TURKEY: STILL COMMITTED TO JULY 8 PROCESS, BUT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000959 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TU CY SUBJECT: TURKEY: STILL COMMITTED TO JULY 8 PROCESS, BUT TO WHAT DEGREE? REF: ANKARA 711 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Turkish MFA Deputy Under Secretary responsible for Cyprus Haydar Berk claims that Turkey remains committed to the July 8 process. He said Turkey wants to ensure, though, that the Turkish Cypriots do not shoulder the blame for the process breaking down by agreeing to discuss comprehensive settlement issues such as disposition of property in the technical committees. Both Berk and, in a separate conversation, MFA Under Secretary Apakan argued that UNSRSG Moller has "misled" P-5 representatives and secretariat staff in perpetuating the perception that the SIPDIS Turkish Cypriots are blocking progress. They said that proposals forwarded by the "TRNC President" Talat to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon in an April 3 letter are evidence of Turks' continued commitment to the process, and Apakan was specific that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regard the negotiations as continuing. The Turkish officials also lamented the lack of progress on direct trade with Northern Cyprus. Although GOT officials assure it won't be the Turks who walk away from the table, there appears to be little creative thinking going on in Ankara on how to recapture the initiative on the Cyprus problem. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) MFA Deputy Under Secretary for Americas and the Northeast Mediterranean (Greece/Cyprus) Haydar Berk briefed Ambassador on the GOT's current view on moving the July 8 process forward. As he did previously (reftel),Berk placed blame for the current impasse squarely on Cypriot President Papadopoulos. Berk characterized Greek Cypriot (GC) moves in recent months as merely an attempt to display a bit more flexibility so its EU partners would not view the Cypriots as purely obstructionist. He said the GC side had made clear its unwillingness to engage in confidence-building discussions by raising comprehensive settlement issues like property that will scuttle any chance of success for the technical talks. TURKS WON'T TALK PROPERTY -------------- ¶3. (C) Berk emphasized Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (TC) continue to support the July 8 process and hope to get it moving quickly. He claimed that the TC side had, in fact, "saved the process" after the latest impasse, insisting that talks should continue despite continued lack of agreement on terms of reference for the technical committees and working groups. He underscored TC opposition to GC attempts to insert the property issue in the technical committees. Berk noted the TCs had perceived GC flexibility on this issue when GC negotiator Tzionis signaled "agreement to disagree" on whether property issues could be raised in the technical committees. With that understanding, the TCs believed talks could proceed even if the TCs refused to discuss property issues in the technical committees. Per Berk, the GCs later backtracked and indicated the TCs would "pay a price" for refusal to engage on property in the committees. As a result, the TCs had sought a written guarantee that their refusal to engage on property would not block the entire process and cause them to take the blame. MOLLER MISLEADING? -------------- ¶4. (C) Berk renewed the Turks' earlier misgivings about UNSRSG Moller, whom he claimed "is misleading P-5 representatives as well as the Secretariat" in perpetuating the perception that the TCs are blocking progress of the July 8 process. Ambassador countered that in the aftermath of Papadopoulos' positive step in taking down the Ledra Street wall and his seeming willingness to push ahead with meetings of both the technical committees and working groups, there had been a perception that "TRNC President" Talat had agreed to press forward on talks, then pulled back. While Papadopoulos' motivation likely was to reduce pressure within the EU to proceed with the direct trade regulation, the net effect had been an effective ambush of Talat, the TCs, and Turkey. ¶5. (C) Berk said the Turkish side needs agreement that the July 8 process will not be open-ended. Only a limited timeframe can ensure the GCs do not use the process to delay indefinitely engaging on comprehensive settlement issues. Berk also reiterated that, while GCs voted down the Annan Plan, it still should serve as a "basic parameter" on the basis of which discussions should move forward. Issues regarded as final settlement issues in Annan and decades of earlier Cyprus negotiations cannot now be regarded as "day-to-day community" matters for discussion in the technical committees, which Berk and Apakan accused the GCs ANKARA 00000959 002 OF 002 and Moller of trying to do. However prospects for true engagement appear to be dimming. Berk noted that even Greek Cypriots from parties that have been relatively open to discussions with the TCs, such as AKEL, have ratcheted up attempts to further isolate the TCs. He referenced a letter sent by the AKEL party mayor of Nicosia to her Turkish counterpart, refusing to attend municipality meetings where the TC mayor is present and pointed to continued GC objections to allowing TC universities to participate in the Bologna process. PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS? -------------- ¶6. (C) Berk called Ambassador's attention to Talat's April 3 letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon as well as a TC non-paper which lay out TC views on how to move the process forward. However, progress over the next several months was unlikely. Ambassador acknowledged the difficulty of moving forward during the Turkish election cycle. Berk saw as more of an impediment the changeover at the UN with a new Secretary General and senior staff. Ambassador noted that we saw the July 8 process as a way to demonstrate that there was sufficient common ground between GCs and TCs to make it worthwhile for the UNSYG to spend time working toward a comprehensive settlement. Lack of progress in the July 8 process risked removing the issue from his agenda altogether. He emphasized our hope that the GOT will urge Talat and the TCs to keep the onus on Papadopoulos to keep moving July 8 talks ahead. ¶7. (C) Berk lamented the EU's continued inability to follow-through with its commitments to ease the isolation of the TCs. He pointed to GC attempts to maintain control over the flow of EU aid project funding targeted for the North and the German EU Presidency's lack of progress on a trade regulation. This makes it all the more difficult to sell continued Turkish concessions to a skeptical public. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The current Turkish political constellation is boxing Talat in as much as the GCs. The Turkish military has signaled clearly that any political steps the TCs take should be reciprocal and simultaneous, and that TGS will remain the final protector of Turkish national interests, including on Cyprus. The ruling AKP will risk neither nationalist nor military backlash in the run-up to this year's parliamentary elections. For now, it may be up to Talat to decide how much room to maneuver he has. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON