BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMOROS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000128 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR F, AF/FO, NEA/FO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 TAGS: EAID PTER PREL IR CN SUBJECT: BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMOROS REF: 05 PORT LOUIS 743 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES D. MCGEE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The U.S. Government is missing the opportunity to build a strong relationship with the Union of the Comoros. In light of the recently-completed Operational Plan process for the Comoros, Post considers that USD 100,000 in security assistance is inadequate to seriously advance transformational diplomacy goals. A modest investment of USD two million annually in basic health and education programs would have a real impact in this country of 700,000 people; although even that is barely half of the average per capita assistance that the U.S. provides in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Comoros has in large part been unrewarded for consistent support for American interests, including former President Azali expelling the Islamic NGO al-Haramain for suspected ties to extremists and the Government's cooperation in the Rewards for Justice Program in search of Comoran-born terrorist Harun Fazul. Young Comorans, finding few opportunities at home, flee to Madagascar, Mayotte, or France - those who stay behind, bored and unemployed, are offered scant hope in schools funded by Iran and Saudi Arabia. END SUMMARY. The Status Quo Scenario - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Under the just-completed Operational Plan, current U.S. assistance is limited to USD 100,000 for military training. This is dwarfed by contributions from Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and China, who steadily gain influence in the Comoros. Iran, in particular, has long courted and funded the cleric, and now Union President, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi. The pragmatic President, who insists no "conditions" would be accepted in exchange for Iran's financial assistance, quickly saw Western donor pledges of over USD 200 million evaporate after his election last year (Reftel). A devout Muslim, though not radical, Sambi is quickly emerging as an Iranian ally in the Indian Ocean region. Foreign-funded "madrasa" schools function throughout Comoros, although reportedly they are not allowed to teach extremism. Comoran Muslim elders, unanimously peaceful, frequently express concern about these schools, and about Comorans who return from Islamic education abroad. Terrorist suspect Harun Fazul became radical after he left Comoros for Sudan and the Afghan War; the next Fazul, among thousands of bored and unemployed Comorans, could be home grown. A Minimal Funding Scenario - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Post believes Sambi's efforts to improve the health and education of his desperately impoverished people are sincere. In governing justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people, Sambi is making efforts to move in the right direction, although slowly given that his government is bankrupt. Post is already convinced, based on Sambi's policies, that Comoros deserves a fair hearing from Washington policymakers for consideration for AGOA and MCC eligibility. From virtually zero assistance, U.S. aid to Comoros should immediately be increased to USD two million annually, representing modest per capita funding of USD 2.86 for about 700,000 Comorans. As such, this is still barely half of the sub-Saharan African average for the U.S. (USD 5.51 in 2005 according to OECD figures). ¶4. (C) To date, Comoros has earned at least this level of support for its commitment to supporting U.S. interests. Former President Azali expelled the extremist-connected al-Haramain NGO at the request of the USG. The Comoros cooperates fully in the Rewards for Justice Program in the hunt for Harun Fazul. Western rhetoric promised that assistance would come when Comoros was stable and free and Sambi's May 2006 inauguration marked the first peaceful and democratic transition since independence in 1975. Those promises, so eloquently articulated, remain empty. ¶5. (C) In December 2005, at the Port Louis donor's conference, the United States pledged USD 2.6 million in assistance to Comoros for dispersal in 2006 (Reftel). A subsequent diversion to Lebanon in 2006 broke the promise. Iran has quickly filled the void, signing an agreement to provide training exchanges, vessels and other materials to Comoros. To further solidify their influence, we have heard that Iran is in the advanced stages of planning to relocate their Madagascar Embassy to the Comoran capital of Moroni. The Risk: Comoros Returns to Chaos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Sambi faces enormous challenges. He inherited an empty treasury and a substantial backlog of salary debt to teachers and civil servants. Taxi drivers have gone on strike because the roads are not being repaired; hospital employees are currently on strike because basic supplies, such as oxygen, are unavailable; full payment of teacher salaries - a promise Sambi made on entering office - remains a future goal. In addition, there is considerable tension between the Union government and the authorities on each individual island with the issue of their relative competencies still unresolved. The Comoros is emerging from a period of political and economic chaos and, for all the hopeful signs, there is no guarantee that it will not slip back into that maelstrom. It is clearly in the U.S. interest to make an effort to prevent that outcome. The Reward: A Foreign Policy Success - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Comorans enthusiastically welcomed the modest USD 280,000 education program launched last week (from FY 2005 ESF resources). This program to create distance learning materials for teachers could easily be quadrupled to provide much-needed professional development for educators. Basic materials and facilities are needed. In health, malaria is the scourge of Comoros, on average affecting every person twice a year. A simple program in cooperation with UN agencies to provide treated nets, training for their installation, and spraying the tiny land area of the archipelago nation would greatly reduce and could potentially eradicate malaria in the Comoros. Capacity is readily available to scale assistance up dramatically. ¶8. (C) Comoros is a neglected pro-American poor Islamic democracy, led by a devout Muslim in conservative dress and turban who repeatedly asks for American friendship, a renewed Peace Corps presence, and economic opportunity for his people. Sambi appears to be irritated by the control his Iranian friends seek to exert, but at present he has few alternatives. Sambi speaks passionately of the positive values of Islam. He rails against extremists who disgrace Islam with violence and hate; the tiny minority who put forward a "false face of Islam." ¶9. (C) At a bargain price of USD two million per year, the United States will gain a Muslim democratic ally in the Comoros. The Comoros proximity to the Horn of Africa, its past history of having spawned a notorious al-Qaeda terrorist, and Iran's clear effort to gain a political toe-hold in the island, only increases the value of this simple investment. McGEE