BAGHDAD'S SADRISTS TOE MOQTADA'S LINE -- NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PINR PINS
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S SADRISTS TOE MOQTADA'S LINE -- NO
TALKING TO US FORCES

Classified By: Classified by PRT Team Leader Joseph Gregoire for reason
s 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable.


2. (C) Summary: In the wake of the attempted assassination
about three weeks ago of Raheem al-Duraji ) a district
administrator or qa'im makam of Sadr City (often referred to
as its mayor) ) Sadr City local councils (LC) have been
withholding their collaboration in the Baghdad Security Plan
(BSP). The LC are engaging in an anti-US boycott and a
moderate bloc of the Sadr City District Council (DC) has fled
to Kurdistan. The PRT's search for a credible alternative
partner in Sadr City to support the BSP has been unsuccessful
so far. All indications are that Sadr City,s leadership is
toeing the line of non-collaboration dictated by Moqtada
al-Sadr (MAS). The non-Sadrists are steering clear of Sadr
City politics, possibly to remain off of Jaysh al-Madhi,s
(JAM) hit-list, possibly to complicate USG efforts according
to their own agendas. Despite these set-backs our search for
Sadr City cooperation continues. Baghdad municipality Deputy
Mayor Naeem Aboub has offered to meet privately with PRT and
MND-B to discuss Sadr City project-related issues. End
summary.

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PRT TRIES TO REACH OUT TO SADRISTS
--------------


3. (C) In a phone call on April 1, Baghdad Provincial Council
(PC) member Riyad Abdullah (Da'wa) reported to us the results
of his 'asking around' at the PC if he could help find
someone worth engaging on Sadr City issues. Riyad said he
had spoken to a member of the PC's Sadrist camp and was told
that the word around the council is that anyone who steps up
to cooperate with the Coalition at this time will be a
target, 'just like al-Duraji'. Riyad offered his opinion
that these threats are credible and that the Sadrists are
gearing up for more anti-coalition activity, such as the
planned protests in Najaf and Sadr City announced by MAS a
week ago.


4. (C) Baghdad Governor Hussein al-Tahan (Badr) has not been
helpful in providing leadership on Sadr City issues recently.
He told us last week he would do a joint visit of the Sadr
City Joint Security Station (JSS) with MND-B/PRT, but it
would have to wait until he returned from a trip to London
the week of April 8. His reaction to al-Duraji's shooting
was one of unconcern; one might say even mild amusement.
Al-Tahan sees no reason to officially replace al-Duraji at
this time despite al-Duraji's withdrawal from the scene.


5. (C) Al-Tahan,s deputy, Deputy Governor Qassim N'ima
(Fadhila),told PRToff that members of the Office of the
Martyr Sadr (OMS) do not intend to step forward at this time.
They see collaboration outside of official duties as a
reason to be targeted.


6. (C) Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Mueen
al-Khademi(SCIRI) has not stepped forward to encourage the
Sadr City local councils to reengage the Coalition following
the declaration that they had shut their doors to protest
MNF-I presence. Other PC members shrug at the mention of the
anti-US boycott in Sadr City, noting that the councils are
functioning and the members are being paid as usual.


7. (C) Engagements with Sadr City DC Chairman Abd al-Hassan
al-Kaby have proven equally unfruitful for MND-B units
operating in Sadr City. Reportedly a high-ranking JAM member,
al-Kaby has not engaged in productive dialogue on critical
security or infrastructure issues. It seems he has also made
a declaration that nobody else on his council will do so
either.

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A FEW STRAY SADRISTS MAY BE WILLING TO TALK
--------------


8. (C) One leader who has offered to meet privately with PRT
and MND-B officials to discuss project-related issues for
Sadr City is Baghdad Municipality Deputy Mayor Naeem Aboub
al-Kaby (Fadhila). Naeem has extensive connections with the
OMS and Sadr City administrators. He can be taken at his
word that he will facilitate ongoing projects that are tied
in to the Amanat (City Hall). However, originally invited by
PRT to visit the JSS station in Sadr City as a public show of
support for the BSP, Naeem demurred, explaining that he
cannot be seen publicly making that kind of visit.


9. (C) The Sadr City 'seculars' (the 19 DC members who fled
to Kurdistan last week) have called PRT members and talked
about possibly returning home to Sadr City. However, their

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re-involvement in politics at this time looks to remain
unlikely.

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COMMENT: A POSITION OF JAM STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS?
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Baghdad's Sadrists have uniformly taken a step back
in recent days from any overt engagement with MNF-I. This
raises a number of questions. Does Moqtada Al-Sadr retain
the complete obedience of all his sympathizers or is a local
faction within Sadr City forcing his hand and leading the
push against BSP efforts that MAS must rhetorically support
to maintain the appearance that he is in control of his
movement? Local Sadrists seem to be hedging their bets. If
MAS remains in control of the situation, then only a change
of heart will modify it. But if his hand is being forced,
this could suggest that the Coalition operations in Sadr City
are disrupting JAM activity, causing local elements to go on
the offensive. MAS may also be 'calling home' the upper
echelon of the JAM leadership who slipped over into Iran in
recent months and succeeding in an attempt to re-establish
his authority.


12. (C) Comment, continued. The bottom line: The stand-off in
Sadr City over cooperating in the BSP indicates that MAS is
either weak or strong. If weak, political carrots may entice
more accommodating behavior. If strong, we seem to be left
with the stick. End comment.
CROCKER