AU SANCTIONS NEXT IN THE COMOROS IMPASSE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO - JSWAN DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV AND JKNIGHT ADDIS FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE CAPETOWN FOR LA LIME PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER MOPS CN AU MO SUBJECT: AU SANCTIONS NEXT IN THE COMOROS IMPASSE? REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 823 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 815 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 411 Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of the Union of the Comoros (GOC) is expecting the African Union (AU) to apply concrete measures against rebel Anjouan warlord Col. Mohamed Bacar when its Foreign Ministers meet September 18 in Cape Town. Privately, we have heard the next step is likely to be sanctions, targeted at Bacar and his henchmen, to include travel restrictions and freezing bank accounts. Union President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi is under considerable domestic pressure to act, albeit reluctantly, to forcibly remove Bacar from power on Anjouan. As he prepares for the worst, admittedly receiving arms and ammunition from the Moroccan Government, Sambi continues to hope for the best and to urge the AU to take a more muscular approach. As he has pointed out before, this problem is much more easily solved than quagmires such as Somalia and Sudan and could be a relatively easy and confidence-building "win" for the African Union. Allowing the problem to linger, however, damages the AU's credibility while it harms the Comoran people and Sambi's government -- and U.S. interests. Post suggests a public statement, if the Cape Town meeting does result in the announcement of sanctions, supporting the AU efforts to promote free and fair elections in Anjouan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During Ambassador Marquardt's September 12-14 visit to the Comoros to present his credentials, he met with senior GOC officials, as well as South African Ambassador Mabeta and AU Representative Mourad. All shared a grave concern at the ongoing impasse on Anjouan (REF B),where Bacar remains in power and in defiance of the international community's demand that free and fair "island" elections be held there. Bacar's intransigence creates a range of problems for the people of the Comoros, for Sambi's government, and for U.S. policy: ¶3. (C) For the people of the Comoros, Bacar's regime has cracked down on all opposition, leading significant numbers to flee Anjouan. Many of these displaced persons have gone to nearby Moheli, while others have gone to Grande Comore or - illegally, and sometimes fatally when their boats have capsized - to the French-administered island of Mayotte (REF A). In addition, at a time when the Comoros seemed to be emerging from its troubled history of coups and instability, this action jeopardizes both foreign aid and foreign investment that might have been destined for the impoverished economy of this emerging democracy. Because the main port of the Comoros, Mutsamudu, is on Anjouan, it also means goods are becoming less available and prices higher on the other islands. Some interlocutors pointed out that current shortages of basic foodstuffs on Grande Comore are due to Bacar's deliberate effort to cut them off and send a message. ¶4. (C) For Sambi's government the impasse is proving destabilizing. Sambi is himself from Anjouan and his opponents now ask openly how he can govern the whole Union when he cannot even enforce discipline on his own island. The loss of Government revenues from customs at Mutsamudu is substantial. In addition, several donors have suspended projects and programs while waiting for the crisis to be resolved. Most serious is the progress towards debt forgiveness brokered by the IMF, a process that has been placed decisively on hold. According to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Comoros' access to debt relief will be lost for good if the impasse is not resolved by late October. ¶5. (C) For the U.S., another ungoverned space in the Indian Ocean represents a security threat. The Union Government has been entirely cooperative in our efforts to apprehend fugitive Comoran terrorist Harun Fazul, but we have no such assurance from the rebel Bacar. Indeed, we - among many others -- are convinced that Bacar derives continued income from criminal enterprises, as well as from shell banks he has allowed to flourish there (REF C). For this reason, despite orders from the central authorities, Anjouan never shut down its offshore banking activities. We have also heard that Mutsamudu has become a frequent transshipment port for illegally logged hardwoods from both Madagascar and the African mainland. Finally, U.S. credibility suffers when a ANTANANARI 00000933 002 OF 002 Muslim democracy seeks our help in ensuring a democratic transition in a troubled region and we are seen as providing little or no assistance to its efforts. ¶6. (C) Our contacts in the Comoros said the African Union "experts' meeting" on September 3-4 in Addis Ababa had decided to prepare a road map of sanctions to pressure Bacar to allow free elections on Anjouan. These are to be presented and, probably, passed at the meeting of concerned Foreign Ministers being held September 18 in Cape Town. AU Representative Mourad was reluctant to discuss the details of the sanctions under consideration, but he said that Bacar, who had been invited, would not be present, sending a loyal representative in his stead, whereas the GOC would be represented by Foreign Minister Jaffar. South African Ambassador Mabeta said the package would start with sanctions targeted at a list of Bacar's supporters and would include travel restrictions and banking limitations. The option for a more muscular AU force was also under consideration and the mandate of the AU forces, meant to oversee the election on Anjouan (and currently cooling their heels at a makeshift camp in Moroni),had been extended to the end of 2007. ¶7. (C) While recognizing that an armed invasion to restore the Union will be viewed as a reversion to the Comoros' prior history of instability, Sambi has always retained that option. This is clearly his last choice preference, but he appears to be preparing for that eventuality. He told Ambassador Marquardt that "personally, I prefer not to take such action, which would risk undermining my efforts to improve the country's international image." However, he also alluded to pressures limiting his patience and admitted that Morocco and other countries have provided arms and zodiacs for a possible 200-man incursion onto Anjouan. Indeed, President Sambi and the Ambassador, en route to the USS Forrest Sherman, walked right by a Moroccan Air Force C-130 on the tarmac on Grande Comore; rumors were circulating widely that it was bearing weapons and ammunition for the Union army. ¶8. (C) For the AU, the tiny island of Anjouan is regarded as a nuisance, but also as one that provides a perhaps unique opportunity for AU success. After all, the Comoros is one of only a handful of African "crisis countries" with a resident AU presence (others include Sudan, DROC, Sierra Leone); clearly, resolving the Comoran impasse is easier than succeeding in these other countries. Having denounced Bacar's power grab and insisted that free elections be held, what is the AU to do if/when Bacar proves defiant? As one Anjouan resident said recently to Reuters: "If they can't solve Comoros, they are hardly going to solve Darfur." If sanctions prove ineffective, will the AU prove willing to take military action to enforce its authority? Sambi clearly hopes that it will and he believes that an international force will not meet serious resistance on Anjouan. However, if he has to take action with his own troops, Sambi is concerned that Bacar will fight and blood will be shed. The AU Representative Mourad agreed, telling the Ambassador, "Bacar's militia is the most potent fighting force in the Comoros." ¶9. (C) COMMENT/ACTION REQUEST. We have consistently told the GOC that we support the AU efforts to resolve the Anjouan crisis, preferably through peaceful negotiation. Bacar's good faith as a negotiator has now been completely discredited and the AU is apparently moving to exert pressure to enforce its ultimatum. If the Cape Town meeting results in concrete measures, we propose publicly supporting these measures in a statement by the Department Spokesman along the following lines: "The United States takes note that today the African Union, meeting in Cape Town, enacted measures designed to restore democracy in the Comoran island of Anjouan. We fully support the Union of the Comoros and the African Union in their joint efforts to promote free and fair elections on Anjouan as soon as possible, and call on authorities on Anjouan to cooperate fully with the AU in this regard." END COMMENT/ACTION REQUEST. MARQUARDT