UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL ON BERDIMUHAMMEDOV

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000191 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN (PERRY),SCA/PPD, EUR/ACE USUN FOR ECOSOC/HUGHES, MALLY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TX US SUBJECT: UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL ON BERDIMUHAMMEDOV Ref: Ashgabat 178 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Charge exchanged post-Niyazov views February 10 with visiting UN Secretariat official Vladimir Goryayev, a Turkmenistan veteran with extraordinary local access. Goryayev predicted that change would be slow and cautious at best under Berdimuhammedov, since the latter will remain fettered by "the (Niyazov) Old Guard." But he also claimed to have obtained concessions from the interim president in a meeting the previous day, including for a UN Rapporteur's visit before June. Goryayev pressed fervently for USG support to install a UN Preventative Diplomacy Center in Ashgabat, a long-standing project which he likewise promoted during Niyazov's life. END SUMMARY. An Old Hand Talks of the Old Guard -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Currently Deputy Director of the Asia and Pacific Division in the UN's department of Political Affairs, Goryayev is a very old Turkmenistan hand with extraordinary local access at highest levels. He has been at the UN for over twenty years, by most accounts was instrumental in facilitating Niyazov's Declaration of Turkmenistan's Neutrality in 1994, and reputedly maintained close personal relations with Niyazov ever since. Never before had he approached Embassy Ashgabat (our previous contact consisted of a fleeting encounter or two at receptions),but he contacted Charge Friday through the Turkmenistan MFA with an urgent request for contact. The meeting over a Charge-hosted Saturday lunch lasted two hours. ¶3. (SBU) Goryayev told us he had met with Interim President Berdimuhammedov the day before. Additionally, he had seen Foreign Minister Meredov twice "for a total of many hours" since Thursday. He implied his talks had produced an encouraging picture for progressive prospects, but simultaneously admonished that such progress will be very slow at best. Little or no political steps should be expected soon -- no dramatic declarations or cabinet re-shuffle in the new president's inauguration speech, for example. Partly, this was because Turkmenistan society remained traditional and cautious in the extreme about change, even positive change. But there was a further iron restraint: the position and riches of "the Old Guard" depended totally on keeping Niyazov's legacy intact, Goryayev asserted. ¶4. (SBU) Goryayev defined this "Old Guard" as consisting of "nine or ten" figures, some in the shadows, who put forth Berdimuhammedov because he was a relatively non-descript, time-serving survivor who would not build up personal power. Berdimuhammedov was in effect a front-man for this group, which was sure to block any even symbolic political shift from Niyazov's days. The interim president was even uncertain whether he would win the February 11 election, according to Goryayev. (Charge interjected that "in that case he's the only one who is.") Rumor Exchange -------------- ¶5. (SBU) We questioned why, if these premises were true, Berdimuhammedov could have made his January 3 speech with elements that manifestly aimed to undo some of Niyazov's hobbyhorses. Goryayev's non-response was that "just a few of the nine or ten" group backing Berdimuhammedov had been involved in working up that speech. Asked for any insights as to how the succession had been so smoothly organized after Niyazov's abrupt death, Goryayev offered none, just speculating as have others that the death may have been concealed for a day or two while arrangements were made. He reflected that FM Meredov in their long meetings had seemingly gone out of his way to cite his (Meredov's) contacts and conversations with Niyazov purportedly through the eve of the announcement of his death, i.e., December 20. ASHGABAT 00000191 002 OF 004 ¶6. (SBU) Talk turned to the rumored recent move from Owadandepe jail of former Oil Minister Gurbanmyradov (Reftel). Goryayev said Gurbanmyradov was now out of jail altogether, just under house arrest. However, he emphatically rejected the recent prediction by another source that Gurbanmyradov might return to his old post in the new government. According to Goryayev, Gurbanmyradov was released out of Berdimuhammedov's sense of tribal loyalty (they are both Tekes from Gokdepe) instead, which Goryayev characterized as "not really a positive sign." He was likewise initially dismissive of the notion that "grey eminence" Rejepov would retire from his security position by April, but seemed less certain when apprised that the rumor came from a serious source. Goryayev argued that while Rejepov's son Husein Rejepov ran the Consular Department at the MFA, the son needed the father to remain in government so he could keep his job at MFA. (Comment: This is Byzantine logic, but also possibly true. End Comment.) Berdimuhammedov Agrees to UN Rapporteur Visit? -------------- - ¶7. (SBU) Goryayev announced he had won three separate concessions in his talk with Berdimuhammedov. -- First, the Central Election Commission (CEC) would now become a standing body, rather than be specially formed for each election. -- Second, the UN would work with Turkmenistan to improve its current Election Law, as passed by the Halk Maslahaty on December ¶26. (Comment: The electoral areas in which Goryayev said the UN would work with Turkmenistan are the same in which we understand ODIHR projects doing so. He plainly had not coordinated with the OSCE, whom Goryayev was due to see that evening. As for the formation of a standing CEC for which Goryayev took credit: that announcement was made two weeks ago in the form of a published amendment to the December 26 Law on Elections; unless he was in contact long-distance it would seem the credit belongs elsewhere. End Comment.) -- Third, was a commitment to invite a UN Rapporteur to visit Turkmenistan. This person, Goryayev specified, would be the UN's longstanding permanent rapporteur for religious matters, Pakistan's Asma Jahingir. She would come to Ashgabat no later than May, be given unfettered access, and write a public report. As part of her visit, Goryayev expected Jahingir to organize a "religious roundtable" event embracing representatives of all faiths. ¶8. (SBU) In response to the third initiative, Charge asked if this prospective roundtable would include Catholics, whose church was not now allowed to be registered except as an NGO? Wincing slightly, Goryayev claimed he had raised the Catholics' situation with the interim president, but that there remained a barrier in the form of the law requiring the local head of any registered church to be a citizen of Turkmenistan. He plainly was not prepared to press the issue for now. ¶9. (SBU) Goryayev implied he had persuaded the acting President to soon release two "high profile" prisoners who were "good people," and to come to new agreements with the ICRC about prison visits. (Comment: Goryayev would not release their names and Charge has no idea to whom he was referring. End Comment.) Goryayev said that Berdimuhammedov would not/not extend this treatment to ministers or other ex-officials in jail because "their hands were sticky" (i.e., for well-founded corruption charges.) ¶10. (SBU) At this point, Goryayev suddenly asked "what do you think would be the reaction if the government announces a synagogue will be built in Ashgabat?" Charge agreed such a move would be dramatically positive (not least because of the implications vis-`-vis Turkmenistan's main neighbor to the south),and again pointed out the situation of the Catholics, whose original church, "Transfiguration of the Lord," built in 1904, was destroyed in ¶1931. ASHGABAT 00000191 003 OF 004 Return of the Preventative Diplomacy Center -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The main point of Goryayev's meeting request emerged at its end. As expected, he launched a passionate pitch for the U.S. to back his longstanding (going back to the late 1990s) project to establish a regional UN Preventative Diplomacy Center in Ashgabat. Charge replied that, as Goryayev knew, U.S. support for this project had been unthinkable under Niyazov's rule, first and foremost due to Niyazov, but that, even with Niyazov gone, the manifold practical objections remained: lack of flights, hotels, modern postal, internet or other infrastructure, gratuitously difficult working conditions, e.g., dipnotes required for the most low-level and banal affairs, etc. ¶12. (SBU) Refusing to acknowledge that these factors should weigh in the decision, Goryayev kept insisting it was vital to establish the Center now, on two main grounds: -- to address the growing regional tensions throughout most of Central Asia; and -- to insert the "Trojan horse" of a UN presence so as to sway Ashgabat's future. "(F)or every UN flag that flies outside the Center, I will extract another (progressive) concession from the president." ¶13. (SBU) Charge said she remained skeptical, but would agree to reconsider the issue, were convincing arguments made. She repeated that the government would have to make dramatic improvements in infrastructure to warrant establishing a regional UN Center in Turkmenistan. Russia -------------- ¶14. Charge told Goryayev that Russia need and should not be left out of our discussions and progress towards greater openness and integration. From Goryayev's reaction, this aspect seemed neither on his mind nor of interest. Instead he responded that he was born in the Ukraine and his first language was Ukrainian (though he occupies a Russian-quota slot at the UN). BIO NOTE -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Goryayev is Ukrainian, from Sumy, where his father worked in tandem for many years (no further details) with the father of President Yushchenko, with whom Goryayev was boyhood pals, he says. He looks in his fifties, suave and well-tailored; his English is a bit short of impeccable, but fluently effective. Since Turkmenistan's independence, Goryayev has been a frequent visitor and was considered a fast confidante of President Niyazov's, as well as the effective author of Turkmenistan's UN-approved "neutrality." His motivation for pushing this through the UN remains a mystery. His pitch for a preventative diplomacy center may be a pursuit for his own UN fiefdom, attendant with all the head-of-UN agency perks, or perhaps his motives are more altruistic. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Post defers to Washington the issue of whether to consider giving the Center a new lease of life in post-Niyazov circumstances. From Ashgabat, there is no new argument in favor of a project that with or without Niyazov still needs to demonstrate that it has potential to be more than a bureaucratic or personal vanity project. It would be interesting to know if USUN hears any hint of wider Secretariat attention to resurrecting the Central Asian Center. It also occurs to us that Goryayev's sudden new cultivation of Embassy Ashgabat might indirectly owe something to ASHGABAT 00000191 004 OF 004 the expectation that a U.S. diplomat is about to become his new UN boss. End Comment. BRUSH