FM BAKOYANNIS FOCUSED ON KOSOVO, MACEDONIA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 002305 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS FOCUSED ON KOSOVO, MACEDONIA IN RUN-UP TO NATO, EU MINISTERIALS Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D), ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite visits this week by Egyptian President Mubarak, Turkish FM Babacan, and UN mediator Nimetz, FM Bakoyannis focused on two main issues in her December 3 introductory meeting with Ambassador Speckhard: Kosovo and Macedonia. On Kosovo, she "unofficially" urged delaying a status decision until March, to give Tadic greater traction in the Serbian elections. She had also pressed EU colleagues to give a concrete message to the Western Balkans regarding their EU future. Ambassador Speckhard pointed out that, in our view, further delay would have a detrimental effect on regional stability; EU unity would be essential in the weeks ahead. Bakoyannis assured the Ambassador that -- provided the EU found a legal basis -- Greece would keep its personnel in Kosovo and support technical assistance programs. On Greece's bilateral dispute with Macedonia over the name, Bakoyannis was firm: Greece would veto Macedonia's NATO entry absent agreement on a mutully acceptable name. Ambassador Speckhrd urged Bakoyannis to stick to the Interim Areement, which was designed to keep this issue rom impeding Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic course. Bakoyannis (who discussed the issue last week with U/S Burns) maintained that no Greek government could move any further than Karamanlis already had; it was politically impossible. Bakoyannis was optimistic, however, about the upcoming visit by Turkish FM Babacan, saying that she looked for "momentum" in the run-up to PM Karamanlis's January visit to Ankara. Finally, she pushed for Greek admission to the Visa Waiver Program, terming it the most important step the U.S. could take to improve the bilateral relationship. END SUMMARY. STRONG U.S.-GREECE TIES A FOUNDATION FOR COOPERATION . . . ¶2. (C) Ambassador Speckhard noted that shared interests between Greece and the U.S. were the foundation of our cooperative bilateral relationship. First, we share an interest in Balkan stability, which is thinly rooted and needs maturation. That means resolving the issues of Kosovo and Macedonia's NATO entry. Second, we share an interest in combating transnational threats. Greece, with its key strategic location, can contribute both bilaterally and through the EU, including in the areas of counter-terrorism, trafficking and non-proliferation. Third, we share an interest in regional stability, lowering Aegean tensions and fiding a resolution of the Cyprus problem. Finaly, our countries share an interest in expandig our economic cooperation. These shared interests were one reason we welcomed FM Bakoyannis's participation in the recent Anapolis conference on the Middle East. . . . IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . ¶3. (C) Bakoyannis agreed that U.S.-Greece ties were strong. She appreciated the invitation to Anapolis, as Greece was at the crossroads between the Middle East and Europe. Moreover, the presence of the Greek Patriarchate in Jerusalem meant that it also had an interest in a final settlement. Bakoyannis emphasized that the EU needed to support U.S. efforts in the Middle East -- only the U.S. could put sufficient pressure on the parties to bring a resolution. The EU focus should be on the Palestinians, not just through the Paris donor's conference, but also through infrastructure projects that made a visible difference to everyday life. Greece was prepared to support these EU initiatives. ¶4. (C) Bakoyannis added that Greece also sought to help U.S. peace efforts bilaterally; for that reason, it sponsored periodic Track II discussions in Athens. In addition, Bakoyannis offered to host a follow-up meeting of women political and business leaders in Athens on May 28 (a subject she has discussed with Secretary Rice). As part of the "Next Generation Activity" she had raised in Anapolis, she also planned a ship-board program for Israeli and Palestinian youth (ages 12-20) that would build contacts and understanding while cruising the Greek islands. . . . IN THE BALKANS, ESPECIALLY KOSOVO . . . ¶5. (C) Bakoyannis also agreed that there was a veneer of stability in the Balkans -- but it was thin. That was why Greece had pushed its EU partners for a credible, concrete message to the Western Balkans about its EU future. For many in the Balkans, the EU was important not because it offered a common "roof" for different nationalities, but because it offered economic development and prosperity. But that would take time; these countries needed assurance that there was light at the end of the tunnel. ¶6. (C) Focusing on Kosovo, Bakoyannis suggested that the EU do as much as possible to prepare for "the next day," including laying the groundwork for its relationship to Serbia. Bakoyannis -- speaking "unofficially" -- argued that Kosovars should wait until March before taking any steps on independence (she believed Thaci was prepared to do so at the request of the U.S.). Waiting until March would get past Serbia's elections, giving Tadic the only electoral chance he had. Otherwise, the international community would face another nationalist government, and have no moderate interlocutor. Another reason that a status decision should be postponed until spring: Pristina could face a winter electricity cutoff by Serbia, which supplied 26% of its electricity needs. That could prompt reprisals by Kosovar Albanians against the Serbian minority. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Speckhard underscored our assessment that Kosovo status could not wait another six months for resolution without threatening the stability now in place. EU unity on this point would be particularly important. Bakoyannis agreed that EU unity was crucial, but maintained that the Kosovar government could handle a 4 month wait. She noted that the Romanian and Bulgarian FMs would visit Athens on December 22, as a coordinated response by countries in the region would be important in the EU context. Greece would try to be "as constructive as possible," and -- provided the EU found a legal basis -- would keep its military forces and experts on the ground (and even send more). . . . EVEN WHEN WE DISAGREE (MACEDONIA) ¶8. (C) Bakoyannis noted she had reviewed the Macedonia name issue with U/S Burns in Madrid. The Karamanlis government had take a bold policy decision to support a compound name that included the word "Macedonia" -- and gained parliament's agreement. But this was as far as any Greek government could go. Bakoyannis admitted that it was "incredible" that, with all the other issues in the region, it was Macedonia that brought the Greek public to "explosion." If there was no agreement on the name issue, Greece would not let Macedonia join NATO. ¶9. (C) Ambassador Speckhard emphasized that the Interim Agreement was designed to prevent exactly that, and the United States expected the parties to abide by its principles. Bakoyannis argued that U.S. recognition of Macedonia had changed the situation. The government in Skopje simply did not feel any pressure to do what the Interim Agreement called for: negotiate on a mutually acceptable name. Bakoyannis added that Skopje was now considering changing their automobile license plates; did they really think that would go over well when cars were driven to Thessaloniki? Greece had agreed to support a Macedonian as president of the UNGA, only to hear him call his country "Macedonia" not "FYROM" according to UN rules. Greeks were "not fools" any longer. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Speckhard urged FM Bakoyannis to look at the issue more broadly. NATO expansion was another step of European security -hplishments of both NAT` several years. Thaal that the issue berl Bucharest summit. Bakoy such stability must be ring on the U.S., as itQior to its NATO entry, Romania had been pressed to sign a difficult agreement with Ukraine -- and it did. Good neighborly relations were essential for entry into the Alliance. The Karamanlis government was making an intense effort, and so was UN mediator Nimetz. But Greece needed a solution it could live with. Bakoyannis admitted, however, that she was not optimistic. KEEPING UP MOMENTUM WITH TURKEY ¶11. (C) With FM Babacan due i Athens December 4, Bakoyannis told the Ambasador she hoped for "momentum" with Turkey. Te two governments were both recently elected, an Greece openly supported Turkey's EU course. She noted that Karamanlis's visit to Ankar (scheduled for January 28, though not yet oficially announced) was the first by a Greek PM in 48 years. She hoped that, during the visit, there could be a clear declaration that there was no causus belli between the two. It would take some negotiation, but a statement indicating that two allies do not threaten each other with war would be a positive step. It would help propel Greek public opinion, and make it possible for cooperation between parliamentarians. Bakoyannis also planned to raise with Babacan the influx of illegal immigrants coming from the Turkish coast; Greece would ask Turkey to honor the existing bilateral agreement that required them to take back migrants detained by Greek authorities. Most of these were Kurds and Iraqis who had made their way through Turkey to Greek shores. Ambassador Speckhard told Bakoyannis he would discuss with Ambassador Wilson in Ankara to see how the U.S. might be helpful in supporting this historic opportunity for advancing the relationship between Greece and Turkey. WORKING TOGETHER ON ALLIANCE PRIORITIES ¶12. (C) Ambassador Speckhard expressed appreciation for Greek contributions to Alliance efforts, which he urged be as robust as possible. Bakoyannis suggested that it would be useful for Defense Minister Meimarakis to visit the U.S., in part to build knowledge of Greece's efforts. The Ambassador questioned whether Greece could contribute additional resources for Afghanistan, both personnel and equipment (particularly helicopters). Bakoyannis responded that helicopters were difficult due to shortages, but Greece had offered forces for Kabul airport. And EU CFSP Rep Solana had just called her to request a Greek plane for operations in Chad. A GREEK PRIORITY: VWP ¶13. (C) Bakoyannis added a bilateral priority to the U.S.-Greece agenda: Greek participation in the Visa Waiver Program. Both the MFA and the Embassy had made an immense effort to persuade U.S. authorities that Greece was a credible candidate. Greece was the only Schengen country not part of VWP. It already met most criteria, and now had state-of-the-art passports. She had discussed this with President Bush as well as the Secretary who (she believed) had committed to including Greece; there was no better step to build the bilateral relationship than to extend VWP to Greece. Ambassador Speckhard noted that a DHS evaluation team was currently in Greece, and pledged to work with officials in Washington on the issue. SPECKHARD