WHAT BAGHDAD'S GOVERNOR THINKS OF RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: IZ PGOV PINR PINS
SUBJECT: WHAT BAGHDAD'S GOVERNOR THINKS OF RECONCILIATION


Classified By: Classified by PRT Team Leader Joseph Gregoire for reason
s 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT Reporting Cable.


2. (C) Summary: Governor of Baghdad Province Hussein al-Tahan
told PRTOff that he does not think any kind of outreach to
Sunni political parties is worthwhile. Although he said he
has met many of Baghdad's various political leaders, he
scoffs at the idea that negotiations at his level with
insurgents or their sympathizers will result in any
meaningful compromises that could reduce the level of
sectarian strife in Baghdad. Despite his rhetoric, al-Tahan
has issued directives to change the Sunni/Shia make-up of
several police stations - an act that could ostensibly bring
better sectarian balance to Baghdad's security forces. End
summary.


3. (C) Governor Hussein al-Tahan (Badr) again criticized the
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) during a PRToff visit to his
office on March 20. He reiterated his usual mantra that he
has been sidelined by the security officials responsible for
BSP, and that he is never informed of ongoing operations.
When asked whether his representative at the Baghdad
Operations Command (BOC) is receiving information, al-Tahan
replied there is little cooperation between the BOC and his
office and offered few ideas how it might be improved.


4. (C) Governor al-Tahan was critical of the current BSP
operations, which he suggested focus solely on the Shia areas
of Baghdad; in particular, Sadr City. He said there is a
widespread opinion among the Shia that their neighborhoods
are being targeted, while other, and to their minds, more
dangerous (i.e., Sunni) areas are being neglected. Al-Tahan
said this will 'awaken' the forces like Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
after their recent interlude of 'sleep'.


5. (C) Asked about current reconciliation efforts, al-Tahan
seemed bemused that someone in his position and with his
authority might reach out to rival political organizations in
an effort to dampen sectarian strife. He laughed about
members of the Council of Representatives making such efforts
and asserted that most of the leaders of the Sunni parties
are 'two-faced.' What they say in front of a TV camera is
entirely different, he suggested, than what they intend to
do.


6. (C) Later in the conversation, al-Tahan spoke about the
placement of police stations in various parts of Baghdad. He
disclosed that he had directed Iraqi Police stations in
Husseiniya, a largely Shia section, and in Rashidiya, a Sunni
enclave, to swap chiefs and to balance the Sunni/Shia mix of
officers between the two stations.


7. (C) Comment: Governor al-Tahan remains volatile,
capricious, and unrepentant about his pro-Shia agenda.
Occasionally, he surprises us with seemingly constructive
moves that just might bring stability to Baghdad and succor
to its inhabitants. End comment.
CROCKER