EU-ERITREA COURTSHIP?: MEANINGFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASMARA 000346 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM ER SO SU UK EU SUBJECT: EU-ERITREA COURTSHIP?: MEANINGFUL CHANGE SHOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE GSE REF: A. ASMARA 328 ¶B. ASMARA 339 ¶C. ASMARA 336 Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has recently personified (at least for him) reasonableness and cooperation in meetings with the EU representatives and UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson. Simultaneously, however, the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) continues to excoriate the USG for "neocolonialist" exploitation of the Horn of Africa and "misguided regional ambitions veiled behind claims of fighting terrorism". The GSE also continues to impede Embassy operations and disregard its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Although we would like to believe, as many of our European colleagues do, that Eritrea is seeking to reengage positively with the international community, the GSE's words have not been matched by constructive actions in Sudan, Somalia, or domestically. Unfortunately, we do not expect that they will be. In anticipation of possible GSE meetings with senior British and EU officials in the coming days and weeks, we should urge our European colleagues not to mistake manipulation for progress. Nor should they allow vaguely constructive GSE rhetoric to obscure the fact that what we need from Eritrea is real change in their conduct on Somalia, Sudan, domestic human rights, and in their engagement with their international partners. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Courting, and Being Courted By, the Europeans and the UN -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In early February, President Isaias Afwerki received Louis Michel, EC Commissioner for Development and Aid on a visit to Asmara. Michel, in an effort to induce Eritrea to reengage with the international community, chose not to raise with Eritrea the difficult issues of human rights, the seizure of European food aid, or its highly troubling role in introducing weapons and fighters into an already troubled Somalia in 2006 in support of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). In the absence of a serious challenge from the EC on policy issues, Isaias was cordial in return - especially as the GSE was clearly looking to reestablish itself as a serious regional actor in light of Ethiopia's military success in Somalia. Eritrea was also seeing prospects for its role as "the" mediator of the Darfur conflict increasingly slipping away despite the support of the Government of Sudan, and, we believe, President Isaias was keen to encourage European acceptance of Eritrea as central to the resolution of issues in Sudan. ¶3. (C) As part of this largely non-substantive exchange, Michel invited Isaias to Brussels and the normally reclusive Eritrean leader apparently accepted enthusiastically the invitation in principle. No date for a visit has been set, and perhaps it may yet be derailed given Louis Michel's reported pending departure to seek a return to elective office. (Note: It is unclear how broadly Michel's enthusiasm for engaging Eritrea is shared within EC headquarters. End Note.) Subsequently, Isaias, in meetings with both UN Special Envoy for Sudan Jan Eliasson and in the EU Troika on Somalia (Refs A and B),made it clear that he was looking forward to visiting Brussels soon. ¶4. (C) In his meetings with Eliasson and with the EU Troika, Isaias was at his best in many ways. Isaias is, without question, articulate, intelligent, and has a keen understanding of the Horn of Africa. Eliasson and the EU Troika both were impressed with the breadth of his knowledge, his analytical assessment of the challenges that lie ahead, and his reasonably non-critical, and at times even positive, characterization of the role of the UN-AU in Sudan and the role that the EU could play in Somalia. His calls for an ASMARA 00000346 002 OF 004 inclusive and comprehensive process in both countries in many ways echoed internationally accepted positions. In Sudan, his offer to remain in touch with Eliasson and to continue to "share information" was welcomed by the SRSG and left the door open for an Eritrean role in the broadly inclusive political process Eliasson and Salim seek to encourage. Equally for Somalia, the EU Troika was encouraged by Isaias' surprisingly objective assessment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia and that he was analytically circumspect in his characterization of the CIC; reportedly acknowledging that they were not "representative" but had "filled in a gap" in the quest of Somalis for peace and security. -------------- The Other Face -------------- ¶5. (C) The positions articulated by Isaias in those meetings have encouraged some in the European diplomatic community to hope that Eritrea may be newly-prepared to engage more constructively in the region and the world. The French Ambassador to Eritrea is particularly enthused, believing Eritrea to have been "misunderstood" and arguing for sensitivity to Eritrea's "fundamental security concerns" which have compelled it to act as it has in the face of threats to its existence from Ethiopia. The French seem eager to see Eritrea assume a broader role in a Somalia reconciliation effort and for Eritrea to play a prominent role in Sudan as well. We have repeatedly cautioned our European colleagues here, however, that despite all of Isaias' thoughtful analyses and dialogue with the Europeans and the UN, nothing on the ground has changed. Nor has Eritrea offered its support in any meaningful way on any issues of concern to the U.S. ¶6. (C) To the contrary, reports from Khartoum and from Ndjamena, where the senior Eritrean advisor on Sudan, Yemane Ghebreab, has been for almost two months, all suggest that Eritrea is still seeking to initiate a mediation process on Sudan independent of the UN-AU process. There is no dialogue from the GSE on how or whether it would work within a UN-AU framework nor is there any signal that they are serious about a role for the international community in their initiative. Norway, their closest non-regional international partner on the issue of Sudan, has tried tirelessly to get the GSE to work more broadly with the international community on Sudan. Nonetheless, the Norwegians apparently remain as much in the dark about Ghebreab's agenda as the rest of us (although the Norwegian Ambassador to Eritrea calls him in Chad several times a week). Similarly, Isaias' seemingly dispassionate assessment of the CIC in his analytical overview does not square at all with the strongly pro-CIC rhetoric and actions of the GSE over the past ten months. Isaias's threats against the Ugandan peacekeepers (Ref C),his repeated attacks on the U.S. and Ethiopia all ring with an intensity and venom that was, we believe, carefully edited in his discussion with the Europeans. -------------- - DETERIORATED BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. -------------- - ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, even while cultivating European ties, Isaias and his government appear determined to keep relations with the USG at their nadir. As noted, the rhetorical attacks on the USG remain undiminished and GSE officials remain unwilling to meet with us on almost any level. A key advisor in the Office of the President has noted that relations are "quite bad" across the board including on key policy questions. However, neither he, nor the MFA officials with whom the Ambassador has spoken, have responded to the Ambassador's repeated offer to meet and discuss seriously the issues. Furthermore, the GSE, despite our insistence over the past two months, has not been willing to meet with us to try and resolve the VCDR problems associated with the GSE refusing to allow our diplomatic bags to enter the country without inspection. (Note: We have refused such inspections and none of our diplomatic bags have entered Eritrea for over ASMARA 00000346 003 OF 004 two months. The GSE is now insisting on inspecting the UK's latest diplomatic bags as well. End Note.) Travel, of course, remains restricted and our staff is unable to leave Asmara without ten days notice to and prior approval of the GSE, which is seldom forthcoming for official travel. ¶8. (C) Equally problematic, the GSE continues to refer all requests for visas for USG employees to Asmara for approval. Virtually no official visas, other than for our two regional doctors which were finally issued after months of badgering on our part, have been forthcoming over the past six months. We have been forced to suspend a critical building project on the Embassy compound, have been unable to update our IT programs, and have not support visits in almost a year in areas of security, management and building maintenance. We have been compelled to close certain other-agency operations and suspend public operations, including visa services (no NIVs have been issued since December). Despite our suspension of visa services for GSE officials and restrictions placed on issuance of visas of GSE-sponsored travelers world-wide, the GSE continues to deny visas for our support staff. The most recent denial is a cleared USG air-conditioning technician who previously had been issued visas for Eritrea. We note that our visas requests are apparently reviewed by Eritrean National Security officials rather than the MFA. Under the circumstances, given that even A/C techs are being denied, we have to assume that the GSE has no intention of issuing visas to any of our applicants any time soon. ¶9. (C) As noted above, the Norwegians, who have been one of Eritrea's most-engaged partners over the years, including during their independence struggle, have pushed Eritrea hard to engage more constructively. The GSE has, however, ignored the clear benchmarks laid out by Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Johannsen in a meeting with Yemane Ghebreab in Oslo in early February. At that time, the Norwegians insisted that the GSE had to find a way forward with the USG if it wanted to be a serious player in the region and the world and Johannsen called on them to show their commitment to work with Norway, and the international community, by lifting the visa restrictions on U.S. government travelers, allowing pouches to enter in compliance with the VCDR, and by easing the rhetoric. Despite assurances from Ghebreab that Eritrea understood the need to move forward, there has been no change on any of these issues and the Eritreans have so far avoided any substantive discussion with Norway, at least so far as we know, on the reasons for the unresponsiveness. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) So far, of course, the Europeans have made it easy for Isaias to hit the right notes. None of his recent interlocutors has been willing to push the Eritreans on issues such as human rights or their destabilizing role in the region as a purveyor of weapons and supporter for many, if not most, of the insurgent elements in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. They posit that raising the tough issues might push Eritrea away before they can be brought into a meaningful and constructive engagement. That logic, while often applicable in diplomatic engagement, is not compelling to us in this setting. We believe that the GSE has no intention of reengaging broadly with the international community - and certainly not with the USG - in the near future. In fact, we believe that the GSE has made the calculated decision that it benefits from having the USG as the "enemy" as it seeks to realign itself within the region with Sudan, with the CIC in Somalia, and with various actors in the Persian Gulf including, possibly, Iran. The fact that they have not even raised with us the closure of the visa section for four months now, even though they are regularly complaining to the UK about their similar closure, suggests to us that they are prepared to accept the costs of cutting their ties to the USG. ¶11. (C) Comment continued: At the same time, however, we believe that the GSE is seeking to reestablish itself as a ASMARA 00000346 004 OF 004 "player" in the region. The GSE, we believe, is hoping that the promise of a more constructive Eritrea might lure the EU and split them from the U.S., at least in terms of muting any public criticism of Eritrea by the EU despite all the reasons to do so. We believe, for example, that the EU sends the wrong signals on Somalia by treating the GSE as a partner that, like us, seeks stability in Somalia without even addressing the fact that the GSE was, and still is, an actor exacerbating the problems there. We need to emphasize to the Europeans - and we note that Yemane Ghebreab may be meeting with the UK's Lord Triesman later this week - that vague platitudes about dialogue and working together are not enough. If Eritrea wants to be taken seriously we need to see real and constructive actions in partnership with the international community on Sudan and Somalia, and we need equally to see an Eritrea prepared to be more responsible on human rights and its engagement with international partners. Given the GSE's past track record of irresponsibility in its international commitments, absent clear and concrete actions by the GSE, we believe that isolation, rather than engagement, is the most appropriate response. End Comment. DeLisi