Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ATHENS1853
2007-09-14 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE: SLIGHT ND LEAD AS PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Tags:  PGOV PREL GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTH #1853/01 2571259
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O 141259Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0243
INFO RUEZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0743
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1071
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 1273
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0325
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001853 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: SLIGHT ND LEAD AS PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN
ENDS

REF: A. ATHENS 1834


B. ATHENS 1826

C. ATHENS 1804

D. ATHENS 1785

E. ATHENS 1682

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBIN QUINVILLE.
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001853

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL GR
SUBJECT: GREECE: SLIGHT ND LEAD AS PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN
ENDS

REF: A. ATHENS 1834


B. ATHENS 1826

C. ATHENS 1804

D. ATHENS 1785

E. ATHENS 1682

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBIN QUINVILLE.
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: With Greek voters set to go to the polls on
Sunday, most believe ruling New Democracy is poised to
squeeze out a victory. Its parliamentary majority, however,
will likely be modest. PASOK leader Papandreou has tried to
make the election a referendum on the "right-wing" in power,
but much of his message has been overshadowed by voters'
continued doubts about his leadership. At the ND rally this
evening, PM Karamanlis is expected to wind up his campaign
with an acknowledgment that his government has not
accomplished all its goals, but "we've gotten the message,
learned our lesson, and can move forward." Karamanlis and FM
Bakoyannis have again raised the Macedonia name issue in an
effort to shore up votes against the small right-wing LAOS
party. Much depends on the surprisingly large percentage of
undecided voters, whose "protest votes" could result in a
five-party parliament -- and make even an ND victory
bittersweet. END SUMMARY.

DOWN TO THE WIRE
--------------


2. (C) Greek voters go to the polls September 16 following a
campaign of surprises. PM Karamanlis called the elections in
mid-August before forest fires claimed scores of lives and
devastated large parts of the country. Nevertheless,
opposition attempts to exploit the government's slow response
-- as well as the now almost-forgotten bond scandal -- have
been less than successful. "Unpublished" party polls
indicate, and most observers believe, that ruling ND will
hold on to a modest parliamentary majority. Indeed, forty
eight hours before the election, there has been a noticeable
shift in TV and radio commentary toward a perceived ND
victory of 43 or 44 percent. (NOTE: A party would need at
least 42.3 percent of the vote to give it a majority in the
300-seat parliament. A 44-percent vote for ND would give it
a workable majority of about 157 seats. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Quick government action to pump money into the areas

damaged by fires has apparently worked, improving ND's
position. The proportion of undecided voters remains high,
perhaps as high as 17 percent of the electorate. The votes
ND seems to be losing (in comparison with its 45-percent
victory in 2004) will likely go to small parties rather than
to PASOK. For that reason, the current four-party parliament
may see the addition for the first time of far-right LAOS.
But Karamanlis has been campaigning hard to keep LAOS from
getting over the three-percent parliamentary threshold. He
stated publicly that ND would not enter a coalition
government (i.e., with LAOS) and promised that new elections
would be held as soon as possible if a single-party
government could not be formed.

PLAYING THE MACEDONIA CARD -- AGAIN
--------------


4. (C) Blocking LAOS is also likely behind Karamanlis's
increasingly frequent rhetoric on the Macedonia name issue.
Following on his statements at the September 6 candidates'
debate and September 7 press conference (ref b),Karamanlis
in Thessaloniki on September 13 reiterated his thinly-veiled
threat to veto Macedonia's NATO accession if a mutually
acceptable resolution of the name-issue were not found: "If
they (Macedonia) won't display a practical inclination for a
mutually acceptable name ...they themselves place obstacles
in their way to Euro-Atlantic institutions." FM Dora
Bakoyannis likewise criticized Skopje. If Macedonia did not
work for a mutually acceptable solution, she argued in a
statement posted on the MFA website, "Greece cannot and she
won't be deprived of any of the capabilities that she has as
a member of NATO and the European Union."

LAST-MINUTE RALLIES
--------------


5. (C) The major parties are winding up their campaigns with
rallies in Athens. On September 13, in his last major speech
of the campaign, PASOK leader Papandreou stuck to
time-honored formulas, hoping to energize the party faithful
and shut out the smaller leftist parties. Promising a "new
ENDS

contract" with the Greek people, PASOK would empower the less

fortunate, the students, housewives, pensioners, small
shopkeepers, and the unemployed, who would be made to feel
"proud" again. ND had brought "chaos" while PASOK would
restore the economy, health and welfare, education, and other
sectors ruined by the right. PM Karamanlis will make a final
major appearance in Athens this evening, when he is also
expected to reiterate familiar themes -- his government's
economic and remaining reforms. He is also expected to
acknowledge -- as he did in Thessaloniki -- that his
government recognized it had made some mistakes, "has gotten
the message," and would now move on with renewed
determination.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) The month-long campaign followed little of the
playbook PM Karamanlis had in mind when he called the
election in mid-August. ND seems to have salvaged the
situation and appears poised to hold a modest parliamentary
majority. But the failure of the opposition to capitalize on
the government's woes is as much a testimony to the PASOK
leadership's weakness as to good ND policies and strategy.
While some of PASOK's criticism of the handling of the fires
has hit home, the smaller parties -- and not PASOK -- are the
likely beneficiaries.


7. (C) If, as expected, ND gets a narrow victory, it may
prove bittersweet. Should LAOS enter the parliament and ND
return only a weak majority, it will be more difficult for ND
to move forward on its agenda of "accelerating reforms." It
will also make it more challenging for an ND government to
work cooperatively with us on our bilateral agenda.
COUNTRYMAN