SCENESETTER FOR FM BAKOYANNIS' MARCH 22 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000520 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GR SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FM BAKOYANNIS' MARCH 22 VISIT TO WASHINGTON Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) FM Dora Bakoyannis arrives in Washington with one item at the top of her agenda: Greek participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Several months ago, she had hoped this could be a March "deliverable" for a visit by PM Karamanlis. We've lowered her expectations (and the Karamanlis visit is off). But with Greek elections coming up, Bakoyannis also wants the Karamanlis government to get electoral credit for VWP. So we predict she will lobby hard, at all levels. This gives us an opportunity to give her a realistic assessment of the difficulties and the timeframe -- something that is still lacking in Athens. ¶2. (C) We have worked well with the ND government, and with Bakoyannis on a number of issues, though there are many areas (like Afghanistan) where we would like to see them do more. But because it's an election year, the political knives are out -- including for Bakoyannis. While Bakoyannis has avoided being burned by some of Greece's "third rail" foreign policy issues, she has recently come under fire for her handling of Greece-Turkey issues. And over the past several weeks, she has also been accused of being too "pro-American," with the precipitating event a press statement criticizing Russian MD threats against Poland and the Czech Republic. All this makes her trip to Washington an even more delicate balancing act than usual. Bakoyannis will want to be seen as defending and promoting Greek interests successfully, and, when she returns, will be sensitive to criticism that she is toeing Washington's policy line. DORA, POLITICIAN, AT THE HELM ¶3. (C) In her first year as Foreign Minister, Bakoyannis has positioned herself as a loyal member of PM Karamanlis' governing team. With a political savvy inherited from her father, former PM Mitsotakis Bakoyannis knows that her stint as foreign minister can be either a blessing or a curse. While useful to bolster her credentials as an able successor (or competitor) to Karamanlis himself, she could also burn herself on one of several foreign policy "third rails" -- Cyprus, Turkey, Macedonia, Kosovo. Karamanlis has dealt with his competition by giving her a highly visible job where success is hard to quantify. ¶4. (C) Bakoyannis has made the best of it. Tall, ;photogenic, and charming when she wants to be, she has used international travel effectively to enhance her image. During the Lebanon crisis last summer, she provided Greek support for evacuation efforts, consulting with us before and after visiting the region. Although she believes her contacts in Syria could be useful to the peace process, she has respected our concerns and avoided travel to Damascus. Similarly, during Greece's UNSC Presidency last September, she deftly managed an agenda that included tricky regional issues. TOUCHING THE THIRD RAIL: TURKEY, CYPRUS . . . ¶5. (C) One of Bakoyannis' biggest tests to date was last autumn's EU debate on Turkish accession, and the linked Finnish EU Presidency efforts regarding Cyprus. Bakoyannis engaged early with Cypriot President Papadopoulos and FM Lillikas in support of the Finnish effort, earning the enmity of both. (In his most recent visit to Greece, Papadopoulos pointedly met with PM Karamanlis without Bakoyannis present.) However, in supporting the relatively moderate EU compromise, Bakoyannis and Karamanlis have preserved Greek national interests while avoiding a public breach with the Cypriots. ¶6. (C) Bakoyannis' handling of relations with Turkey has gone less well. After her June 2006 visit to Turkey, she has long anticipated a reciprocal visit from FM Gul. Originally scheduled for early December (inconveniently close to the EU-Turkey endgame),Bakoyannis hastily bumped Gul off the schedule to attend a prospective short-notice UNSC meeting in New York. When the UNSC meeting slipped, she reinvited Gul, only to find that the December date was no longer "convenient" for the miffed Turkish FM. Rumors of a March Gul visit came to naught. And a recent NATO decision to cancel an exercise on an Aegean island (after Turkey objected on apparently questionable grounds) added to the public impression that Bakoyannis has mishandled the relationship. ¶7. (C) Bakoyannis has also been criticized for her decision to announce a series of measures to improve the lives of Muslims in Thrace. She has long been determined to make progress on this issue; the measures she announced in early February (debt forgiveness for wakfs, restoration of lost ATHENS 00000520 002 OF 002 citizenship, increased hiring of imams, quotas for government hiring of Muslims) address many (though not all) long-standing complaints of population in the region. Reaction has been mixed (including, we understand, among some of her ambitious subordinates at the Ministry). Bakoyannis will want the U.S. to use her measures to continue to press for re-opening Halki seminary, but will reject any formal bilateral linkage of the two. . . . MACEDONIA, KOSOVO ¶8. (C) Stability in the Balkans is key for Greek foreign policy. Bakoyannis assures us that Greece sticks to the 1995 Interim Agreement that would allow Macedonia to enter EU and NATO structures as "FYROM," although (like Karamanlis) she has begun adding a hint of doubt by noting that any decision will require approval from the Greek Parliament. On Kosovo, her recent briefings to Greece's Balkan ambassadors, stressing that the GOG will align itself with EU consensus, suggest that Greece will not stridently oppose a settlement, despite its reservations. BAKOYANNIS -- TOO AMERICAN? ¶9. (C) While Bakoyannis' personal and familial teflon has kept much criticism at bay, over the last two weeks she has taken considerable press fire for being too pro-American. The ruckus started when her MFA spokesman (following a U.S. demarche) mildly criticized Russian threats against Poland and the Czech Republic for their stance on missile defense. Greece's strident press -- seeing few similar statements from other EU members -- accused her of being out of sync with EU policy and endangering Greece's relationship with key energy partner Russia. The public heat she has undergone is wildly disproportionate to the apparent benefit to Greece of the statement, so it's important she hear privately from the Secretary our appreciation that Greece stood up for its NATO SIPDIS allies. ¶10. (C) In fact, we work well with the ND government, and with Bakoyannis. Bakoyannis' supportive response to the January 12 RPG attack on the Embassy was immediate. On March 12, the MFA informed us that Greece "gladly" endorsed the Statement of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. And during (or before) Bakoyannis' visit to Washington, we hope to be able to reach substantive agreement on a shipboarding agreement under the Proliferation Security Initiative. But there are several issues where we would like the GOG to do more. On Afghanistan, we have pressed the GOG to lift caveats on its personnel in Kabul. And although Bakoyannis pledged increased funding and personnel for the mission last January, it appears that, beyond money, only one or two civilians might be deployed with the Hungarian-led PRT. BAKOYANNIS' WASHINGTON AGENDA: VISA WAIVER PROGRAM ¶11. (C) Bakoyannis' goal, while in Washington, is to advance Greek participation in the Visa Waiver Program. She had hoped to reach full agreement this month as a deliverable for a possible Karamanlis trip to the U.S. While that deadline is no longer achievable (and Karamanlis plans to visit Australia instead),Bakoyannis does not have the full picture of the process in Washington. We can expect her to press hard, arguing - correctly - that Greece has fulfilled all existing criteria, a point she will make both on the Hill and at the White House. During her visit, she will need to hear some straight talk from us on the process, and get a realistic sense of the timeframe Greece is facing. Embassy continues to believe that Greece could serve as a 'pilot program' to test security enhancements that could later be extended to those aspirants that will require the new legislation in order to be waived into VWP. RIES