TURKMENISTAN: A TURKISH BUSINESSMAN WORRIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001014 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EPET KDEM TU AJ KZ RS TX SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: A TURKISH BUSINESSMAN WORRIES REF: ASHGABAT 1008 ASHGABAT 00001014 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CHARGE RICHARD E. HOAGLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish Businessman and Turkmenistan insider Ahmet Chalik (protect throughout) describes President Berdimuhamedov as weak because he is beholden to outside interests, principally Russian. He says Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul are eager to promote a trilateral energy summit involving Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Chalik insists for Turkmenistan to succeed as a relatively normal, independent country, it needs to institute democracy, an open economy, and rule of law. While Chalik's views on Berdimuhamedov may be idiosyncratic, they are worth considering because of his 15 years as an insider in Turkmenistan. However, the fact that he has lost his most-favored status since former President Niyazov's death may be coloring his views. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a nearly four-hour dinner in Istanbul on September 19, Ahmet Chalik, founder and President of Chalik Holding and with 15 years experience in Turkmenistan, discussed with Charge his rising concern about the government of President Berdimuhamedov. Chalik began in invest in Turkmenistan (textiles and construction at first, now also energy) in 1992. Although he is a Turkish citizen, because he was a confidante of former President Niyazov who treated him like a son, Niyazov awarded him Turkmenistani citizenship and made him a Vice Premier. ¶3. (C) Chalik said, "It's been eight months. We hear good words (from Berdimuhamedov),but we see no actions. Nothing has changed -- except they've taken down Niyazov's pictures and put up Berdimuhamedov's. Turkmenistan cannot recover from Niyazov and become a relatively normal country without democracy, an open economy, and rule of law." FOLLOW THE MONEY ¶4. (C) Charge asked, "Who is Berdimuhamedov? How was he chosen to become president? Who put him in power?" Chalik answered the third question, "The guys with the guns." Chalik said he'd known Berdimuhamedov during the Niyazov era as a "nice guy and relatively competent," but certainly no one with a national political base or political ambitions of his own. Chalik said those who put Berdimuhamedov in power -- at the top of the list he named the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of National Security -- did it not so much to protect their own interests as to defend the interests of others. Asked to be more precise, Chalik chose his words carefully and said, "To the north" (Russia). When asked if he put any credence in rumors that Niyazov did not die a natural death, Chalik shrugged and answered, "Follow the money." He pointed out that Niyazov signed an agreement in 2006 allowing China to be the first major foreign power to challenge Gazprom for Turkmenistan's on-shore natural gas. Chalik then added, "But I can sometimes be 'oriental,'" meaning he recognizes the attraction of conspiracy theories. ¶5. (C) Returning to the current political situation, Chalik criticized Berdimuhamedov for stacking his government with "incompetents from his own tribe," the Geok-Tepes of Ahal Province. "At least Niyazov kept balance by giving ministries and power positions to people from all over the country." Chalik was especially upset that Berdimuhamedov has removed and, in a few cases, imprisoned those whom Chalik described as the most competent and closest to him personally, especially the former Minister of Culture. When asked why he did this, Chalik replied Berdimuhamedov didn't do it on his own. "The guys with guns" who put him in power forced his hand to make him more dependent on them. ¶6. (C) When Charge suggested Turkmenistan had probably maintained the most independence from Russia of the five ASHGABAT 00001014 002.2 OF 003 Central Asian states, Chalik replied, "Not true. On the surface, maybe, but not behind the scenes." He explained his view that Russia had always maintained close connections in the power agencies in Turkmenistan, especially through the traditional Soviet-era mafia-intelligence agencies connection. He specifically critized Deputy Minister of National Security Hojimurad Altayev as the key Russian mafia(s) link in the government. TURKEY READY TO FACILITATE TRILATERAL ENERGY SUMMIT ¶7. (C) On energy, Charge described Azerbaijan President Aliyev's idea for a trilateral energy summit: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. Chalik said he was well aware of this effort and knew that Aliyev and Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev were on board, but he said he did not know if Berdimuhamedov had been approached yet, or if he had been, how he had responded. Chalik said that both Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul, whom he had seen in recent days, were eager to assist with the project, and that Gul had told him he would raise this with the three presidents during his upcoming trip to the region. ¶8. (C) Charge described to Chalik the USTDA offer a few days earlier to fund a feasibility study to link the Caspian Sea natural gas infrastructures of British Petroleum (Azerbaijan) and Petronas (Turkmenistan) as a first step to get Turkmenistani natural gas flowing across the South Caucasus states, through Turkey, and on to Europe. Chalik said he himself had already raised with Berdimuhamedov the Importance of this infrastructure linkage, and Berdimuhamedov had seemed interested but was unprepared to make any firm commitment, probably, Chalik speculated, because Berdimuhamedov cannot make this decision on his own. Charge asked if Berdimuhamedov isn't the final decision maker on Turkmenistan's oil and gas resources, who is -- Deputy Prime Minister for Oil and Gas Tachberdi Tagiyev? "No, it's the guys with guns." Still, Chalik suggested, a concerted diplomatic effort, including by Turkey and states in the region, might find success. THE OLD RULES ARE GONE, THE NEW ONES UNKNOWN ¶9. (C) Describing the inner workings of Berdimuhamedov's government, to the extent he knew, Chalik said there's more unease now than under Niyazov, mainly because no one knows the rules anymore. He said Niyazov may have become increasingly paranoid and cruel toward the end of his life, but at least he exercised some degree of power, as corrupted and capricious as it might have been. People now perceive Berdimuhamedov does not have independent power and are unwilling to make any decisions, even to support things Berdimuhamedov says he wants. Chalik added, "In any case, except for maybe four or five, including the Foreign Minister and Minister of Textiles, the ministers are timid non-entities." ¶10. (C) Asked about Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov's standing with Berdimuhamedov, Chalik replied it varies, depending on Berdimuhamedov's psychological mood, but fundamentally remains strong. "Berdimuhamedov needs him as long as he maintains the appearance of an open foreign policy. But if Meredov tries to take steps against the hidden energy interests, he'll be out." HOPE? EDUCATION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION ¶11. (C) According to Chalik, the longer term hope for Turkmenistan is access to international education and international information. Charge described U.S. offers for cooperation on educational reform and enhanced educational exchanges, and the difficulty we have faced because of Ministry of Education International Affairs Director Nury Bayramov. Chalik said, "Of course. The minister doesn't ASHGABAT 00001014 003.2 OF 003 make any decisions. It's the KGB." ¶12. (C) Chalik suggested it would be worth the effort to try to get CNN-Turk broadcast in Turkmenistan. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: While it's clear Chalik subscribes, to a degree, to conspiracy theories, because of his insider experience it's worth factoring his views into the understanding we're trying to develop of Berdimuhamedov and his government. His is one more piece of the puzzle. The Turkish Ambassador and other Turkish businessmen in Ashgabat have an equally glum view of Berdimuhamedov's government and bemoan losing long-standing contracts to Russian interests. Perhaps they are looking for a conspiracy theory why their bottom lines are shifting. ¶14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Our view is somewhat different. Yes, the new government remains fairly opaque to us, and real change is coming very slowly, but that is the norm in the Central Asian states and exacerbated in Turkmenistan by the destructiveness of the Niyazov era. We see no broad and concrete evidence that Russia is pulling all the strings behind the scenes. In fact, Russian open-source material, which is often officially sanctioned, is beginning to worry more about Russia's place in Turkmenistan. The primary concern seems to be their view that Berdimuhamedov is postponing finalizing the Trilateral Agreement of May 12 to refurbish and expand the Prikaspiskyy gas pipeline to Russia. In the end, the fact that Chalik has lost his most-favored status since former President Niyazov's death may be coloring his views. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND