C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO - JSWAN
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV AND JKNIGHT
ADDIS FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE
CAPETOWN FOR LA LIME
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER MOPS CN AU MO
SUBJECT: AU SANCTIONS NEXT IN THE COMOROS IMPASSE?

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 823


B. ANTANANARIVO 815 AND PREVIOUS

C. ANTANANARIVO 411

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of the Union of the Comoros
(GOC) is expecting the African Union (AU) to apply concrete
measures against rebel Anjouan warlord Col. Mohamed Bacar
when its Foreign Ministers meet September 18 in Cape Town.
Privately, we have heard the next step is likely to be
sanctions, targeted at Bacar and his henchmen, to include
travel restrictions and freezing bank accounts. Union
President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi is under considerable domestic
pressure to act, albeit reluctantly, to forcibly remove Bacar
from power on Anjouan. As he prepares for the worst,
admittedly receiving arms and ammunition from the Moroccan
Government, Sambi continues to hope for the best and to urge
the AU to take a more muscular approach. As he has pointed
out before, this problem is much more easily solved than
quagmires such as Somalia and Sudan and could be a relatively
easy and confidence-building "win" for the African Union.
Allowing the problem to linger, however, damages the AU's
credibility while it harms the Comoran people and Sambi's
government -- and U.S. interests. Post suggests a public
statement, if the Cape Town meeting does result in the
announcement of sanctions, supporting the AU efforts to
promote free and fair elections in Anjouan. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During Ambassador Marquardt's September 12-14 visit to
the Comoros to present his credentials, he met with senior
GOC officials, as well as South African Ambassador Mabeta and
AU Representative Mourad. All shared a grave concern at the
ongoing impasse on Anjouan (REF B), where Bacar remains in
po

wer and in defiance of the international community's demand
that free and fair "island" elections be held there.
Bacar's intransigence creates a range of problems for the
people of the Comoros, for Sambi's government, and for U.S.
policy:


3. (C) For the people of the Comoros, Bacar's regime has
cracked down on all opposition, leading significant numbers
to flee Anjouan. Many of these displaced persons have gone
to nearby Moheli, while others have gone to Grande Comore or
- illegally, and sometimes fatally when their boats have
capsized - to the French-administered island of Mayotte (REF
A). In addition, at a time when the Comoros seemed to be
emerging from its troubled history of coups and instability,
this action jeopardizes both foreign aid and foreign
investment that might have been destined for the impoverished
economy of this emerging democracy. Because the main port of
the Comoros, Mutsamudu, is on Anjouan, it also means goods
are becoming less available and prices higher on the other
islands. Some interlocutors pointed out that current
shortages of basic foodstuffs on Grande Comore are due to
Bacar's deliberate effort to cut them off and send a message.


4. (C) For Sambi's government the impasse is proving
destabilizing. Sambi is himself from Anjouan and his
opponents now ask openly how he can govern the whole Union
when he cannot even enforce discipline on his own island.
The loss of Government revenues from customs at Mutsamudu is
substantial. In addition, several donors have suspended
projects and programs while waiting for the crisis to be
resolved. Most serious is the progress towards debt
forgiveness brokered by the IMF, a process that has been
placed decisively on hold. According to the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, the Comoros' access to debt relief will be
lost for good if the impasse is not resolved by late October.


5. (C) For the U.S., another ungoverned space in the Indian
Ocean represents a security threat. The Union Government has
been entirely cooperative in our efforts to apprehend
fugitive Comoran terrorist Harun Fazul, but we have no such
assurance from the rebel Bacar. Indeed, we - among many
others -- are convinced that Bacar derives continued income
from criminal enterprises, as well as from shell banks he has
allowed to flourish there (REF C). For this reason, despite
orders from the central authorities, Anjouan never shut down
its offshore banking activities. We have also heard that
Mutsamudu has become a frequent transshipment port for
illegally logged hardwoods from both Madagascar and the
African mainland. Finally, U.S. credibility suffers when a

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Muslim democracy seeks our help in ensuring a democratic
transition in a troubled region and we are seen as providing
little or no assistance to its efforts.


6. (C) Our contacts in the Comoros said the African Union
"experts' meeting" on September 3-4 in Addis Ababa had
decided to prepare a road map of sanctions to pressure Bacar
to allow free elections on Anjouan. These are to be
presented and, probably, passed at the meeting of concerned
Foreign Ministers being held September 18 in Cape Town. AU
Representative Mourad was reluctant to discuss the details of
the sanctions under consideration, but he said that Bacar,
who had been invited, would not be present, sending a loyal
representative in his stead, whereas the GOC would be
represented by Foreign Minister Jaffar. South African
Ambassador Mabeta said the package would start with sanctions
targeted at a list of Bacar's supporters and would include
travel restrictions and banking limitations. The option for
a more muscular AU force was also under consideration and the
mandate of the AU forces, meant to oversee the election on
Anjouan (and currently cooling their heels at a makeshift
camp in Moroni), had been extended to the end of 2007.


7. (C) While recognizing that an armed invasion to restore
the Union will be viewed as a reversion to the Comoros' prior
history of instability, Sambi has always retained that
option. This is clearly his last choice preference, but he
appears to be preparing for that eventuality. He told
Ambassador Marquardt that "personally, I prefer not to take
such action, which would risk undermining my efforts to
improve the country's international image." However, he also
alluded to pressures limiting his patience and admitted that
Morocco and other countries have provided arms and zodiacs
for a possible 200-man incursion onto Anjouan. Indeed,
President Sambi and the Ambassador, en route to the USS
Forrest Sherman, walked right by a Moroccan Air Force C-130
on the tarmac on Grande Comore; rumors were circulating
widely that it was bearing weapons and ammunition for the
Union army.


8. (C) For the AU, the tiny island of Anjouan is regarded as
a nuisance, but also as one that provides a perhaps unique
opportunity for AU success. After all, the Comoros is one of
only a handful of African "crisis countries" with a resident
AU presence (others include Sudan, DROC, Sierra Leone);
clearly, resolving the Comoran impasse is easier than
succeeding in these other countries. Having denounced
Bacar's power grab and insisted that free elections be held,
what is the AU to do if/when Bacar proves defiant? As one
Anjouan resident said recently to Reuters: "If they can't
solve Comoros, they are hardly going to solve Darfur." If
sanctions prove ineffective, will the AU prove willing to
take military action to enforce its authority? Sambi clearly
hopes that it will and he believes that an international
force will not meet serious resistance on Anjouan. However,
if he has to take action with his own troops, Sambi is
concerned that Bacar will fight and blood will be shed. The
AU Representative Mourad agreed, telling the Ambassador,
"Bacar's militia is the most potent fighting force in the
Comoros."


9. (C) COMMENT/ACTION REQUEST. We have consistently told the
GOC that we support the AU efforts to resolve the Anjouan
crisis, preferably through peaceful negotiation. Bacar's
good faith as a negotiator has now been completely
discredited and the AU is apparently moving to exert pressure
to enforce its ultimatum. If the Cape Town meeting results
in concrete measures, we propose publicly supporting these
measures in a statement by the Department Spokesman along the
following lines: "The United States takes note that today
the African Union, meeting in Cape Town, enacted measures
designed to restore democracy in the Comoran island of
Anjouan. We fully support the Union of the Comoros and the
African Union in their joint efforts to promote free and fair
elections on Anjouan as soon as possible, and call on
authorities on Anjouan to cooperate fully with the AU in this
regard." END COMMENT/ACTION REQUEST.

MARQUARDT