POLITICAL STATE OF PLAY IN MUTHANNA PROVINCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001228

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS IZ
SUBJECT: POLITICAL STATE OF PLAY IN MUTHANNA PROVINCE

Classified By: Acting PRT Muthanna Team Leader Wade Weems for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna cable, drafted to discuss the
political
state of play in Muthanna province by asking how provincial
elections
might play out if they occurred today.

--------------
Summary
--------------


2. (C) Muthanna politics (and politicians) are opportunistic
and
personal rather than ideological: individuals will affiliate
with
whoever controls the resources or the access they need at a
particular
point in time. For this reason, we judge that the most
likely outcome
of elections, should they be held today, would be election of
the same
core cast of characters, re-affiliated with whichever parties
look
likely to succeed in the elections. Muthanna residents'
dissatisfaction with service provision might hurt Governor
Hassani and
his clique, however. While we would expect the Sadrists to
gain a few
seats on the council at the expense of the peripheral and
technocratic
members of the current Provincial Council (PC),popular
resentment at
recent JAM-instigated violence makes it unlikely that the
Sadrists
would see major gains. End summary.

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Current Make-Up of the PC
--------------


3. (SBU) The current PC is relatively diverse, including
members of
national and local lists who come from a variety of tribal,
religious,
and technocratic backgrounds. From the national parties,
SCIRI-
affiliated politicians hold 7 seats (plus the governorship);
Fadhila 6;
Da'wa 4; the Iraqi National Accord (INA) 3; and the Iraqi
Communist
Party (ICP) 2. Local parties include the Middle Euphrates
Gathering (a
loose group of tribal representatives) 6 seats; the
Independent Islamic
Organization (individuals who claim to have Grand Ayatollah
Sistani's
backing) 5 seats; the Assembly for Muthanna (an ad hoc
creation of arch
politician Mohamed al-Zayadi for his allies) 4 seats; and
al-Wal'wa (a
shell party of convenience for several individuals) 3 seats.

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Possible Election Scenarios
--------------


4. (C) Provincial elections held today could result in three
different
scenarios in Muthanna:

-- SCIRI/Badr, Da'wa, and Fadhila maintain sizeable blocks in
the
Provincial Council based on their patronage machines and
their capacity
to manipulate the voting process, while the Sadrists enter
the Council
for the first time and unseat some of the more independent
and less
powerful members of the smaller, provincial-based parties;

-- Tribal and independent candidates with local appeal, along
with
those who can run on an opposition ticket (Fadhila, the
Middle
Euphrates Party, the INA, the ICP) win a significant number
of seats by
capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction with Governor Hassani
and his
clique's inability to deal with the militia problem, and on a
backlash
against the Sadrists and JAM for plunging the province into

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repeated
paroxysm of violence; or,

-- The same core cast of characters in power now play musical
chairs
and re-affiliate with whichever parties look likely to
succeed in the
elections, while the Sadrists gain a small bloc in the
council at the
expense of technocratic and peripheral current PC members.


5. (SEC//REL USA, MNFI) We judge the latter scenario to be
the most
likely outcome. Muthanna politics (and politicians) are
opportunistic
and personal rather than ideological. Individuals will
affiliate with
whoever controls the resources or the access they need at a
particular
moment. Only a handful of politicians are so branded with a
particular
party that they would be unable to re-affiliate with another:
Governor
Mohamed Ali al-Hassani (SCIRI/Badr),Qassim Hassan Auda
(SCIRI/Badr),
Hadi Jassim Hamza (ICP),and the principal OMS/JAM leaders -
Sheikh
Shamari, Sheikh Zagani, Sheikh Hassani, Dr. Hamid Rasheed,
Dr. Rasheed
Alawi Sha'ie, Imad Raheem, and Ahmed Abdul Kadhum. All the
rest,
nearly the entire current Provincial Council, are party
members only
insofar as its serves their interests. Their interactions
are based on
personal relationships, town or village origins, and tribal
ties.
Party labels in Muthanna, therefore, are nearly irrelevant
every day of
the year save for election day.

-------------- --------------
Dissatisfaction with Services and Political Parties...
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Elections held today would turn on several key
factors. First,
Muthanna residents are dissatisfied with the government's
provision of
basic services and its inability to dramatically increase the
standards
of their daily lives. This dissatisfaction would redound
principally
on Governor Hassani, but also to a lesser extent on those
among the
clique that wields the levers of power within the provincial
council.
(Note: This clique does not act as one unit, but rather is
fluid, with
coalitions drawn from the same key pool of PC members
according to the
matter at stake. The breadth of parties nominally
represented in this
clique illustrates the point that politics are personal
rather than
ideological in Muthanna. End Note.) This clique includes
Mohammed al-
Zayadi (Assembly for Muthanna),Riyadh Majeed Abdul Amir
(INA),
Muhammad Arboud (Assembly for Muthanna),Ahmed Marzook Salal
(Da'wa),
Qassim Hassan Auda (Badr),Hadi Jabr Shirreab (Fadhila and
then SCIRI),
Jassim Shiraad (ICP),Fadhil Muhalhil (SCIRI),Farris Hassan
Abed
(Middle Euphrates Party),Abdul Hussein Mohamed al-Dhalimi
(SCIRI),
Qassim Jabr Abdul Husayn (Middle Euphrates Party),Muhammad
Hassouni
Jodan (Da'wa),and Sheikh Abdullah Shanoon Dadhil
(al-Wal'wa).


7. (SBU) Second, Muthanna residents have expressed
disillusionment
with the Shi'i political parties on the national level, as
well as
provincially. This could translate into more support for
independent,
secular, and tribal candidates, but the party list electoral
system
tends to stifle such promising realignments.

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...But Patronage Counts
--------------


8. (SEC//REL USA, MNFI) Third, however, the powerful
members of the
Provincial Council in the clique mentioned above, have begun
to prepare
for upcoming provincial elections by side-lining capable and
technocratic members of the PC from key committees involved
in
budgeting, contracting, service provision, and economic
reconstruction.
They have installed their own allies in positions that allow
them to
distribute the greatest degree of patronage through contract
awards,
kickbacks, jobs, and the distribution of services in order to
buy the
votes they will need for re-election.

--------------
Impact of Recent Violence
--------------


9. (C) Fourth, and most important, the series of recent
security
crises in Muthanna involving clashes between the ISF, JAM,
and the
tribes will have a profound effect on provincial politics and
elections. (Note: These incidents include two extended
clashes
between ISF and JAM in late November 2006 and
December-January 2006-7,
and subsequent JAM assassinations of provincial politicians
in February
and March 2007. End Note.) On the one hand, the people are
upset that
the provincial government has not dealt with the militia
problem. On
the other hand, JAM has badly miscalculated in many of its
escalatory
actions, drawing the ire not only of the populace in Samawa,
Khidr, and
Rumaytha, but also antagonizing the tribes. Barring major
blunders
from the government forces, or involvement from Coalition
Forces that
would allow JAM to repaint the recent violence as "defense
against the
occupiers," JAM will suffer a major backlash from its recent
violence.
The tribes are the only political force to emerge buoyed by
these
recent incidents, which have proved once again their clout
and their
function as guarantors of security. It is unlikely that they
will be
able to translate popular support into electoral victories,
however,
because of their reluctance to participate directly and
officially in
politics, and their chronic inability, even when they decide
to do so,
to form a unified tribal slate of candidates.


10. (C) Muthanna citizens would be motivated to go to the
polls.
Providing security for them on election-day might be an
issue, as it is
likely that SCIRI's well-practiced techniques of voter
control and
manipulation would lead to clashes between it and the
Sadrists. But
with the backing of the police and the Iraqi Army, and
careful advance
planning, such concerns could be dealt with straightforwardly.
CROCKER