TURKMENISTAN: LOSS OF BLANKET CLEARANCE - WHAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 001303 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017 TAGS: PREL EAIR MARR MCAP MOPS US TX SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: LOSS OF BLANKET CLEARANCE - WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY REF: A. ASHGABAT 1255 ¶B. ASHGABAT 1281 ¶C. SECSTATE 158849 Classified By: CHARGE SYLVIA REED CURRAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: After first declining to renew an existing blanket clearance for U.S. aircraft, Turkmenistan changed its position and granted the renewal when the U.S. government challenged the decision. A combination of factors probably led to the initial denial, includig pressure from Russia, concerns that the overflights may not all be "humanitarian" in nature and thereby could threaten their neutral status, attempts to tighten their air control generally, and a strong desire to not have to extend this arrangement to others. The realization that a new clearance regime, given the volume of flights, would be more work than it's worth, and a wish to preserve good relations with the United States appear to be the reasons why Turkmenistan recanted. Blanket air clearance is now secure for another year, and U.S. aircrews should expect a vigilant Turkmenistan air control function to insist upon strict adherence to its air protocols. END SUMMARY. BLANKET APPROVAL LOST AND REGAINED ¶2. (C) On November 20 the Embassy received notice by diplomatic note that the Government of Turkmenistan would not renew the annual blanket clearance for U.S. military aircraft that overfly Turkmen airspace to and from Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Instead, there would be a new procedure requiring overflight and landing clearance to be sought for each flight and detailed information on each cargo (Ref. A). On November 26, the Government of Turkmenistan reversed its decision and agreed to renew the blanket clearance number (Ref. B). The renewed permission will take effect on 1 December 2007 and extend through 30 November 2008. It came with a single caveat from the Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: U.S. flights must not exceed the number of missions flown this year (approximately 1600). The timing of the renewal ensures no immediate interruption in airlift missions to and from the Afghanistan theater of operations. ¶3. (C) The decision to renew the blanket clearance came after days of bilateral negotiations in the United States and Turkmenistan. Soon after Embassy Ashgabat received 
notification that the Government of Turkmenistan would not renew the blanket clearance, a senior U.S. Department of Defense representative met with Turkmenistan Ambassador Meret Orazov in Washington, DC, while U.S. Embassy diplomats concurrently engaged Turkmen officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ashgabat. Within days, a decision to renew the blanket permission was endorsed by Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and the news was delivered to the U.S. Charge d,Affaires by Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov (Ref. B). ¶4. (C) The successful U.S. diplomacy that led to the Government of Turkmenistan changing its position and renewing the blanket clearance involved three components: a) U.S. negotiators made the importance of this issue clear to Turkmenistan, b) the U.S. side gave Turkmen officials a way to save face, and c) the U.S. showed a willingness to comply with any reasonable requirement from the Turkmen in return for the blanket air clearance. ¶5. (C) When U.S. officials contacted Turkmen counterparts after the initial notification not to renew the blanket clearance, every Turkmen official claimed surprise. The Foreign Minister, the Turkmenistan Ambassador, and the Americas Department Director at MFA all said they were unaware of the action to deny the blanket permission. U.S. ASHGABAT 00001303 002 OF 004 Embassy staff were deeply skeptical of this answer, but no one on the American side challenged the assertion in order to allow Turkmen officials some room to save face. ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, simultaneous U.S. pressure applied at the Turkmenistan Embassy in Washington, DC, and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ashgabat signaled the importance of the issue. In an attempt to get the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to speed up its decision, the Charge told Americas Department Director Serdar Bashimov November 23 that they could expect a call from Washington on November 26. Bashimov mid-day on November 26 said he had relayed the news of an impending phone call immediately to the Minister, who called in the Charge early on the 26th in order to avoid the phone call from Washington. In the end, the Government of Turkmenistan decided to renew the blanket clearance if the United States would simply hold the annual number of overflights at or below the current level. VITAL TO OEF SINCE 2003 ¶6. (FOUO) The Turkmenistan blanket clearance number 999C was first granted to U.S. military aircraft in 2003. It has never provided unlimited permission to operate within Turkmen airspace, and for this reason is sometimes described as a restricted blanket clearance. The blanket permission is authorized solely for delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help stabilize and rebuild the nation of Afghanistan. Aircraft must follow strict flight profiles and can utilize only select call signs. Aircraft are required to file a DOD International Flight Plan prior to entering Turkmenistan airspace and cannot deviate from that flight plan while in Turkmenistan. Blanket permission is limited to registered U.S. military aircraft. Civil Reserve Air Fleet and DOD contract carriers are not eligible for the automatic clearance. In spite of these limitations, the Turkmenistan blanket number 999C is considered vital in maintaining an effective western air bridge to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. WHY BLANKET CLEARANCE WAS INITIALLY LOST -- THE RUSSIANS ¶7. (C) Why did the Turkmen initially decide to not renew blanket clearance? There are several likely factors. One, for example, could be Russian influence on Turkmenistan government officials. On more than one occasion Russian attaches at social events have adroitly commented on the volume of U.S. air traffic across Turkmenistan. Not questioning--simply commenting, as if to quietly let it be known they are fully aware of the U.S. activity. It is certainly believable that Russian officials might have tried to exert some influence on Turkmenistan officials to discontinue favorable access for American air assets, especially given apparent Russian unease about Turkmenistan's budding ties with the West. WORRIES U.S. MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS CHALLENGE NEUTRAL STATUS ¶8. (C) In a similar vein, Turkmen officials may have felt they needed to change U.S. air clearance procedures in order to protect Turkmenistan,s official neutral status. Turkmenistan airport and air clearance workers have occasionally wondered aloud how so many U.S. air missions, composed of military transports as well as commercial charter aircraft, could all be classified as humanitarian. If the Turkmen were asking such questions, nearby governments in Russia and Iran were also likely to be asking Turkmenistan the same thing. It is worth noting, however, that the decision to deny renewal of the blanket air clearance did not deny U.S. access to Turkmenistan,s airspace, but instead changed the clearance procedure. The new clearance procedure ASHGABAT 00001303 003 OF 004 required each aircraft to identify its mission purpose and cargo. Knowing that each U.S. request would be clearly identified as a humanitarian mission with humanitarian cargo, the Government of Turkmenistan technically was allowing the United States to continue flying while covering its action with a humanitarian declaration for every aircraft. That documentation could later be used to rebut any outside argument that U.S. overflights violated Turkmenistan,s neutrality. DID NOT WANT TO EXPAND BLANKET CLEARANCE TO OTHERS ¶9. (C) Another possible factor in Turkmenistan,s initial decision is that it became increasingly difficult for Turkmenistan to defend the U.S. blanket air clearance to ISAF partners who wanted a similar arrangement. During the past year, an increasing number of Coalition nations asked for permission to over fly Turkmenistan in order to support their own deployed forces. These requests were sometimes denied. In July 2007, for example, Turkmenistan denied overflight and refueling permission to a Lithuanian Air Force C-27. The Lithuanian aircraft was attempting to re-supply Lithuanian units and rotate its deployed personnel. When President Berdimuhamedov later visited Brussels, during a 7 November meeting at NATO Headquarters, media reports indicated that Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asked President SIPDIS Berdimuhamedov about transit issues necessary to support alliance operations in Afghanistan. Two weeks later the Turkmenistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the U.S. Embassy that blanket clearance number 999C, which had been used since 2003, would not be renewed. In effect, the Government of Turkmenistan was standardizing the air clearance procedures for all foreign aircraft. It was a procedure nearly identical to Turkmenistan,s existing rule for every other foreign visitor: no one enters Turkmenistan without prior permission. This is also the likely reason why blanket clearance was taken away from civilian SOS International medical flights - the Turkmen want to limit the number of aircraft getting this permission. DESIRE TO STIFFEN AIR CONTROL PROCEDURES ¶10. (C) Outside influence and growing ISAF requests for air clearances may have driven Turkmenistan to reconsider its blanket permission for U.S. aircraft. But there is evidence to show that early this summer Turkmenistan was already acting to stiffen its air control procedures. On at least two occasions during the period May-Aug 2007, the Government of Turkmenistan either denied an air clearance or threatened to deny a clearance to U.S. aircraft perceived to be operating out of compliance with its air rules and procedures. Offenders included Department of Defense contract carriers as well as U.S. military aircraft. ¶11. (C) In June 2007, a US Air Force C-17 departed Afghanistan en route to Ramstein AB, Germany. Prior to take-off, the aircrew filed a flight plan that indicated an overflight of Turkmenistan from East to West. Shortly after take-off the crew decided to stop in Ashgabat and take additional fuel. The C-17 pilot contacted Ashgabat air traffic control (ATC) and requested permission to land at Ashgabat,s Saparmurat Niyazov International Airport. Ashgabat ATC gave permission for the C-17 to land, and the C-17 purchased fuel but was then not permitted to depart. Instead, the aircraft commander and a representative from the US Embassy were summoned to the airport office where a Turkmenistan military representative delivered a verbal reprimand to the crew for landing in Ashgabat without a proper flight plan. The Turkmen officer instructed the U.S. Embassy representative that if such a violation is repeated, the Government of Turkmenistan has the right to detain the aircraft and crew. After filing a new flight plan, the ASHGABAT 00001303 004 OF 004 aircraft was permitted to leave. ¶12. (C) In August 2007, the Turkmenistan State Civil Aviation Service telephonically notified the U.S. Embassy that a civil charter aircraft had incorrectly used the Turkmenistan blanket clearance number to enter and transit Turkmen airspace. Even though civil aircraft are contracted by the Department of Defense and assigned call signs identical to military aircraft, Turkmenistan does not authorize civil charter aircraft to use its standing clearance number, only military aircraft are permitted to do so. The Ministry duty officer warned that civil charter aircraft would be denied clearance and rerouted if they again attempted to enter Turkmenistan airspace using the blanket clearance number. There is probably a financial motive for the Government of Turkmenistan to adopt this practice since commercially registered aircraft are eligible for billing navigational fees that military aircraft are not. AND WHY DID TURKMENISTAN REVERSE ITS DECISION AND RENEW? ¶13. (C) In the end, due to U.S. pressure and common sense, the Turkmen realized that a change was not in their interests. When the U.S. pushed back, it dawned on Turkmen officials how much extra work this new regime would entail -- more work than their small MFA was prepared to handle. In addition, it was also clear how important these flights and the blanket clearance were to U.S.-Turkmenistan bilateral relations. Keeping the number of flights at roughly the same level as in the past, at least gives them cover to say that "nothing has changed," enabling them to counter those who have questioned the nature of the flights. The blanket air clearance is now secure for another year and U.S. aircrews should expect a vigilant Turkmenistan air control function to insist upon strict adherence to its air protocols. CURRAN