HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN ON TURKMENISTAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000422 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV TX IR SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN ON TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN ASHGABAT 00000422 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1. 4 (B) and (D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During an April 20 meeting, Hungarian Ambassador to Iran and Turkmenistan Istvan Venczel discussed developments in Turkmenistan and briefed Charge on the current political situation in Iran. Venczel, who has lived in Tehran since 2003, commented on issues of concern in Turkmenistan -- including pipeline construction, human rights, and Russian influence -- and provided his impressions of Iranian leadership, Iran's nuclear intentions, and public opinion towards the United States. Among the issues raised by Venczel: -- Iran did not have "friends" in the international community, and its isolation helped to justify its belief that it needed nuclear weapons. -- Many factions were competing for power in Tehran and President Ahmedinejad's position was far from secure. --Ahmedinejad's belligerence, which made some Iranians nervous, had turned public opinion against him in some pockets of the population. --Ordinary Iranians still liked Americans, partly because of the large Iranian diaspora in the West and continued travel of Iranians to the United States. -- Iran was in a very strong position in Iraq, and there would be no peace in Iraq without Iran's cooperation. End Summary. VENCZEL ON TURKMENISTAN: PIPELINES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Hungarian Ambassador to Iran and Turkmenistan Istvan Venczel called on Charge on April 20 during a visit to Ashgabat. Venczel, who has lived in Tehran since 2003 and formerly headed the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, plans to retire from the diplomatic corps and may seek an OSCE position in Central Asia. Charge welcomed him and said that Hungary's diplomatic presence, along with that of other Eastern European countries, was critical for Turkmenistan, and commented that the accreditation of the new Polish Ambassador to Turkmenistan and the opening of a Polish Embassy in Ashgabat were steps forward in the relationship between Eastern European countries and Turkmenistan. ¶3. (C) Venczel opened by asking Charge about U.S. intentions regarding the Trans-Caspian pipeline, commenting that he had heard of USG interest in reengaging Turkmenistan on that issue. Charge commented that in order for a Trans-Caspian pipeline to be realistic, Turkmenistan would have to improve its foreign investment climate and the Europeans would need to show more support for the plan, but that Turkmenistan's increased receptivity to engagement with Azerbaijan was encouraging. Venczel remarked that despite this, he was not optimistic about either Europe engaging or Turkmenistan improving its investment climate. ¶4. (C) Venczel raised the issue of Muhametkuli Aymyradov, a political prisoner arrested in 1995 on charges of anti-government plotting, and said that the release of Aymyradov would be a symbolic gesture for Turkmenistan. (Comment: Aymyradov, who was associated with Avdy Kuliev's ASHGABAT 00000422 002.2 OF 003 opposition group in the early 1990s, was arrested in Uzbekistan in 1995 and returned to Turkmenistan, where he was sentenced and imprisoned for 15 years on charges of engaging in activities aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order. In 1998, his sentence was extended by 18 years in connection with an alleged prison break attempt. End Comment.) Venczel said that Niyazov once promised to release Aymyradov to Moscow, but never followed up on his promise. Venczel speculated that Aymyradov's imprisonment was associated with Niyazov's personal dislike of him, and that Aymyradov -- having no association with the 2002 assassination attempt or any recent attempt on the government -- did not pose any kind of threat to Berdimuhammedov. ¶5. (C) Charge agreed that the world was ready for a gesture from Berdimuhammedov -- the release of a high-profile prisoner, for example, or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to prisons. Despite promises, however, the international community so far had not seen any steps towards real reform. For example, Berdimuhammedov announced reforms in the education sector that restore the previous status quo by increasing the years of education, but he would not allow the USG to assist with curriculum development or teaching methodology. ¶6. (C) For now, Charge commented, Russia appeared to be either seducing or threatening Berdimuhammedov, or both, judging from the president's urgent working visit to Russia, and she asked whether Venczel believed that the Kremlin had the power to unseat Berdimuhammedov. Venczel replied that Berdimuhammedov would certainly be more open with Russia than Niyazov had been, because Niyazov was more of a Turkmen nationalist. Russia, Venczel suggested, had a strong position in Turkmenistan, although not as strong as in other Central Asian states, and Berdimuhammedov might fear -- rightly or not -- that Russia had some influence over his political position. IRAN NOT CONCERNED ABOUT U.S. PRESENCE IN TURKMENISTAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Venczel claimed that Iran was not worried about U.S. engagement with Turkmenistan, although the Iranian leadership watched U.S. activities in Azerbaijan with concern. Iran had a good relationship with Turkmenistan. However, Iran became more cautious under Khatami and now made no effort to export the Revolution to Central Asia; most of the mosques in Turkmenistan that had been opened with outside support were established by Saudis. (Comment: Most Saudi-sponsored mosques were shut down under Niyazov. End Comment.) Venczel said that the Turkmen minority in northern Iran faced no major problems and that generally there were no problems with minorities in Iran, everyone suffered equally. IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: QUESTION OF INTENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Charge asked Venczel's opinion of Iranian press reports that Berdimuhammedov -- following his March 16 meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Motaki -- expressed support for Iran's "peaceful nuclear activities." (Comment: The Turkmenistani and Iranian media offered differing reports of Berdimuhammedov's meeting with Motaki. In addition to reports on bilateral cooperation, the Iranian press also reported that Berdimuhammedov gave strong support for Iran's "peaceful nuclear activities." End Comment.) Venczel responded that, while there was no problem with support for a truly peaceful nuclear program, the Iranian position had worsened because Iran insisted on enriching uranium. Iran was not technically in violation of international ASHGABAT 00000422 003.2 OF 003 regulations, according to Venczel, so judgment hinged on the question of intent. Venczel said that, based on his knowledge of Tehran, he was inclined to believe that Iran's leadership wanted to have a nuclear weapon. ¶9. (C) According to Venczel, Iran's insistence on a nuclear program rested on its increased nationalism since the Revolution. Because Iran had few friends in the world, it had to look out for itself. Venczel said that Arabs and Central Asians were afraid of Iran, and Pakistan and Afghanistan were displeased with Iran, so Iran had no clear alliances in this region. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE IRANIAN REGIME -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Venczel, there were divisions within the Iranian regime, making generalizations difficult. Venczel noted that Iran's regime was weaker than it appeared and that the government was not united behind Ahmedinejad. Ahmedinejad, he said, was not exactly "the Supreme Leader's man." Former President Rafsanjani and Mayor of Tehran Ghalibal, he said, had opened separate dialogues. The Mayor of Tehran, for example, made a recent statement encouraging closer relations with the international community, and was considered a "dove." IRANIAN SOCIETY PRO-AMERICAN -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite official belligerence towards the United States, most ordinary Iranians liked Americans, according to Venczel. A recent opinion poll in Iran showed that most Iranians wanted to reengage with the United States, and the large Iranian diaspora in the West -- and the fact that the Iranian regime allowed travel to and from the United States -- was important to perceptions of the West within Iran. Venczel suggested that, if Americans returned to Iran, there was good work to be done. ¶12. (C) Venczel claimed many in Iran hated Ahmedinejad and said that some Iranians would welcome an attack on their country to liberate them from their President. Venczel caveated this observation by noting that the diplomatic corps had little contact with everyday Iranians, but said that it was interesting that he had heard this comment more than once. Iran could not be invaded by ground, he said, but an air invasion might be possible because the Iranian air force was unsophisticated. IRAN KEY TO IRAQ WAR -------------- ¶13. (C) Venczel said that Iran had a very strong position in Iraq, and there would be no peace there without Iranian cooperation. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Embassy is presenting the above information as Venczel provided it. Although Venczel is retiring from his position in the diplomatic corps, conversations with Hungarian and other Western diplomats stationed in Tehran continue to provide a small window into internal political developments in Iran. Embassy welcomes such visits and encourages these embassies to continue to meet with us when visiting Ashgabat from Tehran. End Comment. BRUSH