PFDJ CHIEF VIEWS ON SUDAN, THE BORDER AND SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000874 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PREL KPKO PTER SO SU ER SUBJECT: PFDJ CHIEF VIEWS ON SUDAN, THE BORDER AND SOMALIA Classified By: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 8, CDA met at her request with Yemane Ghebreab, Head of the Office of Political Affairs for Eritrea's sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). Discussion topics included the recent UN/AU Darfur meetings in Libya, the Eritrean-Ethiopian border situation, Somalia and the presence of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in Eritrea. While the conversation yielded little new in terms of GSE policy positions, Ghebreab's expression of interest in continuing discussions on a range of U.S.-Eritrean bilateral matters marked a departure from last spring, when he expressly stipulated PFDJ-Embassy dialogue would be limited to issues concerning the Darfur peace process. End Summary. -------------- -------------- GSE'S PERSPECTIVE ON DARFUR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SPLM -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ghebreab offered positive feedback on the recent Darfur talks in Sirte, commenting that attendance had been good and coordination between the regional actors and the UN/AU team was improving. Although encouraged by the initial accomplishments of these talks, Ghebreab expressed concern that divisions within Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU) and the instability and disorganization within the Darfur rebel groupings could lead to failure in future phases of the negotiations. In addition, the Libyan's and international community's focus on absent Darfur leaders Khalil Ibraham of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Abdulwahid Nur of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) sent the wrong message to those Darfurians who had attended. Ghebreab opined that as long as the other Darfur leaders were present and engaged, a viable Darfur political process could proceed without either Abdulwahid or Khalil. ¶3. (C) Ghebreab noted that the regional partners, including Egypt, and the UN/AU planned to meet in Asmara the week of November 13. He hoped the discussions would result in a plan for next steps in the negotiation process, including a plan of action in the event the current initiative falls apart. Ghebreab emphasized the importance of continued U.S.-Eritrean coordination on issues of Darfur as well as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). He expressed particular interest in meeting with Special Envoy Natsios on Sudan issues. ¶4. (C) As in past meetings, Ghebreab underscored the GSE's belief in the critical importance of maintaining the CPA as the key to peace throughout Sudan. He noted that the recent crisis within the GNU had resulted in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) recognizing, for the first time, the extent of their internal problems. SPLM leaders serving in the GNU found their only fallback to be a weak and politically divided organization. Ghebreab said the SPLM is realizing that to be an effective part of, and counterbalance in, the GNU, the organization has to be unified and strengthened. Without a strong SPLM, the CPA will not be successful, he concluded. -------------- - BORDER STALEMATE: MORE DIPLOMACY NOT AN OPTION -------------- - ¶5. (C) CDA expressed concern over the military build-up and tensions at the border and firmly refuted claims published in the GSE-run media that the U.S. would support or condone any action by either Ethiopia or Eritrea that could provoke conflict. She added that our Embassy in Addis Ababa has delivered the same message to PM Meles. Ghebreab responded that U.S. backing "does not have to be direct support; there are other ways the U.S. can encourage Ethiopia." (Note: Ghebreab's comment echoes an observation from a recent International Crisis Group report on the border stalemate. End note.) Ghebreab assured CDA that the GSE has no plans or interest in going to war, adding the caveat that Ethiopia would instigate any conflict. The positions of the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) were defensive only, in order to protect against an Ethiopian invasion. CDA noted that Eritrea could ASMARA 00000874 002 OF 003 significantly reduce tensions by moving troops out of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),which would also remove this charge of GSE violations of the Algiers Agreement. Ghebreab responded predictably by noting the TSZ represents one quarter of Eritrean territory, and the most fertile. He attested to the need for the EDF to continue its economic activities in the TSZ. (Note: Post believes Ghebreab was referring to farming and other agricultural projects run by the EDF. End note.) ¶6. (C) CDA asked Ghebreab what diplomatic options the GSE might consider to resolve the border impasse and achieve normalization of relations with Ethiopia. Ghebreab said the GSE had been talking with UN Under Secretary Pascoe, but felt the UN has presented no viable new ideas. Ethiopia was the intractable party and in violation of international law, he added. For Eritrea, resolution of the border simply came down to implementing a legal decision. Ghebreab stated the GSE had tried to resolve border disagreements through diplomatic efforts before the 1998 war. Now, the GSE was "100 percent sure that diplomacy will not lead to the demarcation of the border." Ghebreab reiterated the GSE position that after the border is demarcated, Eritrea would welcome normalized relations with Ethiopia. -------------- -------------- ERITREA DOES NOT SUPPORT TERRORISTS; WHAT ABOUT AWEYS? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) CDA expressed concern about the presence of Sheikh Aweys in Asmara, noting that providing support to this individual violated UN Resolution 1267. Without addressing Aweys specifically, Ghebreab averred that the GSE has been one of the staunchest country supporters in global efforts to fight terrorism. The U.S. could not accuse Eritrea of supporting terrorism. He further stated that he had formerly chaired Eritrea's counterterrorism committee and the GSE "would willingly cooperate in the counterterrorism effort." CDA commented that she had seen no evidence of GSE counterterrorism cooperation during her tenure in Eritrea. Ghebreab offered to brief CDA on GSE counterterrorism efforts dating from 2001 in a future discussion. ¶8. (C) CDA inquired also about the GSE's support to the Tamil Tigers, in light of the allegations that appeared in the U.S. Senate hearing report in late summer 2007. With an enigmatic smile, Ghebreab refuted that the GSE has any direct links, opining that the Tamil Tigers have referred to the Eritrean struggle in their literature as a model in the Tamil Tigers' own fight for independence. -------------- -------------- GSE SUPPORTS SOMALIS RIGHT TO RESIST ETHIOPIAN OCCUPATION -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Ghebreab asserted that the GSE has evidence showing that the U.S. fully supported the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Reminding CDA of the long-standing ties between Somalia and the GSE leadership, he noted that Eritrea supports the Somali people in their fight against foreign occupiers. African troops will not end the violence in Mogadishu, he added, because they will not be allowed to intervene in disputes. While in the short term, the GSE benefited from the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, in the long term, a peaceful and stable Somalia was in the GSE's best interest. Peace would only be possible when Ethiopia withdrew its military forces, and these forces should be withdrawn immediately. Ghebreab described U.S. policy toward Somalia as "failed." He noted his willingness to discuss further issues of Somalia in greater depth. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) In his first meeting with the Embassy since August, Ghebreab offered no new insights or change in GSE thinking on Sudan, the border or Somalia. However, he appeared more open and engaged in this meeting than in those of recent past. Ghebreab's repeated statements about his willingness to ASMARA 00000874 003 OF 003 engage in further conversations on a range of policy issues provides a hopeful opening, particularly in light of the new Ambassador's approaching arrival, for more comprehensive and constructive discussion with the PFDJ and the GSE in the future. End Comment. MCINTYRE