FOREIGN MINISTER MEREDOV TELLS SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 ASHGABAT 000044 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY) NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM OSCE MARR TX US SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MEREDOV TELLS SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM TURKMENISTAN IS READY TO TURN A PAGE ASHGABAT 00000044 001.2 OF 010 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a three and a half hour meeting, Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov on January 10 told SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum that Turkmenistan was willing to consider improving bilateral relations on a range of issues from human rights to trade to security. Meredov welcomed Feigenbaum's message that the United States wanted to "turn a page" in bilateral relations and expand cooperation in the areas where joint efforts already were robust, increase cooperation in areas where full potential had not been reached in the past, and address areas where there had been "profound differences." In specific changes from the Niyazov regime, Meredov said the Government of Turkmenistan would: -- Finalize a cooperation plan with the International Committee of the Red Cross, including a prison visit regime; -- Establish a cooperative relationship with the OSCE's Office for Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights (ODIHR), including ODIHR technical assistance with the February 11 presidential election, followed by full-scale ODIHR observation missions to the December 2007 provincial elections and 2008 parliamentary elections; -- Improve registration of religious groups, including registering the Catholic Church; -- Explore expanded cooperation in education, public health, agriculture, security, trade, and involvement with Afghanistan; and -- Discuss freedom of movement, where "we would find a solution." ¶2. (C) Meredov also agreed to a pre-election (late January) expert-level cooperation delegation with participation reflecting the range of areas in the bilateral relationship. End Summary. Meredov Relaxed and Focused -------------- ¶3. (C) Getting the meeting with Meredov was a fight; Embassy had been told "we won't meet with anyone until after the February 11 elections." During the January 10 session, however, Meredov was relaxed, focused, engaged, and occasionally self-deprecating. The meeting, originally scheduled for two hours, ran to three and a half hours. 
Meredov thanked the USG for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's message of condolence and A/S Boucher's presence at the December 24 Niyazov funeral. Meredov apologized that neither he nor Acting President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov had been able to meet with Boucher, but noted there had been no official meetings with visiting VIPs during the funeral. U.S. Wants to "Turn the Page," But Needs to See Change -------------- ¶4. (C) Feigenbaum told Meredov he had requested the meeting so the foreign minister could hear directly from the USG -- rather than through media speculation or third parties and third countries -- about U.S. goals in Central Asia and Turkmenistan. Recognizing that Turkmenistan was in the midst ASHGABAT 00000044 002.2 OF 010 of a transition and might not be ready to make final decisions about the future direction of the relationship, Feigenbaum said he had come to Ashgabat to begin a dialogue between the Governments of the United States and Turkmenistan about the future direction of the bilateral relationship. The United States: -- Was prepared to work with Interim President Berdimuhammedov and the Government of Turkmenistan during the transition; -- Wanted to see a peaceful and stable transition, but also a transition that led to more possibilities, justice, democracy, and openness across-the-board for the people of Turkmenistan; -- Was prepared to work with the outcome of Turkmenistan's political system; -- Respected Turkmenistan's relations with its neighbors and would not seek to disturb existing contracts; -- Did not believe the relationship had lived up to its full potential; -- Needed to see serious changes in Turkmenistan and in the U.S.-Turkmenistan relationship; -- Wanted to explore whether and how to achieve a more cooperative relationship in future; -- Recognized that achieving a more cooperative relationship would not be easy; -- Recognized that, although the two countries had many common interests, they also had "profound differences"; and -- While the two countries needed to work on resolving those differences, these differences should not preclude cooperation in areas where the two countries shared interests. ¶5. (C) Feigenbaum said the core of his message was to reiterate Secretary Rice's and A/S Boucher's message that the United States was ready to turn a page in the relationship -- if the Government of Turkmenistan was also prepared to turn the page. Indeed, there had been a natural sequence in USG actions since President Niyazov's death: the Secretary of State had sent a message that the United States was prepared to turn the page, A/S Boucher had come to Turkmenistan to communicate that wish directly, and DAS Feigenbaum had come to explore what that wish meant and what Turkmenistan was prepared to do. And, when Turkmenistan was willing, the United States was prepared to send a working-level delegation to explore in greater depth what could be done in various areas of the relationship -- trade and economics, democracy and human rights, security cooperation, and cooperation on transnational issues, such as environment, energy, narcotics, and health -- to turn the page. Meredov: Bilateral Relations Sound in Many Ways -------------- ¶6. (C) Meredov recalled that relations between Turkmenistan and the United States had been established on the first day of Turkmenistan's independence, and that then-Secretary of State James Baker had a fruitful meeting with President Niyazov in Ashgabat just a few days after Turkmenistan adopted its constitution. Over the intervening 15 years, there had been good cooperation. Noting that there were some ASHGABAT 00000044 003.2 OF 010 areas where "different approaches" had led to problems, he said Turkmenistan had always preferred to resolve those questions through constructive dialogue, rather than to avoid them. Turkmenistan viewed the United States as a friend. ¶7. (S) Meredov then listed examples of "positive cooperation" between the United States and Turkmenistan: -- Trade and Commerce. To date, 48 companies with U.S. capital were involved in 90 projects, worth $1.9 billion. Textiles manufactured in Turkmenistan were being exported to the United States through well-known companies. Turkmenistan's oil and gas, textile, energy and agriculture sectors all remained open to U.S. products. -- Security and counter-narcotics cooperation. Concrete border security and counter-narcotics law enforcement cooperation, as exemplified by the Altyn Asyr border checkpoint station on the Iran border, built and equipped by the United States. Turkmenistan had also been a member of the coalition in the war on terrorism since 2001 and had assisted the U.S. by allowing transits by U.S. aircraft and plane refueling at Ashgabat airport. Turkmenistan had also signed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2005, and, within that framework, had refused to allow aircraft suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction or their components to transit Turkmenistan airspace. -- Education cooperation. The USG had created opportunities for children and teachers to grow, learn, and develop through a number of exchange programs, including FLEX, UGRAD, the Muskie Fellowship and the Fulbright program. In 2006, Turkmenistan had followed through with another Embassy initiative -- hosting the International Teachers of English Conference (ITEC) in Ashgabat. When problems emerged, the Government of Turkmenistan worked with the Embassy to find a mutually satisfactory solution, according to Meredov (Comment: Only partly true, the government cooperated on arranging the conference but worked overtime to prevent its own teachers from traveling from the provinces to attend. End Comment.). ¶8. (C) Referring to the problematic 2006 FLEX recruitment season, Meredov said "we" worked with the United States to re-test in three cities where local officials had not cooperated sufficiently. Expressing the hope that education cooperation would continue, he noted that all of Turkmenistan's presidential candidates in recent days had mentioned the need for changes in education. "Some" (i.e., Interim President Berdimuhammedov) had called for even more concrete steps, including enhanced overseas educational exchanges with the United States. A number of U.S. organizations, including both USAID and the Peace Corps, were doing much to help, he said; their efforts had been valued by President Niyazov, who had written a message that was to have been read by Meredov to the new group of Peace Corps volunteers being sworn in on December 21. Unfortunately, that message had never been delivered, due to Niyazov's death. U.S. Interest in Central Asia -------------- ¶9. (C) Feigenbaum stressed that, since 1991, the core U.S. interest in Central Asia had been support for the sovereignty and independence of the countries of the region. Media discussion of a "Great Game" belied the fact that U.S. actions in Turkmenistan -- and in the region as a whole -- were focused on supporting Central Asian countries and their sovereignty, and on giving those countries opportunities in ASHGABAT 00000044 004.2 OF 010 every field. The United States did not regard Central Asians as mere objects of struggle with outsiders but as actors in their own right and sought to work with them in all areas -- economics and trade, political reform, human rights and democracy promotion, security cooperation, and to address transnational cooperation on problems such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environment, energy, and border security. ¶10. (C) Feigenbaum noted that many U.S. programs were multi-dimensional in nature -- they had implications for and benefits in more than one area. For example, rule of law was essential to democracy but was also a building block of trade and commerce. Likewise, while secure borders and modern customs helped to assure security they also contributed to trade. The United States wanted to work in a multi-dimensional way on these issues to support countries' sovereignty and independence. The Way Forward -------------- ¶11. (S) DAS Feigenbaum reviewed the history of U.S.-Turkmenistan relations. He then said the bilateral relationship with Turkmenistan reflected three elements: -- A track record of shared success in many areas. The United States was proud of that record and hoped Turkmenistan was equally proud of that success. The USG was pleased with Turkmenistan's cooperation in Afghanistan, and was grateful for Turkmenistan's support. Security cooperation was strong and appreciated. There had been excellent cooperation on borders. There also had been much success in non-proliferation and other issues -- areas not discussed publicly and not always apparent, such as North Korea. Feigenbaum noted a number of areas of productive cooperation and suggested the United States and Turkmenistan should try to build on that track record. -- Unfulfilled potential in more areas. Berdimuhammedov's comments over the last few days on expanding exchanges, restoring some subjects to the education curriculum and offering Internet access to all offered new hope that Turkmenistan's leaders were re-ordering priorities. Yet, USAID's Participation, Education and Knowledge-Strengthening (PEAKS) program had not been approved, even though it would have strengthened Turkmenistan's own efforts to build up its education curriculum, and three Internet Access Training Programs (IATP) centers had been closed. The United States also had encountered significant problems with its FLEX program. In the spirit of improving cooperation, the United States wanted to see those centers reopened. Trade and the rule of law were other areas where more cooperation beneficial to Turkmenistan might have been possible but Turkmen policies had stood in the way. The United States did not want to unsettle existing contracts between Turkmenistan and its partners, but believed options and competition would benefit Turkmenistan and others. -- Profound differences in other areas, not least on issues related to human rights, political reform, and democracy. DAS Feigenbaum emphasized that we needed to work on these differences and the United States hoped to see real change in Turkmenistan. -- Feigenbaum stressed that differences should not preclude cooperation in areas where the two countries shared interests. The United States hoped to turn areas of profound difference into a positive in the relationship. ASHGABAT 00000044 005.2 OF 010 Profound Differences Can be Resolved -------------- ¶12. (C) As discussion turned to political issues and democracy, DAS Feigenbaum told Meredov, "it's no secret the United States hopes to seen an open society in Turkmenistan." A/S Boucher had recently made this point during a VOA interview. The USG wanted greater openness everywhere -- in travel, trade, access to information, citizen participation in the political process, religion and belief, and the press -- in short "comprehensive openness in every sphere." This did not mean the USG expected all countries to look like carbon copies of the United States; instead, it recognized that each country would develop its economy, society and culture in its own way. ¶13. (C) However, there were some issues that had prevented further cooperation and had affected the U.S. perception of Turkmenistan. The United States wanted a new relationship, but there had to be changes in these areas. If Turkmenistan wanted to turn the page, these areas had to be resolved, including: -- Participation in the political life of the country. DAS Feigenbaum noted that Meredov had just hosted a delegation from the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and hoped that the visit had been productive. The United States was very interested in seeing how Turkmenistan's dialogue with ODIHR developed, including on technical assessment of elections and observer missions. Perhaps the United States could also be helpful on elections. -- Freedom of movement on travel. The issue came down to the need to allow citizens of Turkmenistan greater opportunities for exchanges and connections. When Berdimuhammedov had discussed Internet access, he had been discussing increased connections with the rest of the world. Travel was another way of accomplishing the same goal. If people could not travel, then they needed to have an understanding of why they could not travel. -- Civil/civic engagement. Activities of all sorts of groups -- private, independent and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) -- were a vital part of the life of society. All such groups should be able to register. -- Religious freedom. The United States wanted to see people, including members of minority religious groups, engage in religious activity. All minority religious groups and their branches should be able to register. -- Openness to information. Noting that Washington was "intrigued" by Berdimuhammedov's comments on open access for all to the Internet, allowing Turkmenistan's students to go abroad on expanded exchanges, and restoration of banned subjects to the curriculum, Feigenbaum said this concept supported the larger idea of increasing access to information in Turkmenistan. One way to ensure this access would be to accredit more foreign journalists in Turkmenistan and to expand media freedoms. More correspondents in Turkmenistan would promote more information about Turkmenistan. Although this was an area of difference, over time this could become an area of greater cooperation. -- Prisons. Noting that Turkmenistan was talking with ICRC, DAS Feigenbaum hoped the government could find a mutually agreeable way to work with the ICRC and to ensure ICRC ASHGABAT 00000044 006.2 OF 010 access. He pushed for more transparency in Turkmenistan's prison system and about prisoners, including political prisoners. Meredov: There Are No Political Prisoners, But We're Working with ICRC -------------- ¶14. (C) According to Meredov, notwithstanding reports by some media, all prisoners in Turkmenistan had broken laws and had been convicted of those crimes. Reports from opposition representatives of political prisoners were incorrect. Turkmenistan had no political prisoners. Indeed, even now, there were people who had committed grave crimes that were living outside Turkmenistan and were considered opposition leaders. However, Turkmenistan had filed warrants against those people with INTERPOL, and had evidence to prove those individuals -- many of whom had received protection from foreign countries -- were criminals. ¶15. (C) Meredov said the Government of Turkmenistan was negotiating a draft "Plan of Cooperation for 2007" with ICRC. This plan laid out a number of areas of cooperation, including in humanitarian law, health, and the functioning of the prison system. Unfortunately, Niyazov's death had preempted a December 21 meeting between the government and the ICRC's regional representative, Mr. Michel. Meredov hoped the ICRC would reschedule the meeting, and said the government wanted a constructive dialogue on a visit regime. Meredov on ODIHR and Elections: Starting a Long-term Relationship Over Several Elections -------------- ¶16. (C) Meredov said the ODIHR team met with all the main players -- candidates, the Central Election Commission, members of the Mejlis (parliament) and diplomatic missions -- during its two days in Ashgabat. During its outbrief with Meredov, the team told him it considered the visit a success, and that the mission saw a possibility of future cooperation. ¶17. (C) More concretely, the delegation had outlined two directions which election cooperation could take: a broad-based observer program or a technical assistance program. The ODIHR team had stressed that the timing for observation teams outlined in the Copenhagen Document did not allow for an observer mission, since long-term observers -- usually in-country six weeks prior to elections -- would have had to be on the ground already. However, the ODIHR team had said that, particularly since this was Turkmenistan's first major experience working with ODIHR on elections, a technical team might be the way to go. ¶18. (C) Meredov stressed the Government of Turkmenistan's willingness to work with an ODIHR group of experts, which would come as an OSCE field mission, and to allow the team full access at all levels of the election process. "We are ready to meet with them and listen attentively to their recommendations and to learn more about the international experience in elections," he indicated. ¶19. (C) Meredov described a program of long-term cooperation, designed to work with Turkmenistan through several elections. Beyond the February 11 presidential election, election cooperation with ODIHR would extend into the future, including possible full observer missions for elections at the end of 2007 for welayat (provincial)-level people's councils, and in 2008 for the Mejlis (parliament). Meredov ASHGABAT 00000044 007.2 OF 010 stated that the ODIHR team had also discussed other areas of cooperation. Meredov on Freedom of Movement: Willing to Discuss -------------- -------------- ¶20. (C) Acknowledging that he had frequently met with the embassy to discuss "different approaches" to this issue, Meredov said that he always tried to explain the law and discuss specific cases, as they were affected by existing legislation. The Government of Turkmenistan was willing to discuss problems in order to see whether a mutually acceptable solution was possible. While Meredov give DAS Feigenbaum an immediate answer, he was willing to continue the dialogue and "find a solution." Meredov on Religion: An Area of Positive Cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶21. (C) Meredov described religious freedom as a positive area of cooperation. While registration of religious groups was necessary under Turkmenistan's law, the government had adjusted its registration prerequisite of 500 members down to 2 (sic) members following then-EUR DAS Lynn Pascoe's 2004 visit. (Note: Actually, the government requires 5 members for registration. End note.) There are now 118 registered groups: 96 Muslim, 13 Russian Orthodox and 9 other religious groups. (Comment: The government counts every mosque as a group; therefore the numbers reflect the existence of 96 registered mosques and 13 Russian Orthodox churches. The government in the past has shut down non-registered mosques, typically those who refuse to display/pray from the Ruhnama. End Comment.) The government also had resolved problems related to registration of local branches following an October 2005 roundtable with minority religious groups. ¶22. (C) While there were other groups that wanted to register, solutions involved adjustments to local law. For example, although the Roman Catholic Church was a major world religion, Turkmenistan law required heads of religious groups to be citizens of Turkmenistan. However, there were no Turkmenistan citizens who could be appointed heads of the Catholic Church in Turkmenistan without at least five to six years of relevant training. Meredov had met with a representative of the Papal Nuncio late in December 2006 to discuss this issue; the two agreed to work toward a solution. In the meantime, Meredov added, members of the Church, including Turkmenistan citizens, would be allowed to meet and practice their faith. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice will try to find a solution (to the remaining registration cases)," he said. Meredov on NGOs: Willing to Discuss Solutions -------------- - ¶23. (C) Meredov noted that legislation existed on registration of public organizations, but said the government will continue to engage in discussion. "With an atmosphere of constructive dialogue, anything can be discussed and solutions can be found," he added. A Road-Map Forward -------------- ¶24. (C) DAS Feigenbaum reiterated the U.S. desire to turn the page on the bilateral relationship. Reviewing U.S. actions over the past weeks, he said the United States had some ideas on directions for future cooperation, beginning with a working-level exchange to explore the ideas. Feigenbaum ASHGABAT 00000044 008.2 OF 010 proposed that an interagency working-level delegation, headed by EUR/ACE Coordinator Tom Adams with participation reflecting all areas of the relationship, including economics, security, and democracy, visit Turkmenistan in late January in order to explore how the two countries might comprehensively expand their cooperation. Subsequently, when Turkmenistan was ready to make bigger decisions, there could be follow-on visits, for instance by representatives of the Department of Defense or the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL). ¶25. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that it made sense to expand cooperation in areas in which Berdimuhammedov already had expressed interest: -- Health. Berdimuhammedov had a health background and might have his own ideas, but joint efforts on disease prevention, including vaccinations (measles, mumps, and rubella) and a cooperative plan to improve medical equipment in clinics outside the capital were possible. -- Education. Following up on Berdimuhammedov's expressed interest in expanding exchanges, it made sense for Turkmenistan to resolve issues related to the FLEX and PEAKS programs and to reopen closed Internet Access and Training Centers. However, the two countries should also examine new areas to expand education cooperation, such as Internet access and exchanges. -- Security Cooperation. The two sides could possibly expand the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Marshall Center programs, should conclude the exchange of diplomatic notes on the emergency divert program for Mary, and explore other areas of interest, such as additional cooperation border security and counter-narcotics. -- Regional Cooperation. DAS Feigenbaum stressed the importance for Central Asia of finding "opportunities in every direction" on the compass, including to Afghanistan and South Asia, and said the State Department structural reorganization that moved responsibility for Central Asia to the South Asia bureau had been intended to assist Central Asian countries to expand economic and other contacts to supplement existing contacts. The two countries could explore the possibility of new trade programs within the scope of the Central Asian Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Noting Turkmenistan's participation in recent electricity conferences in Istanbul and Dushanbe, he also suggested that Turkmenistan could explore cooperation in those areas. A New Relationship Requires a New Ambassador -------------- ¶26. (C) Meredov promised to answer promptly whenever a new U.S. ambassador was proposed, but stressed that, meanwhile, the Government of Turkmenistan had "open and respectful" discussions with the Charge. Meredov Accepts Roadmap -------------- ¶27. (C) Meredov accepted the idea of a late-January expert-level cooperation visit. Turkmenistan would also continue to consider cooperation projects "with the same respect as before." Past programs -- including the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation and visits to Turkmenistan of U.S. experts on education, music, art and libraries -- demonstrated Turkmenistan's commitment to "wide ASHGABAT 00000044 009.2 OF 010 and comprehensive" cooperation in cultural issues. Trade initiatives under the TIFA and counter-narcotics work also offered areas for continued cooperation. Meredov Seeks U.S. Backing for UN Regional Center -------------- -------------- ¶28. (C) Meredov said Turkmenistan was interested in expanding its cooperation in the region not only in economic and social, but also political areas. One initiative of special importance was the proposal to establish a Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Ashgabat. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had supported the initiative in SIPDIS his 2005 annual report, but Turkmenistan also needed Security Council backing. U.S. support for the center's establishment was important for Turkmenistan. (Comment: This center was one of Niyazov's vanity projects and has never enjoyed USG support. Meredov may have been parroting this request out of habit, he should know the United States has consistently failed to support this initiative as a waste of money and inappropriate given Turkmenistan's isolation. End Comment.) Regional Energy Issues -------------- ¶29. (C) DAS Feigenbaum noted that Turkmenistan had been providing electricity to Afghanistan, and noted a great need for energy in Afghanistan and the region. Countries were moving forward on regional electricity initiatives, and countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which had rich hydropower resources, would found they could get two to three times more for their energy in the south than they could by simply sending energy to existing markets. Although Turkmenistan did not have hydropower, this example demonstrated the power of competition, markets, and options and choices in its economy. ¶30. (C) Meredov noted that Turkmenistan exported electricity to Afghanistan powered by natural gas. Noting that this was an "important moment" in the discussion, he said that the electrical power supplied by Turkmenistan had great potential in the region. Of course, it was natural that other Central Asian states with water resources wanted access to the regional market, but, as demonstrated by Tajikistan, their supply was unreliable. Although Turkmenistan welcomed the economic success of all countries in the region, there were certain rules of economics. But he did not want to discuss those issues; instead, Meredov wanted to focus on Niyazov's proposal to develop Afghanistan's electrical network through provision of electrical power from Turkmenistan. Meredov Requests Urgent Help on Agricultural Exchanges -------------- -------------- ¶31. (C) Meredov thanked DAS Feigenbaum for U.S. cooperation, particularly in the agricultural sector, and noted that USDA's Cochran exchange and the Farmer-to-Farmer exchange program had helped send agricultural specialists to the United States. He asked whether the USG could send three agricultural specialists to the United States, for "one to two weeks," to learn about agricultural organization, management, marketing and methodologies -- especially in the wheat and cotton sectors. DAS Feigenbaum responded that, although this was an issue that should be explored during the working-level visit in late January, he would take the request backed to Washington. Comment -------------- ASHGABAT 00000044 010.2 OF 010 ¶32. (C) Meredov, who often interacts more like the lawyer he is by training than like a diplomat, was in particularly statesman-like form. He clearly understood Feigenbaum's message that a new relationship was possible and desirable; the United States was ready, but change was needed in many areas. While Embassy expected him to be receptive about DAS Feigenbaum's messages on security and counter-narcotics cooperation, Meredov's positive comments on ODIHR, aspects of religious freedom, ICRC and prisons, and his willingness to continue discussion on a number of other issues in the human dimension basket such as freedom of movement, were clearly intended to demonstrate Turkmenistan's own willingness to pursue a new relationship. Unfortunately, old habits die hard. Following the Meredov meeting, MFA failed to confirm most of the appointments it had previously approved for the visit, including a visit to a disabled sports club equipped by USAID, a visit to the Gaudan border crossing station to view EXBS-supplied equipment, a meeting with regional governors, and a visit to a USAID-funded resource center outside of Ashgabat. After Charge protested to MFA protocol that MFA's actions did not reflect Foreign Minister Meredov's positive words about cooperation, a previously approved, then canceled, visit to the local USAID-funded chapter of Junior Achievement was rescheduled. End Comment. ¶33. (U) DAS Feigenbaum cleared this message. BRUSH