SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S DINNER WITH ASHGABAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000054 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY) E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV TX SUBJECT: SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM'S DINNER WITH ASHGABAT AMBASSADORS ASHGABAT 00000054 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1. 4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (U) SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum conferred with the UK, Georgian, Romanian, Ukrainian and Azerbaijani ambassadors plus the French, Turkish and German DCMs over a two-hour supper January 10. DAS Feigenbaum began by summarizing the USG's goals for his visit following the letter from Secretary Rice to acting President Berdimukhammedov, A/S Boucher's attendance at Niyazov's funeral, and his own three-and-a-half-hour meeting with FM Meredov that morning. ¶2. (C) UK Ambassador Peter Butcher responded by volunteering "cautious optimism" about prospects for not just near-term stability but also modest relaxation of the most egregious bits of Niyazov's social-policy legacy. He was impressed by what he saw as a striking focus in presidential candidates' platforms on the daily-life concerns of citizens' greatest concern. To general nods, French DCM Henri Tomasini noted approvingly the prominence given to education by most of the candidates ) restoring the tenth year of secondary education and recognition of foreign-study certifications ) as well as to boosting pensions. No-one predicted any degree of actual political liberalization, however. ¶3. (SBU) German Charge Astrid Wolfe chimed in to emphasize the fortuitous timing of Germany's new Central Asia focus for its EU presidency. EU Representative Morel's December 18 meeting to pave a way for this campaign with Niyazov was the latter's last official engagement. The EU now wants to schedule a further visit, probably by Morel, "soon" (but presumably after the election, as the Turkmen have consistently said the acting president will receive no foreign visitors earlier) and anticipated seeing Meredov on the subject as early as the following day (having been displaced by DAS Feigenbaum's reception, the German joked.) First and foremost, the German/EU goal will be to step up collaboration in education, a field in which "much has been asked by the Turkmen side." ¶4. (SBU) The German Charge added that the government two days previously had made an unprecedented request for the EU to supply by January 20 a large-scale plan for agricultural-sector training. DAS Feigenbaum noted that this mirrored a request that Meredov had made during their meeting. ¶5. (C) Ukrainian ambassador Victor Mayko agreed that the more liberal Internet and educational policies foreshadowed by acting president Berdimukhammedov "will of course take place." But, with emphatic vocal backing from Georgian Ambassador Alexi Petriashvili, he proceeded to deliver a set of variations on his main theme: political progress has no chance, because "petroleum and gas" remain all-important ("without the energy sector, there is no economy or stability") and the Russians have all the necessary instruments to destabilize Turkmenistan as they wish at the first sign of unwelcome 'color' reforms. Here, the generally silent Romanian ambassador, Tasin Gemil, spoke up in agreement. Moscow can stir up animosities between Turkmenistan's tribes or regions. Indirectly, it can also influence and pressure through the other regimes of Central Asia. Moscow's main lever over Turkmenistan, resumed the Ukrainian, was its control of pipelines. He predicted a high-level GazProm delegation would rapidly appear in reflexive response to DAS Feigenbaum's visit. ¶6. (C) Charge asked if there were any way for the West to engage Russia constructively in urging political and social liberalization ) outside the energy sphere ) within Turkmenistan. The Ukrainian and Georgian scoffed at the ASHGABAT 00000054 002.2 OF 002 notion. But they eventually did seem to concede that Russia was strictly concerned with gas. Developments in other spheres would not bother Moscow, provided they posed no risk to GazProm's dominance of the gas sector. ¶7. (C) Azerbaijani Ambassador Elkhan Guseinov agreed that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan ought to develop closer relations. The Prime Minister had come for his first time to Ashgabat, with an imposing official group, for Niyazov's funeral. Maybe a phone conversation with Turkmanistan's new president after the latter's inauguration should be the next step. Charge pointed out that the notion of such a phone call has circled for years, but never passed the threshold of insincere debate over who should initiate it. (COMMENT: This was the first intimate supper to which we have invited the elderly, non-English-speaking Azerbaijani. His Georgian counterpart recommended we do so, but the results mainly confirmed our impression that he is negligible as an agent of enhanced Baku-Ashgabat collaboration. END COMMENT.) ¶8. (C) COMMENT: To judge from this event, little planning of steps to upgrade links with Turkmenistan's post-Niyazov regime has yet been conceptualized by "friendly" embassies on the ground in Ashgabat, let alone discussed in their capitals. Even the Germans' enthusiasm for their new Central Asia policy to date features next to no practical nuts and bolts that we can tell. Participants saw some possibility for change in the educational and other social aspects of local life, but not any immediate prospect for progressive change in Turkmenistani politics. End Comment. ¶9. (U) DAS Feigenbaum has cleared this message. BRUSH