U/S BURNS' JUNE 11 MEETING WITH PM KARAMANLIS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001316 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2017 TAGS: GR OVIP PGOV PREL SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JUNE 11 MEETING WITH PM KARAMANLIS: KARAMANLIS FEELING THE HEAT OVER MACEDONIA'S NATO ENTRY Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his June 11 meeting with U/S Burns, PM Karamanlis was calm about the latest state-of-play on Kosovo final status. However, the normally relaxed Karamanlis was clearly feeling the domestic political heat over Macedonia's NATO entry. Burns promised that the USG would work with the GOM and GOG to lower the temperature, but also urged the GOG to work directly with Skopje and UN mediator Nimitz. Burns also counseled patience on the issue of Macedonia's NATO membership, which would not be discussed within the Alliance until the end of the year. Burns briefed Karamanlis on efforts to counter Iranian proliferation, pressed for additional Greek contributions to Alliance efforts in Afghanistan, and urged Karamanlis to continue efforts to ensure diversity in energy suppliers. On Cyprus, Karamanlis suggested little progress was possible until after elections in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. END SUMMARY. KOSOVO FINAL STATUS POST-G8 ¶2. (C) U/S Burns updated Karamanlis on G8 discussion of Kosovo final status. Although Russia was no longer a contributor in Kosovo, it was still seeking to block a UNSCR. The French proposal for an additional 6-month negotiating period differed only in length from the U.S. proposal of 120 days. In addition, the U.S. had agreed to specific requests to address Russian concerns: reference to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, protection of ethnic Serb rights, and a UN envoy for Serbian issues. Burns said Russia could not be allowed to stop the Process, especially given that it had not contributed to Kosovo stabilization for eight years. At the end of the day, the United States and Europe needed to agree to a process which led to Kosovo's independence. That could include an alternative UNSCR to facilitate the EU civilian mission. ¶3. (C) Karamanlis agreed that the international community could not reverse the reality on the ground. The key was how -- whether through additional time or symbolic measures -- to make it "sellable" to the Serbs. Karamanlis believed the Serbs understood this. While even an additional six months would not allow the GOS to agree, under certain circumstances, its reaction might be muted. In addition, Karamanlis suggested, the EU needed to make some overtures to Serbia so that the Kosovo decision could be seen in the context of the region's Euro-Atlantic integration. Burns agreed that Greece could play a positive role. The GOS had taken positive steps recently, including on war criminals, and the EU was slated to re-start SAA negotiations this week. MACEDONIA AND NATO MEMBERSHIP ¶4. (C) Karamanlis said he had told the Macedonian President and PM last year that he was committed to resolving the name issue, but the GOM leaders said they preferred to wait until elections -- which had brought to power a more nationalist, irredentist government. Normally relaxed, Karamanlis questioned heatedly wether he could get any decsion o acedoia'sNATO membership through the Greek parliament -- despite the fact that his government wanted to see Macedonia enter Euro-Atlantic institutions to assure regional tability. Burns asured Karamanlis that the US understood the ensitivity, but urged the GG to find a way to wrk directly with Skopj. We aso ookedfor rsults from UN mediator Nimitz. The USG would urge the GOM not to take provocative actions or provoke crises -- but that was no substitute for direct contact between the two parties. Burns also counseled patience on Macedonia's NATO membership, which would not be discussed within the Alliance until the end of the year. IRAN . . . ¶6. (C) Burns told Karamanlis that he foresaw a third Chapter 7 UNSC resolution on Iran, but EU countries and other states may need to consider bilateral sanctions in order to bring Iran to the negotiating table. Karamanlis responded, that while Greece favored a negotiated solution, it was clear that all options would need to be considered if there was no progress. The international community could not give Iran the impression that it could "get away with it." They needed an incentive to talk seriously, which they were not doing now. Burns agreed that diplomacy was the preferred solution, but the USG had not excluded the military option. Iran was also starting to push back in Iraq, providing explosive devices to insurgents. The UK had also intercepted two shipments from Iran to Afghanistan in direct contravention of UNSCR 1747. The U.S. and EU must remain united on this issue as well. ATHENS 00001316 002 OF 002 . . . IRAQ . . . ¶7. (C) Regretting Ambassador Ries' imminent departure for Iraq, Karamanlis told Burns that the worst-case scenario would be a speedy U.S. withdrawal. That would open a Pandora's box, not only in Iraq but throughout the region. Burns said that, as a result of the current surge in U.S. manpower, local leaders in Anbar province were turning against Al Qaeda. . . . CYPRUS . . . ¶8. (C) Karamanlis told Burns that he did not foresee much opportunity for progress on a Cyprus solution in the near future, due to upcoming elections in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. He suggested the U.S. find a way to reestablish communication with Papadopoulos, who was certain to be re-elected and was "more realistic than he looks." Karamanlis said he did not understand Turkish-Cypriot reluctance to move forward with last July's UN-brokered agreement on working groups and technical committees. Nevertheless, the international community should be prepared for a more serious effort toward reaching a settlement post-elections. . . . AFGHANISTAN . . . ¶9. (c) Burns pressed Karamanlis to contribute additional assets to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. ISAF forces were doing well against the Taliban in fixed engagements, but ISAF needed additional helicopters, transport, firepower and troops on the ground. Burns pointed out that Greece's contribution need not be immediate; NATO was looking ahead to its 2007/8/9 rotations. Karamanlis admitted that this was not an easy issue. While he would discuss it further with ministers, he did not foresee a serious change in Greece's participation. Burns noted the long-term implications for NATO, both in its first-ever ground combat mission and for the Bucharest NATO Summit next year. AND ENERGY SECURITY ¶8. (C) Burns urged Karamanlis to ensure diversity of energy resources and routes. Karamanlis agreed; the GOG was pursuing both Azeri and (possibly) Kazakh options. The reality was that, at this point, Greece was dependent on Russia for 80 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG). While they were trying to find other sources (and pushing renewable resources),it would not happen overnight. COUNTRYMAN