Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ASMARA602
2007-07-11 11:12:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Asmara
Cable title:  

QUARTERLY FRAUD REPORT - ASMARA

Tags:  CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC ER 
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VZCZCXRO9141
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAE #0602/01 1921112
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111112Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8936
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0302
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 6091
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0400
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1062
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4702
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2951
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0107
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0065
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1749
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0020
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0002
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0183
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0001
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY 0009
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1271
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1401
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0029
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1282
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0229
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASMARA 000602 

SIPDIS


SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/CA
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/EX
PASS TO KCC
PASS TO INL/HSTC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
FRANKFURT FOR RCO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC ER
SUBJECT: QUARTERLY FRAUD REPORT - ASMARA

REF: STATE 00205073

ASMARA 00000602 001.2 OF 004


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASMARA 000602 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/CA DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/EX PASS TO KCC PASS TO INL/HSTC POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS FRANKFURT FOR RCO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC ER SUBJECT: QUARTERLY FRAUD REPORT - ASMARA REF: STATE 00205073 ASMARA 00000602 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. The following is a summary of fraud conditions experienced during the April to June 2007 period. This cable constitutes post's first fraud report; for this reason, this particular report provides a general overview. Subsequent reports will address more specific fraud trends. Post has been closed for visa services since December 2006, due to the host government's refusal to provide visas across the board to official travelers (to include technicians to support our consular systems) and its insistence on the right to inspect the Embassy's diplomatic pouches, which has resulted in the stoppage of post's unclassified pouch since March 2007 affecting post's ability to bring in accountable supplies. -------------- - COUNTRY CONDITIONS - INCREASING DETERIORIATION -------------- - ¶2. The Eritrean economy continues to deteriorate at a rapid rate, leading to increased anxiety among the population. Employment prospects are virtually non-existent. Of those employed, many work as draftees in the Eritrean national service which provides wages barely a step above slave labor, approximately $30 and $40 per month. Prices of basic goods continue to increase, and scarcity is on the rise due to restrictions on imports and the government's holding of hard currency. The wages paid under national service is not sufficient to support individuals, let alone those draftees with families. ¶3. Mandatory national service begins at the age of 17 for both boys and girls, and includes intensive military training. For males, while the official end date is the age of 40, in practice there is no end date to the term of national service; in some cases, individuals have been working in the national service for over 13 years. Because of this, many parents seek any avenue to get their children out of the country prior to be conscripted, even at the risk of their own arrest. Those unable to obtain permission to leave Eritrea often illegally flee across the border to either Sudan or Ethiopia to escape the harsh conditions. Many people with passports leave legally and do not return. The desperation to leave Eritrea is felt at all levels. ¶
4. The consular section in Asmara remains closed to most visa services, but has continued limited issuances for extreme humanitarian cases and those clearly in USG interests. We anticipate remaining closed to visa services for the indefinite future. Post also provides the full array of American Citizen Services. -------------- NIV FRAUD -------------- ¶5. Post is not currently issuing NIVs in significant numbers. At this time, the visa section mainly provides support to our colleagues in the region who are processing the bulk of Eritrean applicants. Asmara routinely verifies documents for these posts and provides guidance on documents that are susceptible to fraud, such as school certificates, those issued by the municipalities and baptismal certificates. ¶6. Three LES sent to training in 2007 at FSI failed to return, leading to a reevaluation and more restrictive Mission training policies until the current environment improves. While technically ASMARA 00000602 002.2 OF 004 not consular fraud, it is illustrative of the difficulties faced by many Eritreans and their desire to improve their lives by emigrating. ¶7. Student visas are another area of high occurrence of NIV fraud. The only university in Eritrea closed in 2003 and many young people are forced to seek higher education outside of the country. Many, because of family ties and resources, wish to study in the U.S. Combined with a struggling economy with few jobs, many young Eritreans see higher education as their only hope for a better future. For students, the most common form of fraud is the use of an altered transcript, which happens to be one of the more readily verifiable documents in Eritrea. Post's LES educational advisor reports a dramatic increase in interest in her advising sessions. Many young Eritreans who wish to study outside of Eritrea are unable to obtain exit visas and passports locally choose instead flee across the border to Sudan. In the past, the Eritrean embassy in Khartoum issued passports to Eritreans, even to those who would not have been issued in Asmara. (Note: A recently issued Eritrean passport from Khartoum could be an indicator of someone who has fled Eritrea illegally and may not be received kindly by the government if they returned. End Note.) -------------- IV FRAUD -------------- ¶8. Post has seen no employment-based IV fraud during this reporting period. ¶9. Marriage fraud has always been a concern of the consular section due to the number of arranged marriages. The fraud seen in Eritrea is typical of many other countries, except that it is neither highly organized nor sophisticated. It tends to be fairly easy to detect, in that the Amcit in the relationship typically leaves Eritrea immediately after the marriage to file the petition and then maintains little or no contact until documentation is requested. Also, all marriages in Eritrea are grand affairs, with even impoverished families having elaborate ceremonies recorded on video. Any marriage not performed with an elaborate religious service or not having video documentation is highly suspect. ¶10. Attempts are also made to understate the age of a child in order to move them more quickly to the U.S. It is very easy to obtain a fraudulent (yet genuinely issued) birth certificate in Eritrea. Post has noted cases of "children" obviously in their 20s attempting to be passed off as teens. -------------- DV FRAUD -------------- ¶11. Post is not currently processing DVs and has nothing to report. In the past, when processing DVs, fraudulent educational transcripts and fake marriages were the most common forms of fraud. -------------- ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD -------------- ¶12. Post has not seen any ACS or passport fraud during the reporting period. Post uses DNA testing extensively to determine parentage, a well-known fact to applicants in Asmara. ASMARA 00000602 003.2 OF 004 -------------- ADOPTION FRAUD -------------- ¶13. Like other types of fraud, adoption fraud is neither organized nor sophisticated but it is becoming more prevalent. The most common form of fraud is the classification of a child as an orphan while the birth parents are still alive and able to support the child. The usual reasons for adoption fraud are to improve the economic condition of the child by having them live with a U.S. relative or to avoid national service. Eritrean adoptions are usually only given to family members and are easy for them to obtain. The Eritrean adoption is then used as the basis for a U.S. adoption case. -------------- ASYLUM FRAUD -------------- ¶14. Post has not processed asylum cases during the period and has nothing to report. -------------- COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES -------------- ¶15. The only area of cooperation received from the Eritrean government involves document verification. However, because even legitimately issued governmental documents are suspect, this cooperation is of limited use. School records tend to be very well kept and there is a history of cooperation with local schools regarding verifying these documents. Post had a recent case of suspected fraud in which the school verifiers seemed reluctant to provide us with negative information due to the stature of the individual's family. Post anticipates that if we were to identify organized fraud rings that the local authorities would take an interest, but to date, post has seen no evidence indicating the existence of this type of organized smuggling in-country. -------------- AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -------------- ¶16. A large number of NIV applicants are expected when the consular section reopens for visa services. The usual walk-in application process will not be able to accommodate the volume. At such time that post reopens for visa services, Post plans to employ the online NIV appointment system to avoid the common problems with queuing in areas outside of Embassy control. ¶17. The Harris technicians who maintain consular computer systems did not receive visas from the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) and were not able to make their scheduled visit in June. Although the section can function in the short-to-intermediate term with local technicians, if this situation is not addressed in the long run, the consular section could be forced to shut down completely in the event of a catastrophic failure of the computer systems. -------------- STAFFING AND TRAINING -------------- ¶18. Two of the three LES and the sole consular associate left the ASMARA 00000602 004.2 OF 004 section during the reporting period but only one position has been filled, leaving the section short on experienced staff. The remaining LES position has not been filled due to the consular section being closed for visa services. The position will be refilled when the section reopens. Training options are currently limited to those available in-country. The Harris technicians could have provided needed systems training in June, but unfortunately were not able to enter the country. The Mission restrictions on off-shore training, currently in place due to the number of LES not returning from training in the U.S., currently limits our staff to on-line courses and on-the-job learning opportunities. MCINTYRE

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