COMORAN PRESIDENT CONSIDERING MILITARY OPTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000815 SIPDIS SIPDIS USAU FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF/FO DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF/E DROTHSTEIN AND CKOLLMAR PARIS FOR D'ELIA NSC FOR DIRECTOR PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL AU EAID PHUM PINR ASEC MOPS CN SUBJECT: COMORAN PRESIDENT CONSIDERING MILITARY OPTION REF: ANTANANARIVO 779 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires George N. Sibley for reasons 1.4 B,D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Comoran President Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi wants the AU to take control of Anjouan by force to allow free elections there, and he believes this could be done without bloodshed. However, he will not wait indefinitely and has a plan for Union forces to take Anjouan - which he concedes will likely result in substantial lives lost. Despite the Anjouan crisis, Sambi was optimistic he could better the lives of the Comoran people, if he had adequate resources. He asked the IMF and World Bank not to hesitate to finance development in the Comoros. Post agrees with Sambi,s assessment that a Comoran Union intervention will be bloodier than an AU one; we also suspect he will take action in the coming weeks if the AU continues urging talks and the Anjouan rebel leader remains recalcitrant. END SUMMARY. Union Preparing To Take Anjouan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Speaking privately before dinner, President Sambi expressed disappointment with the African Union's (AU) lack of will to deal forcefully with Anjouan rebel Colonel Mohamed Bacar (reftels). Noting previous strong words from the AU in Cape Town, Sambi perceived a weakening of the AU's resolve. He emphasized that Grande Comore and Moheli held free and fair island president elections, but Anjouan's Bacar continues to stonewall by preventing a transparent election there overseen by AU observers. Sambi assured that Bacar was unpopular in Anjouan, ruled by force and intimidation, and would surely lose a fair vote - thus explaining Bacar's actions to maintain power by other means. ¶3. (C) President Sambi said he supported the AU's emphasis on negotiation with Bacar to find a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the crisis, but believed Bacar had proved himself untrustworthy and that the time for talking had passed. He reiterated his desire for the AU to take Anjouan by force, stating that a strong international force could succeed without sustaining casualties. In the face of a South African-led military mission, Sambi asserted the Anjouanese militia would quickly surrender. However, the President continued, he would not wait indefinitely, and had a plan for Union forces to attack Anjouan, although he would not specify timing. While sure of ultimate success, Sambi said the rebels would fight his forces and this would lead to substantial loss of life. Friends of the Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Charge d'Affaires Sibley hosted August 14 a dinner for Union of the Comoros President Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi who was in Antananarivo for the Indian Ocean Games. USAID Mission Director Patrick, World Bank Resident Representative Blake, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Resident Representative Van den Boorgearde, African Development Bank (ADB) Resident Representative Safir, and Acting DCM Neubert (notetaker) attended. Sambi's Ambassador to Madagascar and Chief of Protocol accompanied him. ¶5. (C) A cordial President Sambi thanked the U.S. Embassy for bringing together friends of the Comoros for dinner, and passed along his regards to President Bush. Aside from the Anjouan crisis, he noted that his administration has achieved relatively little during one year in office due to lack of resources. Still committed to developing his country and providing basic services and opportunities to the Comoran people, Sambi complained he barely has money to pay civil servants. He noted the IMF's unfortunate decision to put talks on hold for a new program in light of the Anjouan crisis - in part because some of the debt to be restructured or forgiven is loans to Anjouan. The IMF's position stalls other donors, notably the World Bank, who await positive ANTANANARI 00000815 002 OF 002 development on a new financing program. ¶6. (C) IMF ResRep Van den Boorgearde reported progress in talks with Union finance and budget officials, but was inflexible regarding the delay in talks until Anjouan could participate. He suggested the IMF had been at the brink of an agreement when the Anjouan crisis broke out. World Bank and ADB ResReps expressed cautious optimism that their agencies were prepared to work in the Comoros - with the conditions of unity and stability. A Country With No Elevator - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) In equally inspiring but depressing tones, President Sambi spoke at length of the Comoros' underdevelopment. "There is not one elevator in my country," he said, "not one building big enough to need one." He relayed a litany of challenges to his political agenda: an empty treasury when he took office in May, 2006; a budget of merely USD 70,000 for his entire External Affairs Ministry, which is charged with the responsibility of engaging donors; poor infrastructure; weak investment climate; and chronic instability. "We live in the sea, and yet we import salt," Sambi summed up the Comoran economy. ¶8. (C) While remittances from abroad prevented a humanitarian crisis, President Sambi said this was not sustainable - Comorans born abroad will steadily send less and less of their income home than their parents. Addressing the IMF's decision to delay talks on a new program, and needed financing, President Sambi said Anjouan's Bacar was thus being allowed to hold the entire country hostage. CDA Sibley noted the U.S. programs in education and democracy would carry on in Grande Comore and Moheli, only extending to Anjouan when possible. The Mayotte Question - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Sambi asserted that directly or indirectly, all of the Comoros' problems arose from Mayotte; the fourth Comoran island which remained a French protectorate after independence in 1975. In talks with French officials, Sambi said he had asked for a fraction of the money used to repatriate illegal Comoran immigrants be used to create jobs in the Comoros. He lamented the dozens, if not hundreds, of Comorans who lose their lives each year trying to flee poverty in the Comoros for a better life in Mayotte (septel). ¶10. (C) COMMENT: It is difficult to urge patience on Sambi when the de facto secession of Anjouan erodes his credibility as a leader at home and undermines his ability to obtain promised assistance from abroad. He is probably right that a powerful external force could quickly and bloodlessly solve his problem but none of his friends - including the U.S. - has responded to his pleas. As he pointed out, unlike the morasses of Sudan and Somalia, the Comoros could be an easy "win" for the AU that could bolster its credibility. While he was careful not to lay out his timetable, we suspect he was not bluffing when he said he would take action on his own to retake Anjouan. Sadly, we also agree that Bacar's forces are far more likely to resist if faced with a Union-only offensive, leading to preventable loss of life. END COMMENT. SIBLEY