POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF DHI QAR PROVINCE: PART III

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001115 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF DHI QAR PROVINCE: PART III ) OMS AND JAM REF: A) 06 BAGHDAD 4186 B) 06 BAGHDAD 4430 Classified By: Classified By: Dhi Qar PRT Deputy Team Leader Richard Ri ley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Dhi Qar cable, the third in a series detailing the political landscape of Dhi Qar Province. ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: The Office of the Martyr Al-Sadr (OMS) has a large following in Dhi Qar Province, but no representation on the Provincial Council (PC) or in the Governor's office (the OMS boycotted PC elections). Were a PC election held today with OMS participation, however, we believe the OMS would gain seats, although certainly not a majority in competition with three other strong parties -- SCIRI, Fadilah and Al-Dawa. The militia wing of the OMS, the Jayesh Al-Mahdi (JAM),has a strong presence in Dhi Qar and a demonstrated willingness to conduct anti-coalition attacks. Evidence gathered from coalition sources suggests that the city of Nassiriyah in Dhi Qar is being used as a weapons emporium for JAM elements in other provinces like Baghdad and Najaf. While direct evidence of Iranian support is difficult to establish, circumstantial evidence suggests the Government of Iran may have supplied JAM in Nassiriyah with 107 mm and 122 mm "Katyusha" rockets, IEDs, and possibly weapons training either in Iran or through Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although JAM and the Badr Corp are political (and at times military) rivals, the two organizations have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with each other on issues of mutual interest like targeting former Ba'athists for assassination or coordinating logistics for attacks on Coalition Forces (CF). Evidence suggests that in addition to the "official" JAM, up to 20% of affiliated militia members not under direct JAM control operate as loyal (?) rogue elements. End summary. -------------- REASONS FOR OMS/JAM SUPPORT -------------- ¶3. (S) The OMS base of support in Dhi Qar Province is largely among the uneducated poor, whether rural or urban. This is primarily due to the origins of the organization, which include Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr's demonstrated affinity for poor Shi'ites in the 1980's and 1990's and his son's (Moqtada Al-Sadr's) continuing organizational activities among the Shia poor. Dhi Qar's largely uneducated rural population continues to permit pervasive OMS/JAM influence. There is significant support for OMS/JAM in the cities of Nassiriyah and Suq Al-Shuyukh. Despite the following they enjoy in the province, the OMS and JAM are also resented by many due to activities which include ad hoc police patrols to check shopkeepers for pornography, schemes resembling protection rackets, and other destabilizing operations. (Comment: Iraqi Police and other government officials recently told CF representatives that they no longer permit JAM to man illegal checkpoints in the city of Nassiriyah. This year,s Ashura celebration in January and February was the first time in a few years that these checkpoints were absent and JAM members were not allowed to carry weapons in public. End comment.) Support for OMS/JAM is thus not universal and has limits among those who, while not secular, nevertheless eschew extremism and believe that the government and other institutions of Dhi Qar should focus on economic prosperity. They have endured Saddam Hussein and more than a decade of economic hardship and simply want to put militant activity behind them. ¶4. (C) OMS has some mosques in Dhi Qar under its control, but not nearly as many as the SCIRI and Fadilah parties. Many OMS members will go to mosques associated with Fadilah; there is significant communication between Fadilah and OMS. Despite the fact that Fadilah and SCIRI control more mosques, OMS is gaining popularity in Dhi Qar. We suspect part of the reason is that JAM is now helping Shi'ite refugees who have come to Dhi Qar fleeing the Sunni Insurgency in places like Baghdad and Baquba. Thus, significant support for OMS/JAM in some quarters due to financial benefits is countered by the dislike of many others who resent intrusive and destabilizing activities. -------------- OMS/JAM OPERATIONAL PROFILE -------------- ¶5. (S/REL: AUS, CAN, UK, US) Sheik Ahmed Al-Khafaji is the Division Commander and senior JAM leader residing in Dhi Qar. Another key commander is Sheik Aus Al-Khafaji, who was once a lieutenant of Moqtada al-Sadr and a recognized Imam within OMS/JAM but who fell out of favor for a short while in the summer of 2006. We now believe he is back in favor, generally operates out of Baghdad, and comes frequently to BAGHDAD 00001115 002 OF 003 Dhi Qar to buy weapons and initiate attacks against coalition forces using his offices as an Imam, and his prestige as a Sadrist preacher close Moqtada Al Sadr. Coalition military sources operating in Dhi Qar believe that Sheik Ahmed al-Khafaji appears to be the point of contact for JAM commanders in other provinces such as Baghdad, Najaf and Basrah, facilitating the sale of illegal weapons. The local JAM leadership in Nassiriyah then coordinates with contacts in Suq Al-Shuyukh for transfer of weapons to JAM buyers. ¶6. (S/NF) Coalition military sources in Dhi Qar, corroborated by PRT sources, believe there are approximately 5,000 JAM members in Dhi Qar, although the number fluctuates and not all aligned with JAM participate in militia activities. In addition to JAM's generally rural and uneducated demographic, the organization also enjoys the support of some Sheikhs (many rural and uneducated themselves),and counts as members some senior Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA) personnel. These more senior members of the IP and IA act as facilitators of JAM activities by providing intelligence and using their influence to facilitate the transfer of weapons (including rockets, IEDs and mortars) to and from the Nassiriyah area. (Comment: The city of Suq Al-Shuyukh, the second most populous city in Dhi Qar, appears to be used as a hub for Iraqi insurgents and terrorists for weapons from Iran. End Comment.) ¶7. (S/NF) Like the other political parties in Dhi Qar, OMS maintains its party headquarters in Nassiriyah and has offices on the district and sub-district level. We believe they use these offices to coordinate with JAM as well as for political activities. Recently, in addition to the OMS office and JAM headquarters in Nassiriyah, JAM opened a separate Operations Center in the city. Coalition sources has learned that JAM leadership and officers recently moved out of the OMS office in Nassiriyah into the JAM headquarters. (Comment: We believe this move was calculated to reinforce the illusion that OMS and JAM are separate entities, and to give the OMS better political cover, especially in light of expected provincial elections in the second half of 2007. End comment.) ¶8. (SBU) While OMS is technically out of political power in local Dhi Qar governance, making it difficult to win appointment to official jobs controlled by the Governor's Office and PC, many are appointed to federal jobs in Dhi Qar controlled by the Sadrist ministries in Baghdad; almost all such appointments are OMS related. JAM is also known to use strong arm tactics with local contractors to secure jobs for its members. JAM may then "guarantee" the security of a contracted project, and the behavior of the JAM employees, in essence running a mafia-like protection racket. ¶9. (S/NF) Coalition military sources operating in Dhi Qar report that an individual seeking a job with the Iraqi Police must bribe the hiring officer with three months' salary. The estimated starting monthly salary for an entry level police officer $350. Three months' salary reaches over $1,000 -- a significant sum in this poor province. Other reports indicate $300 as the "entry fee" to join the police. The bribe varies from province to province and depends on one's political affiliation. JAM will pay that bribe for its members, or for potential JAM recruits, in order to infiltrate the police and win new recruits. ¶10. (S/NF) JAM is active in the Province and engages in anti-coalition activities via Indirect Fire (IDF) Attacks against Camp Adder and Cedar II, two primary Coalition bases in Dhi Qar. In addition to IDF, there have been various Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP,s) emplaced and targeted against CF. Coalition military sources operating in Dhi Qar believe the JAM, and militias associated with OMS, are responsible for most of the direct and indirect fire attacks on CF in Dhi Qar. -------------- POSSIBLE IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR JAM IN DHI QAR -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Despite OMS/JAM,s professed rejection of Iranian influence inside Iraq, coalition sources believe, based on local sources, that many JAM units have been receiving support from Iran to carry out anti-CF attacks. The major hub of weapons trafficking in Dhi Qar -- Suq Al-Shuyukh -- is the traditional smuggling hub for almost any illegal item from Iran. Consistent reporting shows a pattern of Suq Al-Shuyukh being used as a depot for JAM rockets and IEDs, and Nassiriyah JAM acting as the weapons broker and point of contact for the JAM and other sympathetic militias in other provinces. Coalition military sources report weapons BAGHDAD 00001115 003 OF 003 smuggling from other points as well, such as Al-Amarah in Maysan province and Chubayish in southern Dhi Qar, all of which are on traditional smuggling routes from Iran. Coalition military sources have also learned that the average resale price on the "open market" in Dhi Qar for a 107 mm Katyusha rocket is around $200 and for a 122 mm Katyusha rocket is $500. We are not certain how these prices compare with the international weapons market, but suspect they are low, possibly indicating subsidization from their likely point of origin, i.e. Iran. As to direct cash support for JAM in Dhi Qar, the evidence is conflicting. We have several credible reports which indicate JAM was cash strapped in late 2006, which could refute assertions of direct funding from Iran. There is insufficient evidence to make a direct cash link to Iran. -------------- COOPERATION AMONG ERSTWHILE COMPETITORS -------------- 12 (S/REL) JAM and members of the Badr Militia will cooperate with each other when Coalition Forces are the target, and in targeting former Ba'athists for assassination. The extent of anti-CF cooperation seems to be in scenarios in which JAM does the targeting and Badr Militia members facilitate the transfer of weapons by allowing them to pass unimpeded through police checkpoints under their control. This is done largely out of fear of JAM reprisal. JAM, the Badr Militia, and other organizations have cooperated to target former Ba'athists as well. -------------- ROGUE ELEMENTS AND THE ATOMIZATION OF JAM -------------- ¶13. (S) Many militias which claim to be part of JAM in Dhi Qar do not fall under JAM command and control, yet these rogue elements carry out anti-CF attacks independently of direction from JAM commanders (reftels). In addition, the ranks of the JAM, much more so than other militias, contain individuals who are more criminal opportunist than idealist and who use the JAM structure to carry out kidnapping for profit and smuggling operations. In addition to these criminals, JAM's "rogue elements" also include ideologically motivated elements who will attack CF even without the approval of JAM Dhi Qar central command. ¶14. (S) In Dhi Qar, the OMS and JAM are separate operations. OMS is linked directly to Moqtada Al-Sadr as his political party, and JAM is a militia ostensibly under Sadr's control, but which in reality tends to act independently. We believe that JAM in Dhi Qar will take operational orders from senior JAM leadership in Baghdad, and sometimes Najaf, but the day to day operations, including orders to carry out anti-CF attacks in Dhi Qar, are issued at the provincial level. JAM and OMS are linked in the sense that they operationally support one another. 15 (S/NF) Many smaller militias in Dhi Qar associate themselves with JAM but are not under its command and control structure. Some estimates suggest that around 20% of the total JAM militia force in the province falls into this category (ref. A). We believe this ratio may increase as local commanders seek autonomy from centralized direction. ¶16. (C) Understanding the rationale behind OMS and JAM support in the province is critical in determining strategies to dilute their influence. Contact with Iraqis in regions under heavy OMS/JAM influence has demonstrated that contact with personnel from U.S. Army Civil Affairs, U.S. State Department and other U.S. federal agencies operating through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams has the potential to undermine support for OMS/JAM. The U.S. Army team and the Dhi Qar PRT on Camp Adder have been able to make inroads into areas previously thought to be "off limits" because of militia activity in Dhi Qar -- most notably the city of Suq Al-Shuyukh. A strong regimen of capacity building, economic and infrastructure development, along with a strong Public Diplomacy program, will go a long way towards furthering Coalition goals, and undermining support for OMS/JAM in the province. CROCKER