FEEDBACK FROM ERITREA ON THE CLOSURE OF THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000681 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AF/E, LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2032 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC PINR ER SUBJECT: FEEDBACK FROM ERITREA ON THE CLOSURE OF THE CONSULATE IN OAKLAND REF: ASMARA 653 Classified By: RSO SEAN MCCLANAHAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Following notification on August 10 of the U.S. ordered closure of the Eritrean Consulate in Oakland, the Government of the State of Eritrea(GSE) remains officially quiet yet reports of great concern by the GSE trickle through to Embassy personnel. Members of Asmara's diplomatic community expressed both interest and support in the U.S. action. The media reports present the GSE's predictable and standard anti-American/pro-Ethiopia response to U.S. actions and statements. The absence of a formal response thus far is of no surprise as the GSE most likely is regrouping and developing a strategic and forceful long-term response to the U.S. action. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- UNOFFICIALLY, GSE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE AND PLANNING TO RESPOND -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) On August 13, RSO met with a source (reftel) who has regular contact with Tiagese Kiflezge, a low level desk officer on the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) America's desk. Kiflezge told source on August 11 he was unable to meet because "something bad had happened" and that he did not want to discuss it over the phone. On August 12, Kiflezge met in person with Source and shared that the U.S. had ordered the closure of the Consulate in Oakland. Kiflezge explained the GSE's response with a Tigrinya proverb that essentially describes the action as "being stabbed in the back." Kiflezge explained that the GSE receives approximately USD 400 million in remittances annually from Eritrean-Americans, over 60% of which comes through the Oakland consulate. Kiflezge stated the MFA held a special meeting on August 12, during which participants pondered how the U.S. knew that closing Oakland would be so catastrophic to the GSE. He went on, stating that it would take time to establish new networks to collect and funnel money to their Embassy in DC and that it would be difficult to maintain remittance collections at the same level. Kiflezge noted that Eritrean Missions are strategically located in countries in which the GSE can collect remittances instead of facilitating the more traditional roles of diplomacy and �0A;citizen services. He stated it would not have been as big of a problem if a consulate or embassy such as "Sweden" had been closed, but the Oakland closure was a catastrophic blow to the GSE. He commented that the GSE's previous actions precipitated the closure and admitted that it was long overdue. ¶3. (S/NF) Kiflezge offered further insight into the GSE's initial plans. According to him, later this week President Isaias and his cabinet will meet to discuss a response to the closure. He articulated concern that the worst case scenario for Eritrea would be if the U.S. Embassy in Asmara closes, which could lead to the closure of the Eritrean Embassy in Washington. An end to relations between the USG and the GSE and a further reduction of the GSE's ability to raise money in the U.S. would be extremely problematic for the GSE. Kiflezge said the GSE wants to keep news of the Oakland closure quiet and has no immediate intentions to broadcast it on any Eritrean news media. (Note: The state-owned Eri-TV issued a statement on August 13, that President Isaias would speak on U.S./Eritrean relations later in the week. End note.) ¶4. (S/NF) With regards to possible retaliation, Kiflezge shared the GSE had no immediate plans to retaliate against any Americans at Post, but they might respond by arresting Locally Engaged Staff (LES). Kiflezge then asked specifically about the function of the Foreign Service National Investigator (FSNI) and one of the Embassy drivers. ¶5. (S/NF) Further details of RSO's conversation with source are reported septel. -------------- -------------- OFFICIALLY, ERITREAN GOVERNMENT SAYS NEARLY NOTHING -------------- -------------- ASMARA 00000681 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) In a prearranged meeting to discuss Sudan on August 13, CDA and Conoff met with Yemane Ghebreab, the Director of Political Affairs for Eritrea's sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). CDA did not raise the issue and while Yemane had plenty of opportunities to initiate a conversation on the closure of the consulate, he remained completely silent on the topic. (Note: Yemane is the highest ranking official with whom post has met since the announcement. End note.) ¶7. (U) In response to questions by the international media, Yemane Gebremeskel, Director of the Office of the President, offered the only official GSE response thus far. In interviews with the BBC and Reuters reporters, he stated "I have not seen the explanations they have given for this, but the U.S. are pursuing an unfriendly policy against Eritrea, so I am not surprised...Fundamentally, it boils down to U.S. policy and the support they are giving to Ethiopia while Ethiopia is violating international law." Despite news of the event being printed in media around the world, the Eritrean state-owned media has not reported any news about the closure of the Oakland consulate. The only other statement thus far was a report the evening of August 13 on the state-owned Eri-TV, that later this week President Isaias Afwerki will give an interview about U.S./Eritrean relations. ¶8. (C) Following her request made August 13 to meet with the CDA, Tsehai Habtemariam, the Political Officer of the Eritrean Embassy in Washington, DC met with CDA and Conoff on August 14. (Comment: While Tsehai claimed she was representing solely herself, post believes her request for a meeting was a purposeful move by the GSE to attempt to gain further information on the decision. End Comment.) Filling most of the meeting with pleasantries, Tsehai only raised the closure of the consulate at the end of the meeting, asking if what she has heard was true. Upon confirmation and explanation by the CDA, Tsehai commented she is very concerned and that "things (our bi-lateral relationship) are getting out of control" and proceeded to explain that it was the lack of U.S. support and effort to force Ethiopia to demarcate the border that led to Eritrea's decisions. -------------- THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN ASMARA CHIMES IN -------------- ¶9. (C) Following delivery of the diplomatic note, Post received numerous inquiries from diplomatic colleagues in Asmara. Germany, Netherlands, UK, South Africa, and Egypt all requested additional information from Embassy staff in order to report back to their capitals. All offered support for the decision and one diplomat expressed great pleasure upon hearing the news. In separate meetings upon hearing the news the Egyptian Consular Officer, Mohammed Wagih Abdallah, and the Netherlands Charge Robert Lanschot pressed CDA further, asking if the decision was an attempt by the U.S. to restrict the flow of hard currency Eritrea receives from the diaspora in the U.S. CDA repeated that the U.S. action was due to the on-going restrictions placed by the GSE in violation of the Vienna Convention. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The lack of formal response thus far from the GSE is no surprise, as the GSE often plots their actions carefully and strategically. Post anticipates that at some point the GSE will respond forcefully, as President Isaias will need to both "save face" and be seen as standing up to the U.S. The anti-American rhetoric of the past year, despite a respite of the past few months, can be expected to increase in the upcoming months as the GSE wants to be perceived as being strong and powerful in the eyes of its citizens and its regional friends, such as Sudan and Qatar. Yet, President Isaias remains in a tricky situation as he needs to appear strong, he will also strive to prevent further U.S. actions that could interfere with the sorely ASMARA 00000681 003 OF 003 needed hard currency revenue. Any GSE policy change regarding the pouch, visa issuances to official travelers, or local travel restrictions will be a last ditch effort by the GSE to keep the Oakland consulate open in order to maintain this important source of hard currency. Post remains concerned that the GSE's response will include the targeting of locally engaged staff (LES) and is working with the LES committee and all staff to ensure their heightened awareness. 11.(C) As for Yemane's silence, the GSE has always maintained that discussions on Sudan could continue despite the deterioration of bi-lateral relations and post takes Yemane's willingness to meet as an early indication that this statement continues to be genuine. Yet, with the international media reports, the GSE will be unable to put the genie back in the bottle and post anticipates that while President Isaias' speech later in the week could offer further insight, it will most likely be a regurgitation of the oft heard anti-U.S. sentiment pitched by the GSE. End Comment. HOLZER