MACEDONIA'S AMBASSADOR CONVINCED GREECE WILL VETO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002117

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S AMBASSADOR CONVINCED GREECE WILL VETO
NATO ACCESSION


Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 24 meeting, Macedonia's
Ambassador to Greece, Blagoj Handziski, told Charge that he
was now convinced Greece would make a name change a
precondition for Macedonia's NATO entry. Handziski
emphasized that NO Macedonian government could accept that.
The only solution possible was the "dual name" formula --
which the Greeks had rejected in 2005. Charge agreed that
the GOG appeared determined to breach the Interim Agreement
and veto Macedonia's NATO invitation absent resolution of the
name issue (although it would probably try to avoid a veto by
persuading NATO allies that Macedonia was not ready). Charge
suggested, however, that if either side could compromise,
there were incentives each could offer and benefits each
could gain -- including assurances on territorial integrity
and measures to assist Greece's Slavo-Macedonian minority.
Charge noted that while we continued to press the GOG to
stick to the Interim Agreement, it was worth considering
options available to both sides as negotiations under UN
mediator Nimetz moved forward.


2. (C) COMMENT: Handziski is a shrewd evaluator of the Greek
(and Macedonian) political scenes. He did not ask for the
U.S. to play deus ex machina; we believe he was giving his
own conclusions a reality check before sending them to
Skopje. We agree that the GOG position has solidified. But
we encouraged him to c that
Greek PM country.
Three or four months ago, Handziski admitted, there might
have been some steps Macedonia could take to win Greek
approval -- such as changing the name of Skopje's Alexander
the Great airport or establishing a bilateral mechanism to
review history textbooks (along the lines of the
Greece-Turkey agreement signed by former FMs Papandreou and
Cem). Another possibility was a GOM statement on Greece's
Slavo-Macedonian minority, restating that GOM considered the
issue an internal affair of the Hellenic Republic. But while
he once thought that Greece would put regional stability and
territorial integrity above its domestic concerns, Handziski
was now convinced Greece was determined to make a name change
a precondition for Macedonia's NATO entry.


4. (C) Handziski pointed out that, in Macedonia, all
political parties agreed that NO government could accept a
change in the country's name. If deprived of its name, the
multi-ethnic nation lost the key to its national identity,
and the government would fall. The situation in the region
in the next few months was complicated enough, with
disturbances likely as Kosovo's Final Status was resolved.
The GOM's room for maneuver on the name issue was very
limited; Handziski believed a dual name solution ) using a
separate name for the GOM's bilateral relations ith Greece
-- was the only way out.


5. (C) Handziski a former Defense Minister who after nearly
five years in Greece is a keen observer of Greek domestic
politics, suggested that Macedonia had become both a
political and psychological issue for the GOG. Politically,
Karamanlis faced internal opposition from at least 12 ND MPs,
including on the name issue. That would make it tough to
legislate his reform agenda, and might lead to new elections
as early as February-June 2008. Rumor had it that Karamanlis
was seeking support from the small leftist parties for a
"compromise name," in order to overcome ND divisions.
Karamanlis was also planning to change the election law.
Finally, Handziski suggested that jockeying among candidates
to succeed Archbishop Christodoulos -- who would campaign on
"national" issues -- would box the GOG in even further.
Ultimately, Handziski believed Greece would expect its NATO
allies not to allow it to be "defeated" by Macedonia on the
name issue.

CHARGE: CONSIDER THE OPTIONS TO LEVERAGE FLEXIBILITY


6. (C) Charge agreed that the GOG had made its decision,
though it would likely first seek to convince other Allies
that Macedonia had simply not met NATO criteria for entry.
Charge cited DAS DiCarlo's message while in Skopje, adding
that we were also emphasizing to the GOG our strong
expectation that they would hold to the terms of the Interim
Agreement. But although the factors cited by Handziski were

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important to the GOG in framing the political environment,
our assessment was that Karamanlis's main concerns were long
term and strategic.


7. (C) First, Karamanlis was concerned about his political
legacy. He recognized that if Macedonia were to enter NATO
without a quid pro quo for Greece, it would mean the end of
his government, and it would be for this single act that he
would be remembered (negatively) in Greek history. Second,
Karamanlis recalled the legacy of the Balkan wars of ninety
years ago -- and was convinced that, years from now, an
unscrupulous Macedonian politician might find a pretext for
armed conflict over territory. We have argued to the GOG
that a name change in itself would not be sufficient to
address that far-fetched, but possible scenario. That is why
we also would like to see both sides engage in serious
discussion of confidence-building measures, even in advance
of an agreement on the name. The GOG and GOM were mirror
images: each imputing maximum bad faith to the other side,
and neither calculating the harmful effect on the bilateral
climate of statements/steps made for domestic consumption.
That dynamic needs to be broken.


8. (C) Charge pointed to the upcoming Nimetz talks,
expressing support for the process. It was hard to be
optimistic about that process, given that the political
consensus in Macedonia against any name change was as strong
as the political consensus in Greece demanding a name change.
Further, there would be risks if Nimetz put any proposal on
the table. If he repeated his first suggestion of 2005
(rejected by Skopje),it would put pressure on the GOM. If
he repeated his second 2005 proposal ("dual-name" rejected by
Athens),it would pressure the GOG. Neither scenario would
necessarily make it easier for the two sides to come to some
agreement.


9. (C) Charge advised Handziski to consider the options and
incentives the GOM might use. For example: if the GOM
chose to make a small change in its name, it could
potentially leverage important commitments from the GOG.
These could include enthusiastic Greek "sponsorship" of its
entry into NATO/EU, and measures to recognize and/or give
cultural rights to Greece's Slavo-Macedonian minority.
Another approach could be for the GOM to offer incentives to
the GOG (well beyond renaming the airport) to get sufficient
Greek flexibility on the name to permit entry (as FYROM) into
NATO. These incentives might include reiteration of the
Interim Agreement's assurances on territorial integrity,
agreement by the GOM not to seek a name change in the UN or
NATO without prior Greek consent, and/or establishment of a
confidence-building mechanism. Neither of these options
would be easy, and neither is currently on the table, but
they are the two logical directions that could lead to
Macedonia,s accession next year.
COUNTRYMAN