MACEDONIA'S PATH TO NATO: GREECE AND THE NAME ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001131 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 TAGS: GR MARR NATO PREL SUBJECT: MACEDONIA'S PATH TO NATO: GREECE AND THE NAME ISSUE REF: SKOPJE 416 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES RIES. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1.(C) SUMMARY: In managing U.S. interests in Greece's long dispute with Macedonia over the latter's name, Embassy Athens' primary goal is to prevent Greece from interposing obstacles to Macedonia's NATO membership at the point that an invitation is otherwise timely. We can succeed in doing that by: -- Active lobbying in this election year to keep GoG officials from boxing themselves into a position of blocking Macedonia's membership invitation, should it be merited on the substance; -- Privately assuring the Greeks that the U.S. will NOT press for Macedonia to be admitted to NATO under the name "Republic of Macedonia"; -- A careful choice of words in U.S. public statements, particularly during the President's June 10 visit to Tirana. ¶2. (C) The secondary goal is less urgent, but more ambitious: to use the window between Greek elections this fall and the Bucharest NATO Summit to promote progress, or even completion, of a permanent resolution of the name. The Greek prescription for accomplishing this -- "more U.S. pressure on Skopje" -- is wrongheaded. But the Greek analysis -- that those few months present a unique opportunity to settle this vexing issue -- is on the mark. A subsequent cable will contain recommendations on the role the U.S. can play to push the two parties toward such an outcome. END SUMMARY. GREEK POLITICAL DYNAMICS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Greek foreign policy esablishment, including FM Bakoyannis, former F Molyviatis, and PM Karamanlis' staff, have recently begun to focus on upcoming decisions about NATO membership for Macedonia, from the uniquely Greek perspective of the name under which the invitation will be issued. Unfortunately, the Greek press also has been unhelpfully speculating on the issue, muddying the issues and raising political temperatures. The public debate holds the risk that the Greek Government will -- wittingly or not -- paint itself into a corner on the issue, complicating the NATO process and posing an unnecessary risk to an otherwise pro-American Greek Government facing competitive national elections this fall. ¶4. (C) Our assessment is that FM Bakoyannis has offensive and defensive interests on the name issue as the NATO decisions approach. Offensively, she would like to use the pressure of the NATO accession process -- and the hint of a Greek veto -- to reach an overall, new, and lasting accommodation with Skopje on the name. Greek industry already has major investments in Macedonia and there is a natural economic symbiosis between the two countries, which are astride the main north-south transportation corridor for the new Balkans. Apart from the fundamental dispute on the name, Greece and Macedonia have been (by Balkan standards) pretty good neighbors. ¶5. (C) Defensively, FM Bakoyannis and the PM at all costs want to prevent any new purported Greek "defeat" on the name issue, since it would be exploited in the national elections by the right-wing "LAOS" party, based in the Greek province of Macedonia. Along with a host of neo-racist and anti-U.S. positions, a hard line on the name is LAOS' signature issue. If "LAOS" can figure a way to ride the name issue over the three-percent Parliamentary threshold, it could gravely complicate New Democracy's electoral arithmetic and could even allow PASOK to sneak back into government. MOLYVIATIS: STICK WITH INTERIM AGREEMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) When he was Foreign Minister (2004-06),Petros Molyviatis held to the firm and explicit policy that Greece would abide by the 1995 Interim Agreement (IA). In the IA, the Greek Government committed not to object to Macedonia's membership in Euro-Atlantic structures under the name of FYROM, unless another name was mutually agreed by the two parties. Like other Greek leaders over the years, Molyviatis was firm against any "dual-name" approach (which would have one name for bilateral use by Greece and another, the constitutional name, for everyone and everything else). Greek concern is over the irredentism and purported non-respect of the Macedonians for Greek equities inherent in the concept of "Macedonia" in general and competition for the symbol of Alexander the Great in particular. In pursuance of his strategy, Molyviatis supported Matthew Nimetz' March 2005 proposal of "Republika Macedonija-Skopje" as a single name and was greatly disappointed when Nimetz came out with a dual name as a second 2005 proposal. BAKOYANNIS: USE NATO ACCESSION TO SOLVE ISSUE -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Bakoyannis, during her March visit to Washington, signaled (but did not explicitly state) a departure from Greece's long commitment to the Interim Agreement by indicating that Greece could not ratify NATO membership if the name issue were still unresolved. More recently, public statements by Bakoyannis and PM Karamanlis have been along the same line. The GoG now argues that by failing to address the name issue, and by taking provocative actions such as renaming the Skopje airport after Alexander the Great, Macedonia is failing to meet its NATO MAP obligations to maintain good neighborly relations and is violating certain sections of the Interim Agreement. Beyond the public statements, Greek reasoning seems to be that NATO membership is one of the few levers Athens has left to get Skopje to compromise (the even stronger lever -- EU membership for Macedonia -- is years away from being an actual issue). With the perception that international opinion is moving in Macedonia's favor -- with more than 90 countries recognizing it by its constitutional name -- the GoG seems embarked on a high-risk strategy to force a compromise by Skopje. An essential part of their thinking is that only the U.S. has the capability to force Macedonia to compromise. ¶8. (C) This strategy is risky for the GoG in two ways. First, it creates a risk that the Greek public will perceive Macedonia's accession EVEN -- repeat EVEN -- under the name "FYROM" (which most NATO members, including the U.S., would see as the least contentious solution) to be an embarrassing climb-down by the government. Second, it sets the U.S. up as the fall-guy for the embarrassment, which the GoG may be counting on as a reason for Washington to intervene with Skopje. If so, of course, they will be disappointed; the U.S. is far better placed to withstand Greek public criticism than the GoG is. ¶9. (C) Our assessment remains that, in the end, the GoG is unlikely to veto Macedonian accession under the "FYROM" name. If Greek elections are held in October (as most expect),the GoG may keep up the tough rhetoric only until Election Day and then gradually back away from it. Even if the drumbeat continues after October, the Greek PM would have to think long and hard before taking a decision that would annoy (if not infuriate) all of Greece's Allies. However, we cannot be 100-percent confident of a "no objection" from Greece. The risk is that today's rhetoric will box in the GoG, and that -- even after the fall elections -- a veto of accession absent agreement on the name will look like an attractiQ%QQ %PQ)%f&QQ QQ& (A) T! forestall that, the A-"a11!$)Q Q),, %%0(!Q)*e )n his farewell calls !" Q(% PM !"d BM (JQ*% 6 and 8) that: -- the C!E Q%!!!B)J% Qh% Qa$)tical trap it may be layin! "!QQ )QQe$"QQQ %% Qhe GoG lower the volume o" )QQ rh%QiRiaQQ -- the GoG should not respond to every perceived provocation from Skopje; -- the GoG should recognize that the U.S. is neither obligated nor capable to force Skopje into a compromise that Athens finds acceptable; -- the GoG reaffirm its Interim Agreement commitment to agree to accession as "FYROM". FEAR OF A TIRANA SURPRISE -------------- ¶11. (C) We have heard from both Bakoyannis and one of the PM's closest aides that the government is acutely anxious that in Tirana June 10 the President will state his "decision" that NATO invitations should be extended to Macedonia, as well as Croatia. A "Tirana surprise" would be a big blow to Karamanlis, already reeling from a pension fund scandal. The FM understands that we have not yet completed our evaluation of the candidacies, and that our public statements will offer strong encouragement to the candidacies of Skopje and Tirana. Still, if the President were to state a position that is characterized here as early endorsement of an invitation to Macedonia, it would undercut the GoG's timetable for managing the name/accession decision next year. As the FM put it, the Macedonians should not feel that they have "U.S. support in their pocket." In this regard, Embassy Athens believes that the points contained in reftel are just right for public and private use by the President. U.S. PREFERENCE FOR THE ACCESSION NAME -------------- ¶12. (C) The GoG feels compelled to respond to the themes in the Greek media, despite the latter's penchant for fact-free reporting. Inexplicably, most papers in Athens (and many GoG officials) are convinced that the USG will insist that NATO approve accession for the "Republic of Macedonia" rather than "FYROM". We are not aware of any statement by any U.S. official or Allied official suggesting that NATO accession must take place as "ROM" or ruling out "FYROM." It would be tremendously helpful in controlling the rumor mills (and the worst instincts of Greek politicians) if the Department authorized us to tell the GoG privately (and -- ideally -- publicly) the following: "The U.S. does not insist -- and will not insist -- that the Republic of Macedonia's eventual accession to NATO occur under the name "Republic of Macedonia." As in all previous decisions regarding the country, the U.S. is prepared to join the NATO consensus for either "Republic of Macedonia" or "FYROM." RIES