FURTHER GREEK VIEWS ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001619 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GR KV SR SUBJECT: FURTHER GREEK VIEWS ON KOSOVO NEXT STEPS REF: A) ATHENS 1609 B) STATE 109526 Classified By: CDA TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: In an August 10 introductory call on new MFA Secretary General Agathocles, Charge reviewed ref B points on Kosovo next steps. Agathocles reiterated the long-standing Greek concern regarding the legal basis for any future status decision. He also shared two ideas (which he characterized as rumors): a "Montenegro" option along the lines crafted by EU Foreign Policy rep Solana several years ago, and a confederal formula. Charge underscored that the U.S. would agree to any solution agreed to by the parties. However, in our view, supervised independence as envisaged by Ahtisaari remained the best proposal; it was essential for the international community to be prepared to act should there be no progress by December. Comment: Agathocles's "rumors" likely represent Greek wishful thinking. At the same time, Agathocles clearly implied that the "Montenegro option" had received some official consideration -- though whether by selected Serbian officials or EU authorities was unclear. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Charge reviewed ref B points on Kosovo next steps (which he had already discussed August 9 in a meeting with PM Karmanlis's diplomatic advisor, ref A). Charge underscored that the U.S. looked forward to progress in the additional period of intensified discussions available to the parties. At the same time, we and our allies must be prepared for the possibility that, in December, we are faced with the status quo. In our view, we would need to find another way to move to supervised independence as envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan. At the same time, we wanted to assure our allies that the United States remained fully committed to KFOR; we looked to other substantial contributors, such as Greece, for a similar commitment. ¶3. (C) Agathocles believed the primary obstacle, for the EU, was the lack of a legal basis for supervised independence should negotiations between the parties fail. Without a legal basis, it would be difficult for Greece (and others) to recognize a unilateral declaration of independence. ¶4. (C) Agathocles told Charge he had heard two "rumors" recently. The first (which he suggested came from "semi-official" sources) was that Western nations might be prepared to accept a "Montenegro" solution for Kosovo. While this had been relayed in a hush-hush manner, Agathocles noted wryly that, two days later, Kostunica had publicly rejected such a strategy. The second (un-sourced) rumor was that "someone" had explored with various Kosovar factions the possibility of accepting a form of confederation with the Serbs. While some Kosovar politicians had reportedly rejected this out of hand, others had been prepared to consider it provided a date for referendum was set and the ultimate right to independence provided for. Agathocles suggested that, in his view, these two ideas might offer a productive way out of the current dilemma. But making independence a precondition for the current negotiations gave the participants very little maneuverability. ¶5. (C) Charge responded that, in principle, the U.S. would support whatever solution the two parties agreed to. But all of us needed to consider the question of what course we would take in December in order to preserve stability in Kosovo and the region. The U.S. was not seeking to dictate the process; we were working closely with the Contact Group. Agathocles argued that Serbia needed to find a solution that would allow them to postpone a final decision on the Kosovo issue for several years. A solution along the lines of that crafted by EU Foreign Policy rep Solana for Montenegro would allow Serbia time to deepen its relationship with the EU and improve its economy. That would, in his view, ultimately make Kosovo less problematic to solve. COUNTRYMAN