GREECE-MACEDONIA: FM BAKOYIANNIS MEETINGS IN NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001891 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GR MK SUBJECT: GREECE-MACEDONIA: FM BAKOYIANNIS MEETINGS IN NEW YORK Classified By: Charge Tom Countryman. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: In their September 19 meeting, Charge and MFA SYG Agathocles focused on the Macedonia name issue. Charge noted that, when it came to Macedonia, FM Bakoyiannis would need to demonstrate that the GOG had a strategy to achieve progress (rather than simply ask for help from us). Agathocles took the point, but emphasized that Macedonia was the number one issue for the GOG. Unfortunately, the GOM was not ready to negotiate on the name issue. Charge pressed Agathocles: had the GOG tried to engage at a high political level on the issues of concern, as outlined in the Interim Accord? Agathocles argued that the GOG had tried at a "lower level" and were prepared to do so at a higher level. He agreed with Charge that the new Government should not postpone resolution of the issue, despite the difficulty in selling a solution to the Greek public and parliament. COMMENT: Agathocles got our point. He knows we are looking for both commitment and a strategy from the GOG. But whether FM Bakoyiannis will bring both to her New York meetings with U.S. policymakers is not clear. It may well be that a meeting next week with U/S Burns, followed by a later meeting with the Secretary, would be a productive way to prompt some creative strategizing in the FM's cabinet. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Agathocles told Charge that FM Bakoyiannis wanted to meet with the Secretary, despite the fact that her visit to the UNGA September 23-25 had been curtailed (due to procedural issues related to the post-election government's formation). If, as it now appeared, that would not be possible for them to meet, FM Bakoyiannis was prepared to return to the U.S. at the beginning of October in order to meet with the Secretary in New York or Washington. Bakoyiannis is also seeking a meeting with U/S Burns on Sept. 24 or 25. ¶3. (C) Charge noted that, should a meeting be possible, the Secretary would view Greek issues as part of the overall U.S. SIPDIS policy agenda. FM Bakoyiannis would naturally want to update the Secretary on GOG actions related to those global priorities. For example, it would be useful for Bakoyiannis to convey the new government's determination to continue cooperation with the U.S. on equipment and training for Iraqi forces. She might also outline possible further Greek contributions for Alliance efforts in Afghanistan, and indicate where the new government stood regarding the deployment of an ESDP mission to Kosovo. We would also welcome an assessment of whether, following elections in both Turkey and Greece, these two governments might begin to make progress on resolving Aegean issues. Finally, Charge noted that we had discussed with MFA officials the possibility of an EU border monitoring mission in Lebanon. While these issues might not be at the top of FM Bakoyiannis's list -- a spot undoubtedly occupied by Macedonia -- they were important for the U.S. ¶4. (C) Agathocles noted that Bakoyiannis was already thinking about how to make progress with the GOT on Aegean issues; she planned to meet FM Babacan soon. Kosovo was harder. But Agathocles emphasized that, for Greece, the number one issue was Macedonia. If Greece allowed Macedonia to enter NATO without resolving the name issue, the issue would be a constant source of annoyance for the U.S and the Alliance. Unfortunately, the GOM was not willing to sit and negotiate -- to find a name that both sides could accept (and not a "dual name" solution). Even then, the GOG would have "huge problems" selling such a solution to its public and parliament. ¶5. (C) Charge pressed Agathocles: was the GOG willing to sit and talk with representatives of the GOM without first demanding that they accept a predetermined outcome? Had the GOG conveyed, at the Ministerial or at a lower level, their concerns regarding textbooks, the airport name, etc. as called for in the 1995 Interim Accord? Agathocles argued that they GOG had made these points at "other levels," and was prepared to suggest talks at a higher level. What was unacceptable, for the GOG, was Skopje's strategy of trying to trade agreement to stop building statues, re-naming cities, etc. for Greek agreement to keep the name Macedonia. There was no guarantee that, once in NATO and the EU, Macedonia would not simply resume these pactices. Skopje, he argued, had "locked" their position since the U.S. recognized its constitutional name. ¶6. (C) Charge said the U.S. perception is that Athens, not Skopje, has been the party resisting high-level dialogue. He pointed out that it would be helpful if FM Bakoyiannis could confirm, to the Secretary, that Greece was engaging, at a political/ministerial level, in discussions with Skopje. Without such discussions, an attempt by Greece to walk away from the Interim Accord -- without using its problem-solving mechanisms -- would be even more heavily criticized within the Alliance. If FM Bakoyiannis wanted the U.S. to engage, she needed to demonstrate that the GOG had a roadmap to unfreeze the deadlock and create the conditions for UN mediator Nimetz to succeed. Both the Secretary and Undersecretary would expect the FM not just to describe Greece's constraints, but to give a vision of a way ahead. ¶7. (C) Agathocles argued that, in any case, Macedonia was not ready to enter NATO; it did not meet the criteria. A veto was not the GOG's first choice; he hoped they were not forced to use it. The GOG needed to protect its national interests, but it would try not to reach that point. Charge responded that neither we, nor other Allies, had made a decision on Macedonia's readiness; in previous enlargements of both NATO and the EU, political factors had also been a consideration. It was clearly in the new Greek government's interest to resolve this issue early in its tenure, and not push it off. Agathocles agreed, predicting early elections in either 2009 or 2010. ¶8. (C) Charge reminded Agathocles that, with a Kosovo Final Status decision ahead, there were good arguments for having Macedonia and Albania in NATO to increase regional stability. Agathocles suggested that made resolution of the name issue all the more important for the GOM. COUNTRYMAN