ASHGABAT AMBASSADORS ON POLITICS, GROWING RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: EPET GG PGOV PREL RS TU TX UP
SUBJECT: ASHGABAT AMBASSADORS ON POLITICS, GROWING RUSSIAN
INFLUENCE, AND TURKMENISTAN'S ENERGY OPTIONS

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Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) Visiting Deputy National Intelligence Officer for
Russia and Eurasia Dionisio de Leon, Charge, and embassy
officers met with Ashgabat-based ambassadors on April 26-27
to solicit their impressions of the current political
situation in Turkmenistan. Georgian Ambassador Alexy
Petriashvili, Ukrainian Ambassador Viktor Mayko, UK
Ambassador Peter Butcher, and Turkish Ambassador Hakki Akil
gave their perspectives on Turkmenistan,s internal political
situation, the increasing level of Russian influence in
Turkmenistan, and the potential for alternative energy export
routes.


2. (C) Although the ambassadors presented very different
perspectives on the internal political situation in
Turkmenistan -- reflecting the difficulty of teasing out
rumor from fact and the opaque nature of the political system
-- all agreed that Russia's influence was strong and probably
increasing and that the prospects for alternative energy
routes, including the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, were still open
but contingent on negotiation between Turkmenistan and
Russia. Ambassadors also discussed their views on prospects
for future cooperation with Turkmenistan,s leadership. End
Summary.


GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR: BERDIMUHAMMEDOV NOT CALLING THE SHOTS


3. (C) Georgian Ambassador Alexy Petriashvili believed that
Berdimuhammedov was being controlled by a team of officials
who were responsible for Berdimuhammedov's swift rise and who
had the power to remove the president if he failed to satisfy
their expectations. Petriashvili said that Berdimuhammedov
had absolutely no independent power base.


4. (C) The officials in control, Petriashvili suggested, fell
into two groups: Niyazov's team of ethnic Russian advisers,
including Viktor Khramov, Vladimir Umnov, and Aleksandr
Jadan; and security ministers, namely Presidential Security
Chief Akmurat Rejepov. Rejepov seemed very much "at home" in
the presidential palace and very relaxed, and his connections
from the Soviet KGB Academy were still active.


5. (C) Petriashvili said that Niyazov's family for the most
part had stepped aside, but commented that former
presidential son Myrat Niyazov was trying to become the "new
opposition" to Berdimuhammedov's regime. Myrat had been
trying to convince people that Berdimuhammedov and the
siloviki (security forces) killed his father. According to
Petriashvili, he attempted to demonstrate his connections to
Russian President Putin and the Russian leadership by
visiting Russia immediately after his father's death. Myrat
was planning to visit the United States and to meet with
officials in Washington to prove his sway to Turkmenistan's
new leadership, which for its part was trying to push Myrat
out of town as quietly as possible. Myrat was now living in
the dilapidated Nebetci Hotel, which Petriashili described as
"a place I'd put my accountant."

UKRAINIAN, BRITISH, AND TURKISH AMBASSADORS: BERDIMUHAMMEDOV
CONSOLIDATING POWER


6. (C) Ukrainian Ambassador Viktor Mayko, UK Ambassador Peter
Butcher, and Turkish Ambassador Hakki Akil all believed that
Berdimuhammedov was solidifying his power base. Mayko
dismissed the "puppet master" theory but said that
Berdimuhammedov was very constrained in his decision making.

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Constraints on the president included his inexperience, lack
of independent power, the population's mentality (quick moves
were "impossible and dangerous") and Russian influence. Over
the next year, Mayko predicted that Berdimuhammedov would
increase his personal power to make himself more independent.


7. (C) Butcher said that Berdimuhammedov's firing of Minister
of Internal Affairs Rahmonov was a sign that Berdimuhammedov
was asserting his independence, and Mayko believed that this
was the first of many changes to come in the power
ministries. Mayko believed that Berdimuhammedov would
replace the Minister of Defense, the Prosecutor General, and
the Minister of National Security. He agreed that Khramov,
Umnov, and Jadan were still in power, and said that Rejepov
and National Security Chief Ashyrmuhammedov were definitely
key players in the transitional period.


8. (C) Mayko noted the "newcomers" to the political scene:
the new Head of the Presidential Administration Ishanguliyev
and Myrat Yslamov (Note: Yslamov, a former head of the State
Service for the Registration of Foreigners, and Deputy
Chairman for the State Counternarcotics Commission under
Ashirmuhammedov, was demoted in November 2006, and appeared
to have been reinstalled in government. End Note.),who was
now responsible for logistics and procurement for the
Ministry of Defense (Note: This was just the "top side" of
his responsibilities, said Mayko, implying that his influence
ran deeper. End Note.),as well as Berdimuhammedov's former
deputy in the Ministry of Health Myradov, who now was
responsible for oil and gas procurement ) and suggested that
Berdimuhammedov was building his own inner circle.


9. (C) Akil alone believed that Rejepov was not a powerful
player in Berdimuhammedov's administration. He said that
Meredov was the strongest adviser to Berdimuhammedov, but
that Meredov was noncommittal and deliberately kept a low
profile.


ALL AGREE: THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING


10. (C) All ambassadors believed that Russian influence in
Turkmenistan had increased since Niyazov's death and that
Russia had greater leverage over Berdimuhammedov than it ever
had over Niyazov.


11. (C) Russian leverage played primarily to the Turkmenistan
president's fears that Russia could remove him from power.
If Russia decided to remove Berdimuhammedov, Petriashvili
said, they could. Letting Russia get involved, Mayko said,
was part of the price Berdimuhammedov paid for political
stability at home.


12. (C) Russia's specific goal, according to Akil, was to
obtain solid guarantees from Turkmenistan on gas exports and
to convert the framework agreement on natural gas to a
commercial contract. (Note: Akil stated that, commercially
speaking, there was no need for a long term contract because
there was an existing pipeline; a contract in this case
served mainly political purposes. End Note.) If Russia were
to secure this type of contract from Turkmenistan, the
message -- that all of Turkmenistan's gas belonged to Gazprom
-- would be clear.


TURKMENISTAN FACING CONSTRAINTS ON GAS EXPORT OPTIONS


13. (C) All agreed that Turkmenistan's best commercial option
was the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP),but found it hard to
imagine a day when Berdimuhammedov would stand up and
announce that he had authorized construction of the pipeline,

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considering Russia,s opposition to the route. Mayko said
that he thought the TCP was still under consideration, but
that he had doubts about Turkmenistan leadership's
seriousness, and believed that they may only need it as
leverage to get a better deal from Russia. (Note: Mayko said
that Russia would pay a maximum of $140 to $150 for
Turkmenistan's gas, and that Berdimuhammedov would almost
certainly try to renegotiate the price of Turkmenistan's gas
by autumn, despite the three year fixed price agreement with
Russia. End Note.)


14. (C) Mayko, Butcher, and Akil agreed that the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (-India) pipeline proposals
were effectively off the table because of the security
situation in Afghanistan, and that none of the parties seemed
energized on the issue. Akil said that although Turkmenistan
continued to support the idea of exporting gas to China,
because of the high cost of pipeline construction, China
would only pay a low price for the gas, probably lower than
Russia. (Note: Akil estimated that 6000 km of pipeline would
be required to reach China's gas markets. End Note.)


NEXT STEPS FOR THE WEST: ACT AGGRESSIVELY, QUICKLY, AND BRING
CONCRETE PLANS


15. (C) The ambassadors believed that the West must step up
its efforts so as not to miss an opportunity for engagement
with Turkmenistan's new leadership. All agreed that the West
was not doing enough to send a serious signal to
Berdimuhammedov.


16. (C) According to Mayko, Turkmenistan needed to see
concrete offers, plans, and assistance to believe that the
West was serious about engagement. He recommended that
Western countries move more aggressively, rapidly and
specifically, and said that, if that happened, Turkmenistan
would be more responsive. The West should seize this moment
of opportunity -- when Berdimuhammedov was still open to new
ideas and possibilities -- to take advantage of the readiness
for dialogue.


17. (C) Akil suggested that the timeframe for Western action
was immediate because of Putin's upcoming April 13-14 visit
to Ashgabat. He said that the West should send very
high-level messages to Berdimuhammedov now if Western
countries were serious about the strategic importance of the
TCP; barring urgent intervention, he feared, Putin would
ratchet up pressure on Berdimuhammedov to increase
Turkmenistan's commitments to Gazprom.


COMMENT


18. (C) The lack of agreement by Ashgabat-based ambassadors
on the dynamics of Turkmenistan's internal political
situation reflects the continued opacity surrounding the
country's leadership. Generally reliable interlocutors seem
to have less clarity now on the dynamics of decision-making
than they did during Niyazov's era. The ambassadors'
disagreement as to who is calling the shots in Ashgabat
reflects a situation in the capital where rumor -)
originating at all levels -- is difficult to separate from
fact.


19. (C) The apparent consensus that Russian influence was
growing in Ashgabat was telling, and even more telling was
the common belief that Berdimuhammedov is operating under the
assumption -- right or wrong -- that Russia is in a position
to unseat him or to undermine his political security.
Combined with the shared belief that Russia rolled out the

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red carpet for Turkmenistan's new president while the West
stood by, this painted a gloomy picture for the prospects of
increased cooperation with Turkmenistan. The call for more
concrete signals from the West was clear, and the ambassadors
conveyed a sense of urgency, suggesting that the window of
opportunity was not unending. End Comment.
BRUSH