. (C) The Ambassador sought Al Hakim's assessment of

prospects for Iraq's future and its POLITICAL and security

situation. Al Hakim said Iraq has just come through a

"great transformation" -- a development almost beyond

description. Genuine authority had passed to the Iraqi

people through elections. Wealth would benefit the

people. No precedent for this existed in the region. Iraq

generated a budget of $40 billion, even though almost all

productive activity was frozen. Eight to ten million visits

were made to the Imam Hussein mosque during recent Ashura

celebrations. He insisted that Iraq's transformation

rested on a broad base of popular support: 90% of all

Iraqis supported the new Iraq, including most Sunnis. Al

Hakim believed Iraq could advance quickly if it could

figure out how to rely on this base and to establish "real

forces capable of defending and supporting the new

regime." Although overall the public lacked faith in the

police, there were areas, such as Najaf, where the police

were capable and enjoyed public confidence. He also

believed that popular committees should be organized so

that people could defend themselves. He described at

length how the citizens of Karbala and the south had

organized effective, voluntary security for the Ashura

celebrations, protecting the processions to Karbala all the

way from Basrah. He insisted that Iraq needed to find a

suitable formula to use the people.



4. (C) Moving on to other issues, he touched on the need

to move forward on a number of issues that could contribute



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to reconciliation. He urged rapid progress to "establish

federalism" by enacting a group of laws, including the law

on provincial powers. He decried the failure of the

"national unity government" to live up to its collective

agreement to fulfill a 33 point national agenda. Everyone

signed, but little had been done. Perhaps it was time to

reexamine the agenda.



5. (C) Al Hakim had harsh words for many of Iraq's

neighbors. He said they did not respect Iraq's government

nor its people. More talks and pressure were needed as

some neighbors wanted to control or to divide Iraq. He

called the Ambassador's attention to a fatwa allowing the

killing of Shia he alleged had been signed by 30 Saudi

scholars associated with the Kingdom's Ulema Council. Al

Hakim laughed when he quoted the official Saudi response

that the government could not intervene since it was a

"free country." The Ambassador pointed to the upcoming

Expanded Neighbors Conference as an opportunity to improve

Iraqi neighbors cooperation with the Iraqi government. He

promised that the U.S. would contact them all before the

conference to work for a positive outcome. He suggested

that Al Hakim certainly had more access to the Iranians

than we did, and he did not know who actually had any

influence over the Syrians. Al Hakim said he would be

hopeful about the results but admitted to fears that others

would use the conference to raise inappropriate issues.

The participants had to accept the Iraqi POLITICAL process

could not be overturned. He pointed to Amre Moussa's

"strange statements" as well as Saudi King Abdullah's claim

that the coalition presence was an illegal occupation. How

could it be illegal when it was at the Iraqi government's

request? Al Hakim said that the PCNS had encouraged the

Prime Minister to make regional trips before the

conference.



6. (C) Al Hakim said he had recently had "frank talks"

with Shaykh Khalifa in Bahrain and Shaykh Mohammad bin

Rashid in Dubai, asking them to focus RELATIONS in a

positive way. No government in the region rests on such a

broad, popular base as the Iraqi government, he repeated.



7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Hakim

acknowledged that the situation with the Sunni coalition,

Tawafuq, was not good. He was disturbed by their

withdrawal from the PCNS and insisted that SCIRI wanted

them to continue in the government so that Iraq could move

forward. Regarding the Baghdad Security Plan, Al Hakim

focused on the lack of progress against Al Qaeda,

complaining that not enough was being done to confront

them. Although sectarian violence was down, he urged that

more be done to confront the terrorists in the "hot areas"

in Karkh. The Ambassador described his recent visit to the

Doura market. Al Hakim was pleased to hear that a degree

of normalcy had returned but wondered how long the expanded

forces could stay in the streets of Baghdad and what would

happen when they had to withdraw. He returned again to his

theme of employed the people themselves in organized

self-defense units tied to the police stations. He

described a couple of recent popular events in Iraq, in

mixed Sunni and Shia neighborhoods with no problems, just

like in the old days in Baghdad. They concluded

discussions with a hope that the good days return to the

city.



8. (C) Before his departure, Al Hakim did make a point of

reminding the Ambassador of his ongoing concern for CF

arrests of his people and repeated his commitment to take

care of matters if the problems and the evidence were

presented to him.

CROCKER