PARAGUAY SCENESETTER FOR SOUTHCOM COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000285 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR MASS SNAR PA SUBJECT: PARAGUAY SCENESETTER FOR SOUTHCOM COMMANDER Classified By: POLCOUNS JAMES P. MERZ; Reasons 1.4(b),(d) ¶1. (C) Admiral Staviridis, Embassy Asuncion warmly welcomes your visit as an opportunity to promote U.S. interests focused on strengthening democratic institutions, promoting sound economic policies and good governance, disrupting criminal organizations, and combating terrorist financing. You come at a particularly sensitive time, with President Duarte weakened and much of the body politic focused on Presidential Elections scheduled for May 2008. Neighboring governments -- immediate and more distant -- and segments within Paraguay routinely call into question important aspects of our security relationship. Many Paraguayans - inside and outside the government - however, support closer U.S. ties, in particular as a political and economic counterbalance to the influence Brazil wields over Paraguay and in response to concern about growing cooperation between Venzuela-Bolivia, including in the military sphere. ¶2. (SBU) An overview of the current situation in Paraguay follows, highlighting key issues which may come up in your scheduled meetings. Your Program in Asuncion -------------- ¶3. (U) Post is glad to have this opportunity to host your visit to Paraguay. You will meet with the Ambassador first and then with the Country Team to obtain brief on the overall situation in Paraguay with a particular focus on CT issues. We have arranged for you to visit both the Minister of Defense, Dr. Roberto Gonzalez Segovia, and the Commander of Armed Forces, GEN Bernardino Soto Estigarribia, and his service chiefs. Your meetings with them afford the opportunity to strengthen existing rapport, and to discuss ways to advance U.S. bilateral security cooperation, particularly military exercises. As this will be your first visit to Paraguay, we believe that you will find your stay to be both enjoyable and fruitful. The Political Scene ¶4. (C) Your visit comes four years into the presidency of Nicanor Duarte Frutos. In that time, Duarte has taken steps to deal with a pressing fiscal crisis, revive the economy, and fight corruption. In the last year, however, political support for Duarte has sagged with polls indicating the general population is not satisfied his government has taken adequate measures to create jobs, improve the economy and tackle corruption. Duarte has also taken a shift toward the left, criticizing President Bush and stressing greater appreciation for Venezuelan President Chavez, and his "commitment" to the region. Duarte continues to seek a Constitutional amendment allowing for his reelection. Much of the population as well as the opposition parties and some within the Colorado Party (who seek to back other candidates) are dead-set against reelection. Duarte's reelection prospects, while remote, are not dead. Meanwhile, he is looking to identify a potential presidential candidate to succeed him, favoring his Education Minister Blanca Ovelar over Vice President Castiglioni should the amendment not come to fruition. Vice President Luis Castiglioni formally declared his intention to seek the Colorado nomination March 28 further complicating the messy political scene. Leftist priest Fernando Lugo represents the opposition's leading candidate though he faces a potential legal challenge himself as the Constitution bars "ministers" from seeking political office. Paraguay,s Public Security Challenges ¶5. (C) Twelve members of the Free Fatherland Party (PPL) - a far-left, rural-based political movement - were found guilty in 2006 for the kidnapping and murder of the daughter of former president Raul Cubas. The body of Cecilia Cubas was discovered in February 2005. Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia have yet to estradite others implicated who took refuge abroad. Evidence ties the PPL to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Cubas kidnapping has proven to be one in a series of events over recent years to suggest the emergence of a political movement bent on provoking instability through violence. A culture of distrust, allowing for little inter-institutional cooperation, hampers the ability of Paraguay's law enforcement community and military to tackle rising concerns about public security; Paraguay,s National Police are widely disparaged by the general population as incompetent and corrupt, and the police and military are rivals, not partners. The Cubas killing and clear evidence of FARC involvement shocked Paraguay,s leaders and population. Increased cooperation with Colombia and the U.S. and the realization of the need for better intelligence and other security measures were positive, if ironic, results of the Cubas case. Concern over the PPL has died down since the conviction while, internal security concerns have risen. Of late, major robberies and kidnappings of an apparently criminal nature, including alleged terrorist financier Mohammad Barakat, are on the rise, particularly in Ciudad del Este. Reforming the Economy, But Growth Insufficient ¶6. (U) Paraguay,s economy relies heavily on agriculture. It features bloated but weak state institutions and the heavy involvement of state-owned enterprises. There is considerable activity involving the trading of imported legitimate goods, contraband and counterfeit products, most of which are destined for Brazil or Argentina. President Duarte took office in 2003 inheriting a weak economy and promising to attack widespread corruption and reform the economy. He named a non-partisan, technocratic economic cabinet and has supported their efforts. On a macroeconomic level, Paraguay,s performance has been strong: economic growth reached 4 percent in 2006 and inflation was 12.5 percent. However, whereas the government succeeded early on in getting some significant economic reform laws through Congress, progress over the three years has been slow. The confrontation between Congress and the Executive has all but frozen any reform efforts that require legislation; the Congress has rejected several loans (from the IDB, EU and Japan) and suspended for one year the application of the previously authorized personal income tax. For Paraguay to escape from the poverty affecting roughly half of its population, the country needs to increase productivity by attracting capital and raising annual growth rates to at least 5 or 6 percent -- and sustaining them there. Success will require the government to stay the course on macroeconomic stability and undertake deeper structural reforms. But as the President now gears up for a bruising 2007 fight over re-election, there is no sign of the political will. International Crime and Counter Terrorism ¶7. (U) The Tri-Border Area (TBA),the region of Paraguay that meets Brazil and Argentina near the city of Ciudad del Este, is a primary USG concern. The area, with its loose borders and lax controls, is a a hub for transnational criminal activity including drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms trafficking, intellectual piracy, document forgery, and contraband. Brazil has tightened its border controls forcing the trafficking of contraband downward, however, the evidence significant money continues to flow out of CDE to the Middle East. Brazil has begun erecting a wall around its customs facility on the border that has raised some controversy. 8.(SBU)Paraguay is widely regarded as the weakest link in combating the wide range of illicit activities that occur in the TBA. Corruption at multiple levels undercuts serious law enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, Paraguay has taken serious steps to address its institutional deficiencies by creating special units, principally in Customs and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) to investigate more effectively IPR violations and customs fraud. The MIC,s Specialized Technical Unit (UTE) in particular has made a number of significant seizures of counterfeit products. These units receive significant assistance from the USG in the form of INL funds or the MCC Threshold Program. ¶9. (SBU) Paraguay,s Anti-Money Laundering Secretariat (SEPRELAD) has also received technical assistance and equipment from the U.S. Paraguay has subscribed to all 12 UN counter-terror conventions but its anti-money laundering law is lacking in that it does not allow for prosecution of money laundering as an autonomous crime. Nor does Paraguay yet have counter terrorism legislation. Paraguay seeks to meet its international obligations through provisions in a series of three bills. UNCTC Executive Ruperez approved of the draft legislation text when he visited in July 2007. The first bill establishing money laundering and terrorist financing as crimes and setting out the consequent penalties was delivered to Congress this October. The bill on procedural tools for the prosecution of these crimes remains under arduous debate before a Legislative Reform Commission and could face much of the same when it is submitted to Congress. The law establishing SEPRELAD,s regulatory authorities has been drafted but not yet submitted to Congress pending movement on the first bill. Paraguay,s SEPRELAD could face suspension from the Egmont Group should this bill not be adopted before June. In December, Treasury designated nine individuals and two entities from the TBA for involvement in terrorist financing. Publicly, Paraguay subscribes to the Brazilian line that terrorist financing is not a problem. However, on a constructive note, in the absence of an effective money laundering law, Paraguay has prosecuted three alleged Hizballah terrorist financiers for tax evasion. ¶10. (SBU) Paraguay is a significant transit point for the transportation of cocaine and other narcotics by air from Colombia and Bolivia to Brazil. Much of the northwestern part of the country is barren and uninhabited, and the GOP has difficulties in enforcing the law due to geography and the political (and judicial) power some drug traffickers wield. Paraguay,s Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD),the single-most effective law enforcement body in Paraguay, coordinates GOP interdiction efforts, with significant assistance from the DEA and support from US Special Forces advisors. ¶11. (SBU) In 2004, Paraguay and Brazil collaborated in a joint operation, with DEA assistance that produced an historic seizure of over 260 kilograms of cocaine and the arrest of Brazilian drug kingpin Ivan Carlos Mendes Mesquita, wanted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. Paraguay cooperated with the USG extradition request and Mendes Mesquita was taken into U.S. custody in 2005, a dramatic and unprecedented step. Working closely with the U.S., SENAD has effectively targeted Brazilian trafficking groups that are run mostly out of Pedro Juan Caballero (PJC) on Paraguay,s northern border with Brazil. Within the past year, SENAD has made a number of significant arms seizures with evidence signaling links to Brazil,s PCC and Colombia,s FARC. While these weapons were seized in PJC and Asuncion, arms and drug trafficking also occur out of CDE. Presently, SENAD is hard-pressed to meet challenges in that region for lack of resources (its national annual budget is just $2 million). SENAD will inaugurate a helipad in PJC on April 11, the second phase of State Department funded ($500,000) project, creating a SENAD facility in the region and a potential base from which to launch operations. SENAD Director Ibarra will appeal to you for SOUTHCOM assistance to fund fuel and helicopter maintenance. Regional Concerns ¶12. (SBU) The political situation in Bolivia is on the political radar screen in Paraguay but not in a major way. Some commentators have conveyed concern that instability in Bolivia could lend itself to a higher flow of drugs or other illicit activity from that country. Some Paraguayan military officials have conveyed to me a concern about lingering irredentist claims within some segments of the Bolivian military to territory in the Chaco -- a vast region in Western Paraguay that borders Bolivia and served as the site of a war with Paraguay in the 1930s -- that could stir controversy and tension should Bolivia suffer an extended period of instability. Reported discoveries of potential commercially significant natural gas resources near the Bolivian border could add fuel to such concerns. Lastly, Brazil and Paraguay rely on Bolivian infrastructure for land traffic extending to the Pacific coast that could be jeopardized in the event of instability in Bolivia. Some Bolivian commentators, including political officials, have signaled concern that the U.S. sought to establish a military base in the Chaco for the purpose of monitoring activities in Bolivia or attempting to control energy resources in the Bolivian and Paraguayan Chaco region. All things considered, however, Bolivia does not figure large in Paraguay's foreign relations -- or vice versa -- and most Paraguayan decision makers devote fleeting attention to developments in Bolivia. ¶13. (SBU) Despite preoccupation with close-to-home terrorism issues including kidnappings, local violent radicals, the FARC, and fund-raising for Hezbollah, Paraguay is reluctant to take a lead in the war on terrorism beyond its borders. This is due to pressure from Brazil as well as domestic concerns that an aggressive anti-terrorism policy (e.g., vis a vis the Middle East) will draw terrorist reprisals. In addition, memories of abuses under the Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1989) still cast a long shadow. In 2004, President Duarte received JCS Chairman General Myers but then made a public show of announcing that Paraguay would not send a contingent to Iraq despite having volunteered to do so to President Bush a year earlier. Given false allegations the U.S. wants to establish a military base in Paraguay, we recommend tailoring any public remarks about Paraguay,s role in the GWOT in a way that will not lend fuel to these false claims. It is perhaps best to focus interlocutors on attacking corruption and the facilitation of international crime as a way to improve Paraguay,s international image. ¶14. (C) The political situation in Bolivia and the activities of President Evo Morales are currently at the center of the political radar screen in Paraguay. Some Paraguayans have conveyed to us a concern about lingering irredentist claims within some segments of the Bolivian military to territory in the Chaco - a vast region in Western Paraguay that borders Bolivia and served as the site of a war with Paraguay in the 1930s - that could stir controversy and tension should Bolivia suffer an extended period of instability. Brazil and Paraguay rely on Bolivian infrastructure for land traffic extending to the Pacific coast that could be jeopardized in the event of instability in Bolivia. Late last year, some Bolivian commentators, including political officials, have signaled concern that the U.S. sought to establish a military base in the Chaco for the purpose of monitoring activities in Bolivia or attempting to control energy resources in the Bolivian and Paraguayan Chaco region. Paraguay and Bolivia relations have cooled over the Venezuelan and Bolivian Military Agreement announced last fall. Some within the Paraguayan government, civil society and the media have expressed the desire for Paraguay to enter into a bilateral security agreement with the United States. A small circle of senior government officials is currently considering a USG-proposed 5-year SOFA granting A&T privileges and immunities for US military personnel but the main obstacle seems to be President Duarte. ¶15. (U) Paraguay and Bolivia signed a security/defense agreement at the end of March, which included a joint communique on dengue fever. The agreement aims to improve communication and information exchange as a way to address as a way to address mutual suspicions. It also details plans for the 6th High Military Command Meeting in Asuncion on September 10-12 to increase military-to-military exchanges and ties. U.S. Activities ¶16. (SBU) U.S. activities in Paraguay are focused on strengthening democratic institutions, promoting sound economic policies and good governance, disrupting criminal organizations, and combating terrorist financing. Post maintains bilateral assistance programs dealing with combating narcotics trafficking, money laundering, intellectual property violations, and trafficking in persons. A Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor and advisors from Treasury,s Office of Technical Assistance have worked quietly behind the scenes over the last three years to assist the Paraguayan Government in developing appropriate money laundering and counter-terror legislation. In the wake of the Cubas kidnapping, Vice President Castiglioni traveled to the U.S. for meetings with VP Cheney, former SECDEF Rumsfeld, and other key officials to discuss a comprehensive approach to Paraguay,s security challenges, including a high-level seminar sponsored by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) that was held in September 2005. Former SECDEF Rumsfeld visited Paraguay in August 2005. At the end of 2006, CHDS followed-up with comprehensive meetings on transformation and reformation of the military. Paraguay has expressed interest in acquiring technical assistance in development of its National Security Strategy and National Defense Plan. USAID and the Peace Corps also have programs in the country. Paraguay began to implement a USD 35 million Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program in May 2006; its poor historical record on corruption was the major reason it did not qualify for full participation in the program. The Threshold Program focuses on combating impunity and informality. ¶18. (C) Notwithstanding, President Duarte's decision last October not to extend SOFA protections to U.S. military personnel, U.S. military cooperation with Paraguay has continued, albeit under a lower profile. While MEDRETES have been suspended for the time being, but teams of Special Forces advisors, obstensibly unarmed since the Senate has not approved the entry of "troops" as required by the Constitution, are scheduled to interface with their Paraguayan counterparts on several different occasions throughout the year. A team of 13 entered Paraguay in late March and is scheduled to remain for three months. This subject is sensitive and we have not yet spoken to it in public. We continue to negotiate the terms of a new SOFA but are not optimistic about prospects for progress in before May 2008 elections. Separately, we are hopeful about concluding a 505 Assurance Agreement with Paraguayan through an exchange of notes with the Foreign Ministry the week of your visit. This agreement will enable us to proceed with disbursement of $1.1 million for GPOI funds. We are also providing Paraguay with some $3.5 million in 1208 funds for weapons and other equipment. The Military's Mission ¶19. (SBU) Paraguay's military is a small force struggling to redefine its mission notwithstanding insufficient funding and intermittant scandals. The Army is the largest of the three services (6,000),followed by the Navy (2,000) and Air Force (1,200). The Navy has a law enforcement mission on Paraguay's rivers. The military's primary mission is to protect Paraguay,s territorial integrity, defend the legitimate authorities in accordance with the Constitution, and cooperate in civil defense. It does not have a lead role in counter drug operations; however, the military provides a specialized tactical unit to support SENAD. The military's Special Forces unit is in the process of organizing a company-size counterterrorism unit, and the Presidential Guard Unit has a specialized counterterrorist platoon. More recently, Paraguay has attempted to increase its presence in peacekeeping operations. Brazil is supporting Paraguay's deployment of 33 personnel to Haiti. ¶20. (U) Military infrastructure and equipment is old, obsolete and in desperate need of repair/replacement. Paraguay,s defense budget for 2007 represents approximately 1.9 percent of the national budget or USD 72M. Ninety percent of the budget is used to pay salaries and 5 percent is used for sustaining conscripts, leaving only 5 percent for operations, maintenance and training. Budget problems are not expected to go away in the near future due to lack of strong support in congress and lingering memories of Paraguay's 35-year dictatorship among some politicians. ¶21. (U) Despite the above-noted challenges, the military has remained subordinate to civilian authority. When called, it has supported law enforcement activities, public health campaigns and provided transportation assistance for farmers to bring their products to market. The military is still seen as the first to be called whenever there is a "crisis," and many Paraguayans feel "safer" when the military is out on the streets with the police. The President called upon the military to support the police in November 2004 in the wake of the Cubas kidnapping and ensuing sense of insecurity; military remains on the streets today. The role of the Presidential Guard and its former leader, Col. Galeano, had created controversy. With its own armor, artillery and other material, and better trained troops, it is the strongest unit in country and acts independently. The new commandant of the Presidential Guard is Lt. Col. Jose Casaccia. Strong Record of Military Cooperation ¶22. (U) Post's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) has developed a robust JCET/CNT program, second to only that of Colombia in the region, and implemented the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program contributing significantly toward establishment of host nation CT capability, including designation and creation of a Paraguayan Tier 1 unit. Funding from the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Cooperation (EIPC) program has facilitated the training of over 1,081 observers and peacekeepers and the deployment of approximately 101 Paraguayans in support of peacekeeping operations in this hemisphere and Africa. Separately, ODC has also launched an outreach program, leveraging the State Partnership Program, designed to encourage the military to build institutional links with legislators in part through visits by Paraguayan Congressmen as well as Flag officers from the Joint Staff and Ministry of Defense with their counterparts in the U.S. The partnership with the Massachusetts National Guard is robust; the MANG designation of a full time TCA coordinator from MANG has greatly promoted this lash up. These visits have generated greater appreciation for the value of military cooperation. Article 98/Immunities ¶23. (SBU) We do not have an Article 98 agreement with Paraguay. Last year, the MFA formally informed us that it was not prepared to sign an agreement with. The Impact of Your Visit ¶24. (U) You are unlikely to encounter the press as jounalists generally do not stake out the Ministry of Defense where your two most important meetings will take place. Should you encounter press, it is worth noting Paraguayan journalists are generally friendly people. Even if you have no time, it is better to stop and answer a question or two than to refuse questions. If you refuse, then it becomes a case of offended reporters claiming "secret meetings." Some anodyne talking points you might consider in the even press does find you and asks questions: Purpose of visit -- I assumed command of SouthCom last October. It is customary and traditional for newly-appointed SouthCom Commanders to make courtesy visits with counterparts in the region. -- This is an initial visit to Paraguay to meet key civilian and military leaders of a valued friend. -- (important to note) Paraguay is my first stop on this trip. From here, I travel to Argentina where I will meet with Argentine counterparts. Rumors of a base -- Reports of the basing of U.S. troops are without any basis in fact. -- The US Government has no interest in basing troops in Paraguay. Guarani aquifer (rumors that the U.S. wants to steal Paraguay's supply of fresh water) -- I have heard of these rumors and they are without basis in fact. -- The U.S. has access to adequate water supplies. In the unlikely event of a crisis, there are sources much closer and more cost-effective. (tongue in cheek) Bringing the water by air or a pipeline across the continent of South America are not realistic options. International Crime and Counter-terrorism -- As clearly outlined in the U.S. report on global terrorism, we believe the activities in the Tri-Border Area are basically fundraising and financing) not operational in nature. -- We rely on the authorities in the countries involved to provide the legal structure to allow the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of persons involved in such activities. -- We are pleased by Paraguay's active cooperation in the fight against terrorism. It has taken important steps to counter this grave problem and was instrumental in helping strengthen regional cooperation with the U.S. (through the "3 plus 1" mechanism). But where is your proof that Paraguay funds terrorists? -- We never said that "Paraguay" funds terrorists, but rather individuals in Paraguay (specifically in the Tri-Border Area) fund organizations engaged in terrorist activities. -- President Duarte mentioned the threat from terrorist financing in his 2005 annual message to Congress -- Illicit activity, particularly along the tri-Border, fosters corruption, discourages investment, inhibits economic development, and creates a milieu favorable to money launderers and terrorist financiers. -- In recent years, Paraguay has convicted individuals for tax evasion who have also been implicated in laundering money to terrorist groups. -- It is vital Paraguay continue to prosecute and convict those implicated in illicit activity, including money laundering and terrorist financing. Anti-drug effort -- Paraguay is making an important effort against drug trafficking, despite limited resources -- We are confident there will be continued good performance in this area, which will benefit the Paraguayan people, as well as the region at large. ¶Q. What will SOUTHCOM be providing Paraguay to meet its security challenges? Can you give us radars and helicopters? -- The U.S. has provided Paraguay millions of dollars in funds to assist Paraguay in combating narcotics trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and intellectual property rights piracy. -- Those funds support training for judges, prosecutors, and police, purchase of equipment, and conduct of operations. -- Since 1987, the U.S. has donated over USD 6.6 million to assist Paraguay's law enforcement efforts. ¶Q. What will SOUTHCOM do to help Paraguay deal with the threat posed by the FARC? -- Evidence of FARC ties to the Cubas kidnapping is very disturbing. The FARC has demonstrated its readiness to commit any number of atrocities, including kidnappings and other forms of terrorism, to advance its objectives. -- The U.S. recognizes Paraguay's commitment to address this problem. We are exploring ways we can support Paraguay, particularly in the law enforcement field, with appropriate training. ¶25. (SBU) For your background, we also provide press guidance prepared to deal more in depth with the senstive issue of ongoing military cooperation with Paraguay absent an agreement providing protections and Senate approval for the entry of "troops." ¶Q. Now that the bilateral agreement allowing MEDRETEs and joint military training exercises (18-month agreement, June 2005-December 2006) has expired, are there any U.S. troops in Paraguay? Are there any joint military exercises or MEDRETEs underway, or planned? ¶A. Absent Government of Paraguay approval, there are no MEDRETES, and there are no joint military exercises scheduled for 2007. However, a variety of other military to military cooperation activities continue on a professional and technical level with the Paraguayan Armed Forces, much as we have been doing for more than 60 years. ¶Q. What are these activities that you mentioned? ¶A. The United States military maintains close cooperation with many countries through out the world, and the relationship we enjoy with Paraguay is not unusual. For example, the United States and Paraguay are working together to develop peacekeeping operation abilities. The U.S. is supportive of the Government of Paraguay,s efforts to deploy peace keeping units or observers to Haiti, Cyprus, and other locations around the world in UNITED NATIONS peacekeeping operations. We also support GOP efforts to improve the Paraguayan military,s capability in responding to disasters and in other types of humanitarian efforts. Unfortunately, the Paraguayan government has not authorized any MEDRETEs, the mobile medical clinics that are very important in supporting humanitarian efforts. In close coordination and cooperation with the Government of Paraguay, we also conduct a variety of seminars, conferences, orientation visits, advisory and instructional activities for the Armed Forces of Paraguay. For example, there are subject matter expert exchanges in stopping illegal narcotics and arms trafficking, responding to terrorism, and protecting the sovereignty of the country. We have also provided technical medical analysis regarding how to control dengue fever. All these activities are coordinated through the Embassy,s Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in conjunction with, and at the request of, the Government of Paraguay. For more details on the nature of this cooperation we refer you to the Paraguayan Military Forces. ¶Q. Do the military personnel working in the ODC have immunity? No. Absent an agreement, participants in military cooperation activities presently do not enjoy protections. ¶Q. How are these efforts different from the other military activities that were executed last year under the previous agreement? Last Year: The Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs),MEDRETEs and Fuerzas Comando Exercises conducted last year were designed for the training of both U.S. forces and the Paraguayan armed forces, side-by-side. Military personnel from both nations learned from each other and trained together. The MEDRETES, for example, provided an opportunity for U.S. and Paraguayan medical personnel to work side by side to provide medical care, dental and veterinary care to citizens in remote parts of the country where doctors and medical personnel are often not available. The military units here last year for non-MEDRETE exercises used their own weapons and equipment while training with the Paraguayan military. All exercises had been coordinated and approved by the GOP and the Paraguayan Senate as is stipulated in the Paraguayan Constitution. Now: The military personnel that are in country today are technical experts and advisors who enter Paraguay unarmed and work with various branches of the Paraguayan armed forces or other Government of Paraguay offices. (If pressed: For example, SENAD). ¶Q. How many U.S. military personnel are there in Paraguay right now? ¶A. US military personnel that come to Paraguay to work with the US Embassy enter with the full approval of the Government of Paraguay organization with which they work. There are many different types of military personnel that support the various US Embassy offices and as a general rule we do not like to get into specifics on numbers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has our list of accredited personnel. If pressed for an actual number: In a general terms, an approximate number of U.S. military persons here at any one point would be about two dozen (24 people, or so) in a variety of different assignments, including office support workers inside the Embassy. ¶Q. How long will this military cooperation continue? We hope that the GOP will continue to want and support our military to military cooperation efforts because or our long standing history of more than 60 years. We feel that cooperation is beneficial to both our militaries and countries. As we have seen this year, the level of cooperation is an ongoing project between our two countries subject to the approval of the sovereign nation of Paraguay. The ambassador has said that we are continuing to negotiate with the GOP in the hopes that Paraguayans can benefit from activities such as MEDRETEs and engineering exercises. FACT: In the most recent period of MEDRETEs, from July 2005 to December 2006, Paraguayan patients treated by doctors and receiving free medicines totalled 56,484 patients. Veterinarians treated 2,533 animals. (source: ODC) ¶Q. Where are the US military personnel located? ¶A. Because many of these military personnel are here at the request of the Paraguayan military, we refer you to the Military Forces Headquarters regarding these specific questions. ¶Q. The U.S. has provided military equipment, medicines, and other supplies to the Paraguayan Government in the past, during the JCETs, MEDRETEs, etc. Will the current US efforts continue bringing military equipment and supplies as part of our programs? ¶A. Yes. Our military-to-military cooperation programs provide for the donation of some equipment and training. For specific info, we refer you to the FFAA. If pressed: In general terms, the United States is currently providing approximately USD two million dollars of cooperative assistance to the FFAA, including: -- $1.1 million for Peace Keeping equipment and training, -- $250,000 for professional and technical military education and training (IMET), -- $250,000 for professional and technical military training in CT courses, -- approximately $500,000 for seminars, conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and orientation visits.) ¶Q. Is there information on the C-17s and other military cargo planes that occasionally land at Asuncion,s airport? ¶A. C-17s and other cargo aircraft stop briefly in Asuncion on routine flights that usually bring some American foods, office equipment, and personal household goods for the use of personnel assigned to various U.S. Embassies in the region. At times the flights also bring in some of the equipment and supplies that will be donated to the GOP. Normally, these aircraft unload at the Paraguayan Air Force terminal. All U.S. military aircraft that land in Paraguay obtain permission to do so from DINAC, the GOP civil air authority, and do so in close coordination with the Paraguayan Air Force. ¶Q. How long have these flights been occurring? ¶A. This type of routine air cargo service regularly serves American embassies around the world. These flights have come to Paraguay regularly for more than 60 years. In fact, they used to be much more frequent, but have decreased significantly as the Embassy buys more and more products from the local economy. CASON