TIME TO SPEAK UP: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ERITREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000036 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UNSC ECON EAID SOCI KIRF KPAO ER SUBJECT: TIME TO SPEAK UP: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ERITREA ASMARA 00000036 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: CDA Jennifer A. McIntyre, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). REFTEL: ASMARA 28 ¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The serious abuses of human rights fo which the Government of Eritrea is responsible and its continued rejection of even the most fundamental democratic principles in governance remain serious problems and a major impediment to improvemen of bilateral ties. (reftel) Over the past year, we have scaled back ou engagement with the GSE on many levels, particularly in terms of the military-military partnership, but we had hoped that there was still room for engagement on issues of mutual concern such as Sudan and the unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia. The GSE, however, appears to have made a strategic decision to reject engagement with the USG and to seek closer ties with a range of states, including Iran and Venezuela, who do not share our world view. In so doing, the GSE has also become force for greater regional instability, with their direct support for the CIC in Somalia, and the channeling by Eritrea of weapons and men, standing as an example. ¶2. (C) We believe that in order to support both our policies and our principles, we must accept that quiet efforts to engage Eritrea on huma rights have been ignored by the GSE. Thus, our efforts must become mor public and assertive. We believe that with more vocal efforts we will expose Eritrea to more intense international scrutiny. Moreover, as th true nature of this regime is revealed, we will: lessen its credibility reduce the flows of critical funding from the diaspora; and ultimately decrease Eritrea's ability to insert itself in unhelpful ways in issues beyond its own borders. We have no illusions that the GSE will be quickly responsive - except perhaps negatively. Nonetheless, we hope that USG leadership will elicit or compel support from at least our EU partners to speak out as well. Post suggests a multi-faceted approach involving the use of radio and internet media, increased people-to- people interaction with the Eritrean people through means of the Ambassador's self help grants and coordinated outreach to the Eritrean diaspora, members of Congress, and our international partners. And while post will once again aggressively seek to engage the GSE in discussion on human rights issues, a strong and visible Washington role will be necessary to frame our message and concerns and to build the base of support we need outside the Department. End Summary and Introduction. PUTTING THE GSE ON NOTICE -------------- ¶3. (C) In our engagement with GSE representatives, post routinely raise our concerns on human rights abuses and the lack of civil liberties. GSE officials, however, largely disregard our concerns and cavalierly dismiss criticisms of their human rights performance. In fact, as note reftel, the government seems to take an almost perverse delight in its role of human rights "bad boy" and relishes its "in-your-face" defiance of international concerns. Our requests for dialogue and engagement on these issues are ignored and, as a general rule, GSE officials refuse t meet with Embassy officers to answer even the most basic of questions regarding Eritrea's laws and policies. Our EU colleagues have faced similar stonewalling as well. We have persistently requested meetings with officials in the Office of Religious Affairs and with the Director of National Security. With the former we have had our requests routinely refused for over a year and with the latter we were told recently to "stop calling." (Note: We continue our efforts nonetheless.) Most recently, in response to the designation of Eritrea as a country of particular concern for severe restrictions on religious freedoms, one GSE official told the Ambassador that for Eritreans "bein detained in a shipping container is a luxury." ¶4. (C) Despite the GSE's callous indifference to our concerns, post plans to embark on a more aggressive USG human rights campaign in Eritrea. Our strategy calls for the Ambassador to press even more strongly for a series of formal calls on officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Religious Affairs, the Office of Nationa Security, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Local Government and the Office of the President to seek greater engagement with the GSE on issues of human rights and the restrictions of civil liberties. In these calls the Ambassador will, on the one hand, encourage greater bilateral interaction to clarify any possible confusion over GSE laws, ASMARA 00000036 002.2 OF 003 proclamations and practices and, on the other, let the GSE know that th USG will not hesitate to publicly voice our concerns on these issues an hold the GSE accountable for its actions in appropriate fora. USING OUR WEBSITE, AMERICAN CORNERS, THE OPPOSITION AND PUBLIC FORA -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) With no free media, no civil society and nearly no opportunities for public discussions, countering GSE propaganda within Eritrea is difficult. To date, the internet is the only source of external media the GSE has not restricted. As part of our strategy, Post will use internet-based resources aggressively while also seeking to expand our public outreach - although doing so on human rights-specific issues wil be challenging in the face of GSE restrictions and hostility. We propose as initial steps to prepare short and easy-to-read fact sheets detailing both U.S. policy and our concerns on GSE human rights abuses that we can post on our website, print out for distribution and provide as backgrounders to media, opposition websites, and interested NGOs. W will use our monthly speakers program with the American Club to focus o subjects concerning civil society and civil liberties. We will continu efforts to reach out to schools in addressing younger audiences on similar topics through the use of films and discussion. We also wish t explore the possibility of podcasts, discussion boards, list-serves and other live on-line means of conversations with Embassy/State Department staff that could reach Eritreans with internet access within Eritrea an those within the diaspora. We would also seek to increase VOA's Tigrinya broadcasting and explore VOA-Arabic broadcasting that focuses on Eritrea as well. (Note: Given the political issues associated with translation within Eritrea - and the arrest of two FSNs allegedly for translating opposition documents in 2001 - Post would need assistance from Washington to procure Tigrinya and Arabic translations. End Note.) ¶6. (C) In addition, the exiled Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean Democratic Party under the leadership of Mesfin Hagos, is eager to establish radio broadcasting to Eritrea. With the normalization of relations with Sudan, some of the Eritrean opposition located in Khartoum has come under increased scrutiny, and the Government of Sudan (GOS) recently closed down a previous GOS-sanctioned Eritrean oppositio radio broadcast. Supporting efforts of the Eritrean opposition to provide alternative news sources could also prove valuable. REACHING OUT TO A NEEDY COMMUNITY -------------- ¶7. (U) With the closure of the USAID office by order of the GSE, post lost a significant tool for promoting democratic values and civil society, and the means to provide basic humanitarian assistance to communities. The average Eritrean, particularly those outside of Asmara, remains isolated. Most are unable to access alternative information other than the anti-U.S. and anti-Western propaganda presented by GSE-controlled media outlets and in local meetings with GS and PFDJ officials. Given the GSE restrictions on travel and the inability of Embassy staff to meet with, let alone work with, most arms of the GSE bureaucracy, our strategy includes intensified outreach efforts and direct support to communities at the grass-roots level. We have widened our net this fall to seek out more and varied community- based projects for FY2007 funding under the Ambassador's Self Help (SSH and Democracy and Human Rights (DHR II) initiatives (Note: Cable fundin requests will be sent septel. End note.) The implementation of these projects will expand the visibility of the U.S. Embassy and tangibly demonstrate the USG's commitment to assisting the Eritrean people. REACHING OUT TO STAKEHOLDERS: CONGRESS, DIASPORA, AND FOREIGN MISSIONS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The remittances sent and the taxes paid by the diaspora are a critically needed revenue source for the GSE and we believe that the diaspora must be educated and exposed to the realities of the Isaias regime and its blatant disregard for both the welfare of Eritrean citizens and for the most basic of international norms on democracy and human rights. Doing so will, we believe, also lead to diminished remittance flows and may encourage members of the diaspora to speak out - and these are voices to which the GSE might listen. While conversations have begun on mechanisms to restrict the transmission of diaspora remittances, we recognize that there would be many ways of ASMARA 00000036 003.2 OF 003 circumventing restrictions (e.g. third-country transfers, informal mechanisms, etc). Thus we believe it is critical to offer the diaspora an alternative perspective to GSE propaganda and undercut their motivation to support the GSE. Also critical to this effort will be th continued restriction on the movement of GSE-sponsored fund-raisers in the U.S. ¶9. (C) The engagement with the diaspora will, of necessity, be driven a much by Washington as by post. We welcome other suggestions from Washington for increased engagement that will bring greater focus on Eritrea's human rights abuses. Encouraged by the working group recentl convened by AF/E, we would propose a similar approach with DRL, the Office of Religious Freedom, PD and H to discuss other strategies that would increase the focus on the GSE's human rights violations and rejection of democratic values and norms. In particular, we would look for ways to work with legislators concerned both about human rights and stability in the Horn of Africa. ¶10. (C) Efforts in Washington and New York to work with our international partners as well will be important, using various vehicle including our engagement with the EU troika. We understand from our German colleagues in Asmara that the EU, under the German presidency, may seek to develop a more comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa. We know that EU member-states with missions in Eritrea are deeply concerned about the human rights situation and will likely emphasize that the need for an increased focus on these issues be factored into any comprehensive strategy. As it is, the EU missions here, which have sought dialogue with the GSE on human rights under the framework of the Cotonu agreement, have met with little cooperation fro the Eritreans. After two years of efforts to dialogue, they are questioning whether stronger measures are required. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The above suggestions are not exhaustive, but hopefully, illustrative, of some of the options available to us. We believe strongly, however, that the USG must be seen as willing to speak out, especially given Eritrea's deteriorating social, economic, and politica environment. The Isaias regime, if anything, continues to move in the wrong direction on human rights and civil liberties and is unlikely to self-correct. We must speak out with a clarity and purpose that offers Eritreans, both within Eritrea and the diaspora, an alternative vision and the realization that their plight is not being ignored. ¶12. (C) Comment con't. We believe a coordinated strategy involving the Embassy in Asmara, Washington and other bilateral and multilateral missions, will have impact - but could possibly result in negative repercussions directed against the Embassy and our staff. The already difficult operational problems we face in terms of travel and visa restrictions and violations of the Vienna Convention could be exacerbated and the possibility that some U.S. staff members could be expelled is real. We nonetheless believe that this is the right course - but suggest that this is all the more reason we need to have Washington's continued engagement and commitment, to provide a degree o cover to an already exposed Embassy staff, if we are to proceed as robustly as we envision. We look forward to working with the Departmen in discussing and coordinating various options and next steps. End Comment. McIntyre