GOI PERSPECTIVES ON NEIGHBORS' CONFERENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001164

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: GOI PERSPECTIVES ON NEIGHBORS' CONFERENCE

Classified By: Deputy Chief Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Subsequent to his April 1 discussion with
the Foreign Minister (septel),the DCM engaged a number of
GoI officials on the neighbors' conference. Continued
skepticism of the potential gains of the conference, and
fears of outside intervention, leave many in the GoI lukewarm
about the event -- particularly if not hosted in Iraq or a
"neutral" location. Shia leaders in Najaf are not
necessarily against the conference, according to the PM's
Chief of Staff, but are not encouraged by it either. The DCM
stressed the opportunity for the GoI to seek increased
regional support by engaging diplomatically in the neighbors
plus event. End summary.


2. (C) On the afternoon of April 1, FM Zebari had reminded
the DCM that the PM's office harbored deep suspicion of the
intentions of Iraq's neighbors, dampening GoI enthusiasm for
a neighbors' conference that it could not fully control as
host. Zebari noted potential "Najaf" concerns in the
background of GoI thinking. The DCM spoke with PM Chief of
Staff Tariq Abdullah later on April 1 to seek clarification
of the current GoI position. Abdullah said he saw no strong
arguments against the conference, and suggested that Najaf
would have made its voice heard more clearly if it were
indeed against the idea; "we would have heard." He said
Najaf interlocutors had been briefed in advance of the March
10 neighbors' meeting in Baghdad and had raised no
objections. Sistani generally did not interfere in such
matters unless he saw an overarching concern critical to
Iraq's future, said Abdullah. (Sistani had not objected to
PM Maliki meeting POTUS in Jordan, for example, in spite of
much opposition within the Shia
community.) Abdullah said he was "pleasantly surprised"
that Sistani did not intervene more often, and was in fact
"very flexible and modern" in his approach. Sistani was not
happy with Iran's role in Iraq, he added, contrary to what
some might assume. Abdullah concluded that rumors of an
anti-conference bias in Najaf seem unfounded.


3. (C) Nonetheless, the PM is worried that Arab countries
are unsupportive of Iraq and are in fact undermining Maliki's
efforts. Abdullah said that Syria is negative, Saudi Arabia
supports militants, Egypt does "not make life easy," Iran
interferes, and Turkey and Jordan have their own agendas.
This, cumulatively, worries the PM about neighbors'
intentions. He said a delegation sent to Egypt to pave the
way for a potential Maliki visit got turned away at the
airport. Gulf states "open doors to armed militants," he
lamented, citing "confirmed reports" of UAE funding for
"militant groups in the south."


4. (C) The GoI continues to look for support from the Gulf
and will reciprocate in kind when support was offered,
according to Abdullah. The GoI felt it had actively courted
Saudi support in particular, yet remained convinced that
Riyadh was fearful of a democratic and open political system
on its border. Saudi Arabia may cite Iran as its primary
concern, he said, but the real fear of that authoritarian
society (where Abdullah lived for five years and recalls
being watched very closely) is the type of political system
Iraq is trying to achieve. The PM was therefore concerned
that any conference that he could not carefully control would
feed other countries' desires to "create a mandate over Iraq"
and undermine GoI legitimacy. Abdullah added that the
conference offered a chance for the U.S. to talk to Iran, but
felt bilateral discussions could be "more productive."


5. (C) The DCM also spoke briefly with other officials with
close ties to Najaf or the PM confidants, including Finance
Minister Bayan Jabr, CoR member Sami al-Askari, National
Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai, and Oil Minister Hussein
Shahristani, to encourage each to send the message that the
conference is an important opportunity for the GoI. Careful
preparation could nudge regional dynamics in the GoI's favor
and Iraq could seek greater support at the ministerial level;
a well-run conference could thereby reinforce the GoI
position rather than undermine it. The DCM noted that the
conference also offered the U.S. an opportunity to engage
with all the neighbors in a multilateral setting. The DCM's
interlocutors took these points on board and promised to
relay the message favorably.
CROCKER