BAGHDAD'S SADRISTS TOE MOQTADA'S LINE -- NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001168 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017 TAGS: IZ PGOV PINR PINS SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S SADRISTS TOE MOQTADA'S LINE -- NO TALKING TO US FORCES Classified By: Classified by PRT Team Leader Joseph Gregoire for reason s 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: In the wake of the attempted assassination about three weeks ago of Raheem al-Duraji ) a district administrator or qa'im makam of Sadr City (often referred to as its mayor) ) Sadr City local councils (LC) have been withholding their collaboration in the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). The LC are engaging in an anti-US boycott and a moderate bloc of the Sadr City District Council (DC) has fled to Kurdistan. The PRT's search for a credible alternative partner in Sadr City to support the BSP has been unsuccessful so far. All indications are that Sadr City,s leadership is toeing the line of non-collaboration dictated by Moqtada al-Sadr (MAS). The non-Sadrists are steering clear of Sadr City politics, possibly to remain off of Jaysh al-Madhi,s (JAM) hit-list, possibly to complicate USG efforts according to their own agendas. Despite these set-backs our search for Sadr City cooperation continues. Baghdad municipality Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub has offered to meet privately with PRT and MND-B to discuss Sadr City project-related issues. End summary. -------------- PRT TRIES TO REACH OUT TO SADRISTS -------------- ¶3. (C) In a phone call on April 1, Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) member Riyad Abdullah (Da'wa) reported to us the results of his 'asking around' at the PC if he could help find someone worth engaging on Sadr City issues. Riyad said he had spoken to a member of the PC's Sadrist camp and was told that the word around the council is that anyone who steps up to cooperate with the Coalition at this time will be a target, 'just like al-Duraji'. Riyad offered his opinion that these threats are credible and that the Sadrists are gearing up for more anti-coalition activity, such as the planned protests in Najaf and Sadr City announced by MAS a week ago. ¶4. (C) Baghdad Governor Hussein al-Tahan (Badr) has not been helpful in providing leadership on Sadr City issues recently. He told us last week he would do a joint visit of the Sadr City Joint Security Station (JSS) with MND-B/PRT, but it would have to wait until he returned from a trip to London the week of April 8. His reaction to al-Duraji's shooting was one of unconcern; one might say even mild amusement. Al-Tahan sees no reason to officially replace al-Duraji at this time despite al-Duraji's withdrawal from the scene. ¶5. (C) Al-Tahan,s deputy, Deputy Governor Qassim N'ima (Fadhila),told PRToff that members of the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) do not intend to step forward at this time. They see collaboration outside of official duties as a reason to be targeted. ¶6. (C) Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Mueen al-Khademi(SCIRI) has not stepped forward to encourage the Sadr City local councils to reengage the Coalition following the declaration that they had shut their doors to protest MNF-I presence. Other PC members shrug at the mention of the anti-US boycott in Sadr City, noting that the councils are functioning and the members are being paid as usual. ¶7. (C) Engagements with Sadr City DC Chairman Abd al-Hassan al-Kaby have proven equally unfruitful for MND-B units operating in Sadr City. Reportedly a high-ranking JAM member, al-Kaby has not engaged in productive dialogue on critical security or infrastructure issues. It seems he has also made a declaration that nobody else on his council will do so either. -------------- A FEW STRAY SADRISTS MAY BE WILLING TO TALK -------------- ¶8. (C) One leader who has offered to meet privately with PRT and MND-B officials to discuss project-related issues for Sadr City is Baghdad Municipality Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub al-Kaby (Fadhila). Naeem has extensive connections with the OMS and Sadr City administrators. He can be taken at his word that he will facilitate ongoing projects that are tied in to the Amanat (City Hall). However, originally invited by PRT to visit the JSS station in Sadr City as a public show of support for the BSP, Naeem demurred, explaining that he cannot be seen publicly making that kind of visit. ¶9. (C) The Sadr City 'seculars' (the 19 DC members who fled to Kurdistan last week) have called PRT members and talked about possibly returning home to Sadr City. However, their BAGHDAD 00001168 002 OF 002 re-involvement in politics at this time looks to remain unlikely. -------------- -------------- COMMENT: A POSITION OF JAM STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS? -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Baghdad's Sadrists have uniformly taken a step back in recent days from any overt engagement with MNF-I. This raises a number of questions. Does Moqtada Al-Sadr retain the complete obedience of all his sympathizers or is a local faction within Sadr City forcing his hand and leading the push against BSP efforts that MAS must rhetorically support to maintain the appearance that he is in control of his movement? Local Sadrists seem to be hedging their bets. If MAS remains in control of the situation, then only a change of heart will modify it. But if his hand is being forced, this could suggest that the Coalition operations in Sadr City are disrupting JAM activity, causing local elements to go on the offensive. MAS may also be 'calling home' the upper echelon of the JAM leadership who slipped over into Iran in recent months and succeeding in an attempt to re-establish his authority. ¶12. (C) Comment, continued. The bottom line: The stand-off in Sadr City over cooperating in the BSP indicates that MAS is either weak or strong. If weak, political carrots may entice more accommodating behavior. If strong, we seem to be left with the stick. End comment. CROCKER