GREECE/MACEDONIA: PM KARAMANLIS' MESSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001618

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: PM KARAMANLIS' MESSAGE

REF: ATHENS 1594 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. Thomas Countryman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY In a one-on-one meeting with Charge on August
9, Constantinos Bitsios, the Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister, conveyed a message from PM Karamanlis. The
PM asked the U.S. to convey to Skopje its view of the United
Nations-sponsored negotiations on the name issue and the NATO
accession process. In his message, the PM stressed that
Greece sees the goal as a name that will be used by Skopje in
all their international relationships -- not one that only
Greece would use. A dual name was not within the mandate of
the Nimitz process; Macedonia's accession into NATO was
"closely linked" to resolution of the name issue. Charge
agreed to convey the message, but urged the GoG to use
effectively the opportunity that would exist between Greek
parliamentary elections next month and a NATO decision on
Macedonia's membership in early 2008. Karamanlis's message
is the most direct indication we have had to date that Greece
is prepared to veto Macedonia's NATO membership if it doesn't
get a solution it can live with. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On July 27, Charge met with Bitsios to discuss the
Greek positions on resolving the name issue with Macedonia.
Charge asked directly what Greece wanted the United States to
do vis a vis the dispute. Bitsios urged the U.S. to make a
clear statement to Skopje: they must move on the name issue.
The GoM would have to accept some change to its name: "a
prefix, a suffix, a hyphen ... something." He asked that the
USG explain to the Macedonian government that the solution is
not to find a name that is acceptable for Greece, but rather
a name which will be used internationally. Bitsios expressed
concern that some in the Greek MFA were engaged in "wishful
thinking" hoping Greece might be able to avoid a decision on
Macedonia's accession to NATO if other member nations
concluded that the country had not met its accession
obligations. Charge advised against engaging in any kind of
a negative campaign toward the Macedonians and urged Greece
to let fellow NATO allies decide the issue on its merits and
for themselves.


3. (C) Charge urged the GoG to consider engaging in an
informal but authoritative dialogue with Skopje on a wide
range of issues as a way to build confidence. Recognizing
the limits of public action in the immediate run-up to Greek
elections, Charge conceded that neither FM would be
appropriate interlocutors at this point, but was confident
that both sides could find trusted and discrete advisors to
engage in such a dialogue. He further urged Greece to
consider what they might ask of Skopje in this process. For
example, Greece might request assurances from Macedonia to
not seek a change (following NATO accession) in the name they
now use at the United Nations; the GoG might also request a
stronger re-affirmation from Macedonia that it will never
seek to change its borders with Greece. Greece should,
likewise, consider what the Macedonians might request of it.
For example, the GoM could raise the issue of the existence
of a Slavic-speaking Macedonian minority within Greek borders
with defined rights. Charge told Bitsios that he was aware
of how difficult this kind of an exchange could be for
Greece, but stressed that after twelve years of sterile
negotiations on the name issue, it might be time to seek a
broader package.


4. (C) Charge told Bitsios it was also essential for the GoG
to avoid the worst-case scenario: opposing Macedonia's NATO
entry while avoiding any dialogue with the GoM. If all other
NATO allies decided that Macedonia met the accession
criteria, yet Greece alone vetoed their membership, the GoG
would come under intense criticism -- not only from the U.S.
-- for having failed to make any effort at bilateral
dialogue. Bitsios said that his government would consider
the suggestions and respond but first wanted to be assured
that such a dialogue would not create "heartburn" for UN
Special Envoy Nimetz nor be considered as a substitute for
the Nimetz-led process. Charge advised that in all
likelihood, Nimetz would welcome the opportunity to see the
two sides meaningfully engaged in fruitful discussions.


5. (C) Charge stressed that timing was of the essence if a
resolution is to be found in the near term. The window
between Greek elections (now widely expected at the end of
September 2007) and NATO's decision on Macedonia's
fulfillment of its MAP obligations was the crucial
time-frame. "The United States has not decided about
Macedonia's accession and will not decide until the end of
2007," Charge told Bitsios, adding that Greece needs to think

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carefully about the next stage. Bitsios countered by asking
if Greece could be assured that Undersecretary Burns will
make this matter "a priority." Charge responded that there
were a number of more burning issues that the USG saw as high
priority in the coming months; the Undersecretary would, of
course, weigh Greece's request as well.

FOLLOW-UP MESSAGE FROM PM
--------------


6. (C) On August 9, Bitsios asked Charge to meet to pass a
message from Prime Minister Karamanlis. The PM, Bitsios
said, welcomed and appreciated any assistance that the United
States can give in resolving this matter. On the question of
what, precisely, the GoG was seeking, the PM wished to
emphasize four points:

-- The GoG considers it hugely important that Skopje
understands that the content and the purpose of the Nimitz
negotiations is not to find a name for Greece to use in its
dealings with Macedonia, but for Macedonia to find a name
that it will use in all of its international relationships,
i.e., a "dual name" solution is outside of the mandate of
these negotiations;

-- The main objective of the GoG is to find a permanent
solution to the name issue. The GoG wants to concentrate on
this alone and believes that resolution of other issues will
follow a solution on the name issue;

-- Greece has done its share on substance in trying to
resolve the name issue and it is now up to Skopje to
reciprocate;

-- It must be made clear to Skopje that NATO accession is
"closely linked" to resolution of the name issue.


7. (C) Charge asked Bitsios if he wanted to be more clear
about what "closely linked" with the name issue meant.
Bitsios, however, declined to elaborate. Charge told Bitsios
that while he understood the Greek belief that all other
matters would follow the resolution of the name issue, he
still believed that an open discussion of all bilateral
issues would help to make a compromise more likely.
Notwithstanding, he assured Bitsios that the PM's message
would be conveyed to Washington. He added that the U.S. can
and will help in the resolution of the long-standing name
dispute, but, in response to a question from Bitsios as to
how energetically the USG would press the matter, Charge said
that the USG does not/not link NATO accession to the name
issue. Moreover, Charge stated that while we are willing to
help, the USG cannot guarantee the result desired by Athens,
for two reasons. First, the Macedonians are presently
engaged in trying to resolve a host of MAP issues that they
see as more urgent and more substantial than the name issue.
Second, the GoG should not underestimate the political
realities and sensitivities in Skopje. Charge concluded
emphasizing that the time-frame between Greek elections and
NATO's decision was the most crucial; the GoG needed to think
about the contingencies.


8. (C) COMMENT: Previous discussion of the name issue between
GoG and the U.S. officials, including in June with
Undersecretary Burns, contained few specifics -- just a plea
that the USG somehow solve this problem. The Prime Minister
has now specifically requested us to convey the Greek view to
Skopje. In fact, the Greek position appears to raise the bar
for success of the Nimetz process. Karamanlis has firmly
rejected any consideration of a "dual name" solution -- and
linked Macedonia's NATO accession to an outcome acceptable to
Greece. It is the clearest indication we have received to
date that Karamanlis is prepared to veto Macedonia's entry
into NATO, even if Greece stands alone among the Allies.


9. (C) COMMENT (cont.): From Embassy Athens point of view,
the USG should continue to convey to the GoM:

-- the Greek threat -- to veto membership even as 'FYROM' --
must be taken seriously.

-- Macedonia -- even while concentrating on MAP fulfillment
-- must negotiate seriously in the next Nimetz round.

As to whether the USG should advise the GoM that (as the
Greeks believe) a dual-name solution is outside of the Nimetz
mandate, we have to defer to a close reading in Washington of
that mandate.
COUNTRYMAN