EU DELEGATION DISCUSSES SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASMARA 000339 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2017 TAGS: PREL ER SO SUBJECT: EU DELEGATION DISCUSSES SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT ISAIAS Classified By: AMB Scott H. DeLisi for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) A four-person EU delegation on Somalia, led by Ambassador-at-large of the German Federal Foreign Office Michael Klor-Berchtold, briefed the EU, Norwegian and U.S. Embassies March 27 about their meeting with President Isaias earlier in the day. The delegation said they emphasized to Isaias the responsibilities of the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) in promoting an all-inclusive peace process for Somalia. Ambassador Klor-Berchtold categorized the meeting as positive with both sides engaged in frank discussion on a variety of ideas for moving the Somali political process along and commented that Isaias' presented his views as a "thorough, broad-based assessment." ¶2. (C) During the 90-minute meeting, President Isaias told the visitors that a "reconciliation" process would not solve Somalia's political problems, but rather, the situation requires a "reconstitution" similar to the political process for the formation of the Afghan government. While the delegation was not entirely clear on Isaias' distinction between "reconciliation" and "reconstitution, they noted his emphasis that the success of any political process in Somalia would require participation beyond members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),to include, in particular, the Somali diaspora and civil society. Isaias also ventured that the political talks might be more successful in a different venue, such as Djibouti, rather than Mogadishu, due to the insecurity there. The delegation disagreed with him on an offshore venue, which in their view would move any political process back to the days when the TFG was operating from Kenya. ¶3. (C) Isaias commented that the EU could play a positive role as an "honest broker" in a political process. As for the AU, Isaias briefly observed that without a clear political process in place, the AU peacekeeping exercise in Somalia is "dangerous." (Note: Klor-Berchtold commented that Isaias had been much more critical in a prior telephone conversation with the EU, when he noted that the "AU lacks planning capacity." End Note.) The delegation noted that the president seemed to be quietly gloating (unsurprisingly) about the increased violence the Ethiopians are facing in Somalia. Isaias said that in the past few weeks, Mogadishu was turning into the "quagmire" that he had predicted. He was skeptical about the durability of a ceasefire and critical of Ethiopia's continued military occupation which, he said, has no exit strategy. ¶4. (C) The delegation stated their plans to travel to Djibouti, Addis Ababa and Nairobi from March 28-30 respectively for one-day consultations with various parties involved with Somalia. Some members of the delegation may attend the April 3 Somalia Contact Group meeting in Cairo. They also mentioned tentative plans to travel to Qatar to meet with Somali opposition, dependent on the outcome of their meetings this week. The delegation also said they had discussed with President Isaias the possibility of his traveling to Brussels in the upcoming months to discuss Somalia. (Note: The proposal for Brussels consultations follows on an invitation made to President Isaias by EU Commissioner Louis Michel during his February visit to Eritrea. The delegation noted that should Isaias visit Brussels, the agenda would be on a broad range of issues to include food security, economic development and regional issues. End Note.) The delegation was clearly pleased with the tone of the meeting with President Isaias, which they felt represented a positive change toward greater openness and cooperation with the EU on Somalia. Nonetheless, the delegation was not unreservedly optimistic. Ambassador Klor-Berchtold commented during the briefing that the President did not articulate a clear GSE strategy towards Somalia, and in fact, Eritrea may not have one at this point. And the delegation clearly felt that Eritrea's actions in Somalia have been, and will likely continue to be, driven by the long-term objective of weakening Ethiopia. Klor-Berchtold also cautioned that Isaias appeared to be pushing a parallel political process outside of the Nairobi ASMARA 00000339 002 OF 002 framework -- a strategy which post notes (and raised at the briefing) is consistent with the GSE's modus operandi in trying to jumpstart a separate political mediation track for Darfur outside of the UN-AU framework. ¶5. (C) Comment: While the European delegation seems to view the "new and improved" Isaias with an appropriate degree of skepticism, they, like most of our European counterparts in town, continue to pursue a carrot approach in engaging the GSE -- even in the absence of any positive actions to accompany the GSE's shiny new words. The Europeans continue to feel that if they can get the GSE to re-engage in any sort of dialogue -- and promoting its regional ambitions would be the real draw for the GSE -- eventually, the EU will be able to broach the sensitive topics of the border demarcation and human rights. Post accepts that anything's possible, and would agree that the Eritrean's newly-discovered affability it dealing with the EU is indeed fueld by a desire to reestablish its somewhat tarnished regional credentials. We continue to caution our EU colleagues, however, that the GSE's new "open" approach to the EU -- when viewed in tandem with their continued targeted antagonism towards the U.S. -- is more likely a GSE gambit to split the U.S. and EU rather than any true change of heart. End Comment. DeLisi