RAVALOMANANA'S CONTRADICTORY LEADERSHIP STYLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANTANANARIVO 000715 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E, INR/AA, AND INR/B DEPT FOR INR/I RHUFF PARIS FOR D'ELIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MA SUBJECT: RAVALOMANANA'S CONTRADICTORY LEADERSHIP STYLE REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 662 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 640 ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 409 ¶D. ANTANANARIVO 325 ¶E. ANTANANARIVO 84 ¶F. ANTANANARIVO 60 ¶G. 06 ANTANANARIVO 1320 ¶H. 06 ANTANANARIVO 1372 ¶I. 06 ANTANANARIVO 1289 ¶J. 06 ANTANANARIVO 278 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEORGE N. SIBLEY FOR REASONS 1.4B,D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 3, 2006, Marc Ravalomanana won a landslide reelection victory emerging ahead of 13 other candidates with 55 per cent of the vote. His nearest rival tallied less than 12 per cent. Coming five years after his initial disputed victory had plunged the nation to the brink of civil war, it was an open question how Ravalomanana would respond to his decisive victory. Six months later the answer is emerging, and it is complex. Ravalomanana has been emboldened to take decisive and dramatic steps: he revised the constitution and pushed it through a nationwide referendum; he promulgated the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) as an ambitious path to transform Madagascar's economy and governing culture; he has demanded accountability of the government and its leaders. At the same time, rather than growing more relaxed and comfortable in power, he appears increasingly to see enemies around him, broaching little dissent as he becomes more isolated and autocratic. He continues to make little distinction between what benefits the nation and what benefits his TIKO Corporation. His critics - led by our French colleagues - focus on the latter problems while his champions point to the former accomplishments. This report attempts a balanced assessment of Ravalomanana's leadership at the start of his second term in office. END SUMMARY "I'M THE BOSS" - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) A born entrepreneur with a tendency to make snap decisions, the President has been emboldened in taking decisive action to show "he is the boss" following a free and fair landslide victory in December 2006 elections (REF H). Upon return from a business trip to China May 19, he famously warned foreign diplomats to stay out of Madagascar's internal affairs or risk expulsion. In a July 13 meeting with senators, he reportedly said if the IMF disagrees with the 
recent amnesty on tax penalties, "nothing prevents us from discontinuing our cooperation." The IMF Resident Representative confirmed to us this was all bluster; there is no change in the Government of Madagascar's (GOM) policy with regard to the Fund. Over the past several years, Ravalomanana has repeatedly asserted the GOM "sovereignty" in deciding how to implement donor assistance. At the same time, some Presidency staffers tell us that his private persona has "mellowed" in his second term, acting less authoritarian in the office and exhibiting more patience in listening to his advisors. ¶3. (C) Despite his landslide victory, Ravalomanana has grown increasingly paranoid: taking substantial security precautions, harping on Madagascar's sovereignty in public statements, and issuing warnings to groups he finds threatening, including journalists and diplomats (REF G). Whether through paranoia or political canny, he sometimes creates buffers to distance himself from unpopular decisions, tasking GOM officials to implement and defend them. In May, Ravalomanana left the Ministry of Interior to announce the controversial decision that French priest Sylvain Ulfer would be deported, while the President flew to Shanghai on business. PRESIDENTIAL PRIORITY -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The President's sense of priority plays a driving role in determining which government initiatives succeed or flounder. GOM officials around the country scrambled to organize a constitutional referendum April 4 in a matter of weeks, while simple electoral reforms that civil society, the international community, and opposition groups have recommended for years have been consistently ignored. ANTANANARI 00000715 002 OF 005 ¶5. (C) A degree of passivity is a Malagasy characteristic, but the President has no patience for personnel and projects he deems to be moving "too slow" or not showing results. Even conversations with the President need to be quick and pointed, or he will lose attention and move to the next topic. Although political pressure to perform in his first term led to frequent cabinet shuffles, the GOM has seen very little personnel change at the minister level in the past two years (REF E). He has reportedly decided to "stop playing the political game" in order to focus on progress, and the ministers seem to be meeting his standards. By contrast, underperforming regional chiefs have been replaced at an impressive rate. Officials are more efficient when held accountable, but GOM staff are often nervous about losing their jobs. A workaholic, Ravalomanana has surrounded himself with young, dynamic Malagasy trained abroad. Still, his unconventional hours contribute to a high burn-out rate on the Presidency staff. ¶6. (C) Although Ravalomanana's emphasis on results is often beneficial, Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Director Emma Ralijohn recently landed in the crosshairs. Frustrated the MCA was not producing results quickly enough by his standards, the President tasked his Council of Ministers to replace Ralijohn despite a direct letter from Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) CEO Danilovich expressing pleasure with her leadership and warnings the move could constitute a breach of contract and set back the program. In-country MCC staff believe his decision was influenced by foreign advisors and regional chiefs wanting to dictate changes in the use of MCC funds, which are not allowed under the compact. CROOKED OR FISCALLY LIBERAL? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) In an Independence Day speech delivered June 25, President Ravalomanana announced the cancellation of all penalties on tax, customs, and foreign currency repatriation arrears before June 26, 2007 in order to encourage the private sector to become current; the arrears themselves must still be paid (REF A). While the amnesty benefits a number of private businesses (at least 61 companies benefit from the cancellation of customs penalties alone),the President's own TIKO company stands to gain the most. TIKO has neglected to pay the bulk of its customs duties since Ravalomanana came to power in 2002; its arrears in VAT taxes for rice imports from 2004 alone amount to USD 10 million. This latest unilateral decree -- made without consulting the IMF or his Minister of Finance -- poses a larger question often raised by Ravalomanana's economic initiatives: TIKO will benefit, but is it at the expense of Madagascar's development or in parallel? ¶8. (C) The drawn out battle with U.S. Seaboard Corporation raises additional questions about President Ravalomanana and TIKO (REF B). For several months, it appeared TIKO's new wheat mill at the Tamatave Port would obtain a monopoly at the expense of this U.S. investor. Only after aggressive and consistent Embassy advocacy did President Ravalomanana finally relent, approving a new lease for Seaboard's silos at the port. It is unclear whether the President acknowledged our arguments about transparency and a level playing field or if he reluctantly acceded to avoid embarrassment. Whatever the answer, the President's ambitious investment promotion initiative appears to have a subtle caveat: invest in any sector in Madagascar where TIKO is not present. POLITICAL VS. ECONOMIC REFORMS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) Although Ravalomanana campaigned in 2001 on a platform of political reform, Madagascar saw great economic reforms but very few political changes during his first term. The President has hung his hat on the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP),an ambitious five-year roadmap for Madagascar's development launched in late 2006 (REF K). Mentioned in almost every one of his speeches, the MAP "Commitments" are cited as the underlying justification for nearly every government initiative. ANTANANARI 00000715 003 OF 005 ¶10. (C) In addition, the President kicked off his second term with a constitutional referendum (REF D) purportedly meant to accelerate Madagascar's development by increasing government efficiency, promoting decentralization, and integrating into the international community. Opposition figures predictably called the changes a presidential power grab. Post questions why Ravalomanana undertook the enormous effort of holding a nationwide referendum for a bevy of seemingly minor changes -- some negative, many positive -- whose long-term impact is still unclear. The most significant change, eliminating the provincial layer of government administration to reduce bureaucracy and decentralize authority, will take two years to phase in. Ravalomanana has started holding Council of Minister meetings at the regional level to "take the government to the people" and conducting capacity-building training to empower local authorities. The President of the National Assembly recently called changes to hold parliamentarians more accountable "very beneficial" by creating real debate and cutting costs. Changes removing the explicit reference to the secular nature of the state are troubling to a degree given the President's strong affiliation with the Protestant Church and open mistrust of Muslims. But it is too soon to tell whether constitutional changes will have any impact on presidential power, as critics allege. ¶11. (C) In terms of political reform, the outdated electoral code continues to be an area of disappointment. Despite consistent lobbying from the international community, election observers, civil society, and opposition parties to adopt electoral reforms, including a single ballot and an independent electoral commission, the President has not budged. While the GOM argued in 2006 there was not enough time to adopt the measures before the presidential election, it appears the President continues to have no interest in addressing a technical issue that plays in his favor, even when it would silence his critics. On the other hand, the President recently expressed interest in reforming Madagascar's unsophisticated political party system. Calling the country's over 100 parties "inactive and inefficient" in comparison with a two-party system like that of the United States, the President pledged to meet with Madagascar's political leaders to "professionalize" the system. LOOKING ABROAD FOR INSPIRATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (C) The President continues to surround himself with a stable of foreign advisors on economic and governance issues from the U.S., Australia, Germany, Norway, and Mauritius -- fodder for critics who accuse him of not trusting his own people. His closest foreign advisor is indisputably Dean Williams, an Australian Harvard professor specializing in leadership. Some observers note Williams, like Ravalomanana, has a big ego and can be abrupt at times, perhaps a reason they work well together. The presidential advisors' influence has contributed to a sustained GOM focus on good governance and anti-corruption efforts, willingness to address human rights issues such as prison conditions, and the creation of the National Leadership Institute to empower up-and-coming Malagasy leaders. A MAN OF THE PEOPLE - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) Although Ravalomanana is one of the wealthiest businessmen in Madagascar, he continues to portray himself as "a man of the people." Those who know him well say he has stayed true to his humble origins. The President continues to speak with a folk accent and use peasant slang. He likes to be unpredictable, changing his domestic schedule frequently and arriving places unannounced. When traveling in the provinces, he infuriates his bodyguards by mingling with people in stores and restaurants. He also conducts a five-minute radio show on Sunday evenings to address current events. While all of this plays well with his peasant base in an overwhelmingly rural country, Malagasy intellectuals criticize his lack of sophistication. PERCEIVED BIAS AGAINST THE COAST - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (C) Because of the long-standing tension between people ANTANANARI 00000715 004 OF 005 living along the coasts, the "cotier," and the highlanders of the central plateau, it has been a truism of Malagasy politics that the President and Prime Minister should have different origins. Ravalomanana's naming a fellow highlander -- General Charles Rabemananjara -- as Prime Minister was one of his boldest moves after the election. Surprisingly, it was accepted at the time by most as a move away from ethnic division and towards meritocracy. Since then, however, as more-and-more highlanders are given government appointments, Ravalomanana's government is seen as ethnically imbalanced. The cotier often accuse the President of funneling development funds to the central highlands from which he hails while ignoring the coasts. Opposition politicians periodically fan the flames of ethnic tension to bolster their support base, most notably in December's presidential campaign and in recent protests along the coast over blackouts and university conditions (REF C). Post believes this is just the latest manifestation of politicians exploiting perceived "tribal rivalry" that extends back several generations. The President has pledged to win over the "cotier" through a number of major infrastructure projects along the coast, some already completed. JIRAMA: A LOST OPPORTUNITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶15. (C) A perplexing failure of the Ravalomanana administration is the ongoing underperformance of the state power and water utility, JIRAMA. Countless restructuring plans have been proffered, and advice and financing promised by the World Bank, France, and European Union. Given coastal grievances over blackouts and the impact on development, Post would have assumed fixing JIRAMA would be a top priority. And yet the latest plan is apparently stalled in the Council of Ministers awaiting approval. Perhaps the JIRAMA problem is so complex and costly as to be beyond the President's political will to remedy. Whatever the reason, JIRAMA is an easy target for political opponents and a major obstacle to MAP goals. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶16. (C) Ravalomanana's prickly relationship with the French dates back to 2002 when they supported his opponent Didier Ratsiraka in the political stand-off that brought the country to the brink of civil war. Although the bilateral relationship is on pragmatic footing (France is the top foreign investor in Madagascar),there continues to be great distrust on both sides. Heavily influenced by opposition figures, French Ambassador Alain Le Roy is not inclined to give the GOM the benefit of the doubt. The confidential May 2007 EU Chiefs of Mission Report Le Roy largely drafted criticizes the "solitary and authoritarian" president and describes a "deteriorating political situation" characterized by authoritarianism, economic conflicts of interest, a grave energy crisis and the incarceration of opposition figures. Ravalomanana, in turn, codified his desire to distance Madagascar from historical French influence in the constitutional referendum by adopting English as an official language and stipulating future presidents must be born of both a Malagasy mother and father. He is said to have decided against French companies in several public tenders. At the same time, several of his ministers and Presidency staff remain close to the French, and the French road-building company COLAS continues to hold the largest infrastructure contract in the country. PSYCHOLOGY: CRITICAL FRIENDS ARE ENEMIES -------------- ¶17. (C) Ravalomanana has achieved his success against enormous odds. Starting selling dairy products from the back of a bicycle, he grew one of the largest corporations in Madagascar. His humble origins and lack of education have made him a perpetual outsider among highland aristocracy. His short stature contributes to something of his "Napoleon Complex" as he strives to prove himself against all comers. This allows him to take bold action unthinkable to most Malagasy, but it also means that he is always seeing the world through a prism of conflict. It is not possible to give a tough message "as a friend" because that message defines the bearer as an enemy. This occasionally reaches ANTANANARI 00000715 005 OF 005 the extreme where Ravalomanana sees plots where none may exist, and we wonder how many of the reported "assassination attempts" over the past couple of years were nothing of the kind. At least one of the would-be "assassins" has been released from jail because the evidence did not support the charge and the most recent assassination "conspirator" has been released on bail while awaiting trial. In addition, Ravalomanana's frenetic energy and short attention span have led some observers to wonder if he might be suffering from some kind of attention deficit disorder. As a result, in meetings with Ravalomanana, we limit our priority topics of discussion and try to make our points quickly and early in the meeting. That Ravalomanana almost never has a note taker present adds to the imperative that important issues be addressed to him early and forcefully. ¶18. (C) COMMENT: In the course of Ravalomanana's two terms, Post has seen a greater sense of accountability within the GOM, increasing decentralization, steady economic growth, a new focus on anti-corruption and good governance issues, and a greater willingness to integrate into the international community. At the same time, Ravalomanana's rhetoric too often does not match his action. He preaches the devolution of power and responsibility, but frequently the government comes to a standstill awaiting a Presidential decision, and his intolerance of error can paralyze even his senior ministers. He has urged the nation to empower women, then has done nothing to expand their role in the senior levels of his own government. He preaches against corruption, but cannot see that actions benefiting TIKO may not always be in the national interest. Legally Ravalomanana may run for one more reelection, but he has hinted that he will not do so. He told Ambassador McGee, in private, "I will not be one of those African strong men." Perhaps he will not run, but we would be surprised if he did not change his mind. If so, and he wins again, he will have spent 15 years as elected president. If the negative trends strengthen and come to dominate in the years ahead, we may yet come to view him as "just another African strong man." Today, however, we would still describe Ravalomanana - on balance - as a bold leader bringing Madagascar into the modern world. END COMMENT. SIBLEY