SLM'S SHARIF HARIR RETURNS TO ASMARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000466 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PINR SU ER SUBJECT: SLM'S SHARIF HARIR RETURNS TO ASMARA CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Late Monday night, Eritrean People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) Head of Organizational Affairs Abdallah Jabir returned to Asmara from his over four months stay in Chad, bringing with him SLM head of external affairs Sharif Harir, SLM commander Khamis Abdalla Abakr, SLM interim chairman Yahia Abdallah and 24 others. The return of these non-signatories came as a surprise to many who believed the non-signatories would never return to Eritrea after the Government of Eritrea(GSE) restricted their travel during their stay in late 2006. Sharif Harir has now aligned himself with the SLM and separated from the Sudanese Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). He and the others came to Asmara upon the completion of an SLM consultative congress organized to bring cohesion and structure to the SLM. Sharif explained that he returned to revive the NRF and to participate in negotiations; negotiations in which the Eritreans, Shari asserts, should be the lead mediator (albeit working with the UN). Neither Khalil Ibrahim of JEM nor the SLM faction leaders Abdulwahid or Abdulshafi have come to Asmara, however, and it appears unlikely they will. Whether those who are here can speak authoritatively for the SLM and the other non-signatories as a whole, will determine if any mediation effort led by the GSE even gets off the ground and provides a playing card in the bidding for the Darfur negotiations. End Summary. ERITREAN LED NEGOTATIONS: A RE-BIRTH IN ASMARA? -------------- ¶2. (C) Sharif said to Poloff on May 22 that he and the other non- signatories trust the Eritreans and see them as playing a key role as lead negotiator. He discounted any role for the AU, dismissing them as untrustworthy, and he rejected the DPA. He acknowledged the declaratio of principles as acceptable, however, described the DPA as a "non- starter" and one rejected by the SLM. He did note that the UN had a significant role to play, both in the negotiations and in peacekeeping. He also expressed frustration at the lack of force behind UN Security Council resolutions. ¶3. (C) As for the negotiations, Sharif told Poloff he returned to Asmara because the timing was right and said he hoped to revive the National Redemption Front (NRF) and bring together the non-signatories. 
In his mind, a regional negotiation is the ideal solution. While Chad and Libya must be involved, it is Eritrea, Sharif stated, "that is the brain." According to Sharif the longstanding support of the Eritreans for the rebel movements of Sudan shows that they can trust the GSE. He did agree that while the GSE would be the lead mediators, the UN and international community must be involved. According to Dr. Taisier Ali of the Center for Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa, who met with Abdallah Jabir on his return, even the Eritreans now recognize the role of the UN and international community in Darfur negotiations. THE OTHERS ARE HERE BUT WHERE ARE KHALIL AND THE JEM? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Noting that Khamis is already in Asmara, Sharif said that Ahmed Ibrahim Diraij of the Sudanese Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) is probably also arriving within the next few days. It is not clear, however, that the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim or Abudulwahid are prepared to come to Asmara. Khalil's role according to both Sharif and Taisier appears to be uncertain. Abdallah Jabir reportedly told Taisier that the Eritreans no longer see Khalil and his Justice and Equality Movemen (JEM) as a reliable partner; he is, from the GSE perspective, undependable. Sharif echoed this sentiment, noting that Khalil's soldiers were not Sudanese but Chadian and that even Chad was getting frustrated by him and had concerns about his alliances. While describing Khalil as "too volatile" he grudgingly admitted that Khalil had a role of some sort to play. To exclude him from the negotiations could be problematic. As for Abdulwahid, Sharif dismissed him outright noting his lengthy absence from Darfur and claiming he has no military support at all. Abdallah Jabir did share with Poloff and Dr. Taisier that he and Eritrean General Tekle attempted to meet with Abdulwahid twice during visits to France in January and February. Both times, the French Government arranged the meetings, and both times Abdulwahid failed to show up or even call. Abdallah Jabir further noted his concern over 600 soldiers in Eastern Sudan who pledge their support to Abdulwahid, who appears to have abandoned them, having not contacted them for weeks. THE SLM: A RESTRUCTURING -------------- ASMARA 00000466 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Sharif also offered insight into the recent meetings of the SLM Over the past few weeks the SLM met together with over 160 representatives of various components of the organizations, including Ahmed AbdelShafi Bassey. At the consultative congress the participants elected not to engage in open elections but rather to agree on leadership and goals through consensus. In the end, the group agreed o laws and the structure of the army and established a transitional council of 51. After much discussion and jockeying by AbdelShafi for the leadership position, the congress agreed that Yahia Abdallah, described by Sharif as a young fighter, would serve as the interim chairman. The position of vice-chairman remains open with the hope tha Abdelshafi will take up the position and Sharif will serve as the head of external and political relations in charge of negotiations. ¶6. (C) Sharif's clearly indicated that he sees this group of the consultative congress that accompanied him to Asmara to be the new leaders of the SLM. He dismissed Abdelwahid, noting he had no real supporters and no real military might, just a loud voice. The G-19 did not participate in the consultative congress and thus, Sharif claimed, they were not legitimate. He alleged that most of them no longer even remain in Darfur. As for Abdulshafi and his supporters, Sharif indicated the consultative congress leaders are ready for Abdulshafi to re-join the group and are engaged in discussion with him. When asked about the numbers supporting them, Sharif refused outright to give a number, even a ballpark figure. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) While most would have predicted after the shenanigans of late 2006, the non-signatories would never return to Asmara, the GSE's influence with Sudanese rebel groups can never be discounted. Abdalla Jabir's many months in Chad appear to have paid off to some extent, and possibly by his presence alone, he has convinced the rebels that the Eritreans are committed to playing a significant role and will not abandon them. What specifically brought Sharif, Khamis and the others back to Asmara is not yet known, however their presence is a plus for the GSE and strengthens their bid to play a significant and key role in negotiations for Darfur. End Comment. DeLisi