MNF-1 GEN. PETRAEUS MEETING WITH TURKISH D/CHOD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000957

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: MNF-1 GEN. PETRAEUS MEETING WITH TURKISH D/CHOD
GEN. SAYGUN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary: MNF-I Commanding Gen. David Petraeus met
April 22 with Turkish General Staff (TGS) D/CHOD Gen. Ergin
Saygun at Incirlik Air Base to discuss Iraq. Saygun stressed
Turkey's strong interest in Iraq's success and in putting
past US-Turkish differences behind us. He expressed
misgivings about the Iraqi leadership, complained about KRG
leader Masud Barzani, and urged that PKK freedom of action in
northern Iraq be curbed. Gen. Petraeus described the
situation on the ground in Iraq and his past efforts to help
promote Turkish-Iraqi/Iraqi Kurd cooperation. On the PKK,
Petraeus flagged the importance of a serious amnesty for
dividing the hard core from those who are not, urged the
closing of Makhmour, and appealed for no surprises -- to
which Saygun responded positively. There was some discussion
of improving US-Turkish exchanges of information on Iraq, and
Petraeus agreed to Saygun's suggestion that he visit Ankara
at some point in the future to continue the dialogue. Coming
on the heels of S/I Ambassador Satterfield's visit here April
20 (septel),this meeting helped update Turkey on Iraq
matters and established a personal TGS/MNF-I connection that
we may need if/as PKK violence and pressures for a Turkish
cross border operation increase in the weeks and months to
come. Specific follow-up items are noted in paras 8-10. End
Summary.


2. (S) Gen. Saygun reviewed recent US-Turkish history on
Iraq. He said both countries need to get over problems
arising from the March 1, 2003 refusal of permission for a US
invasion from the north and the seizure that July of Turkish
special forces in Suleymaniye. Our interests in Iraq to some
extent diverge. We need to identify areas where we don't
agree and work hard on realizing common aims. Sooner or
later, the US will leave the region, and Turkey will have to
continue living with Iraq as a neighbor. It wants to
contribute to peace and stability there and to support a
strong central government.


3. (S) Taking a hard line on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership,
Gen. Saygun urged that KRG leader Barzani "shut his mouth"
for a while and complained about reported Barzani plans to
convene a 'greater Kurdistan' conference that would draw
Kurdish figures from Turkey, Iran, Syria, etc. Saygun
declared that the Turkish forces stationed in northern Iraq
have no secret agenda and that if Gen. Petraeus should hear
otherwise, he should be in touch immediately. He also
cautioned against the use of Peshmerga forces to provide
security in Baghdad. Gen. Petraeus responded that the Iraqi
armed and security forces include Kurds recruits, and they
are part of the Iraqi Army. These soldiers wear Iraqi, not
Peshmerga, uniforms.


4. (S) Gen. Saygun urged a declaration by the Baghdad
government that the PKK is a terrorist organization. This
would show goodwill toward Turkey and help to normalize
relations. He complained about the operational freedom the
PKK enjoys in northern Iraq that has allowed it to build
permanent barracks and to train hundreds of people openly and
without fear. He noted the reciprocal rights Turkey and Iraq
enjoy under 1926 and 1946 agreements with respect to security
75 kilometers on either side of the border. CHOD Gen.
Buyukanit had spoken of the military necessity of action to
strike at PKK bases across the border, but decisions on this
are the responsibility of Turkey's political leaders. Saygun
lamented that after eight months work, Gens. Ralston and
Baser have produced nothing.


5. (S) Gen. Petraeus recounted his own work in northern Iraq
following the 2003 invasion and the importance he placed at
that time on facilitating cooperative relations with Turkey,
particularly trade and the smooth functioning of the Habur
Gate border crossing. He noted continuing delays there
despite infrastructure improvements and urged the stationing
of additional Border/Customs guards to improve throughput.
Gen. Petraeus spoke several times of the unrealized economic
benefits that could come to both countries should
cross-border traffic increase.


6. (S) Regarding the PKK, Gen. Petraeus acknowledged Turkish
concerns and difficulties. He pointed to a strategy that has
worked in Iraq of seeking to drive a wedge between the true
irreconcilables and those who are not in the struggle against
al-Qaeda and insurgent groups. Turkey could take a similar
approach by passing a more genuine amnesty law that could

ANKARA 00000957 002 OF 002


similarly separate the PKK hard core from those who might be
prepared to disengage. He also urged the closure of Makhmour
by enticing the refugees there to return to Turkey under
conditions of a true anmesty. Getting Turkish Kurds out of
the camp and closing it to deprive the PKK of a sanctuary
would be beneficial. Gen. Saygun stated that the problem is
that the Kurds were demanding that those people in Makhmour
who did not repatriate to Turkey must go to Kirkuk. He also
noted an alleged appeal by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan for the Makkmour residents to move to Badakshan
(phonetic),reportedly to provide them better protection from
attack by local Arabs around the camp.


7. (S) Gen. Petraeus also described the current state of play
in Iraq as a whole and as concerns the Baghdad Security
Plan,s (BSP) implementation. The current government,s
divisions along sectarian and party lines make working with
it exceedingly complex and prevent it from being a true
national reconciliation government. PM Maliki,s position is
very difficult and complex. Petraeus described efforts to go
after death squads and bomb makers, changes in the pattern of
sectarian violence in Baghdad, signs of progress there and
elsewhere in the country, and the large-scale role of
foreigners passing through Syria as suicide bombers in
Baghdad and elsewhere. Asked about our timeline, Petraeus
said that by about September, he and Ambassador Crocker will
need to assess whether the BSP and Coalition efforts to
provide space and time for progress on reconciliation are
working. He noted domestic pressure in the US, as well.

Follow-Up Issues
--------------


8. (S) Syria: Gen. Saygun stated that the Syrians are ready
to discuss how to have a more constructive relationship with
the United States. He suggested an intelligence exchange on
information regarding the flow of foreign fighters through
Syria. He noted a recent, successful Turkish-Syrian joint
action against PKK figures in Syria that suggests Damascus
wants to be helpful. Gen. Petraeus agreed to see what can be
provided.


9. (S) Habur Gate/Border Trade: As noted above, Gen.
Petraeus urged efforts to accelerate traffic through the
Habur Gate and to resolve issues between Turkish authorities
and SOMO that have complicated fuel deliveries. Gen. Saygun
agreed to see what he can do. He also offered to help with
any other US/Coalition maintenance, repair and logistics
needs that Turkey might be able to fulfill.


10. (S) Information Sharing: Gen. Saygun plugged for a
stronger liaison between TGS and MNF-I, perhaps through ODC
Turkey. Gen. Petraeus agreed to look at improving the
exchange of information, urged Turkey to put a defense
attach in Baghdad, and pointed to the Ambassador/Embassy
Ankara as they key TGS interlocutor on Iraq matters. Saygun
indicated that the Turkish MFA is working on the DATT issue,
and he subsequently told Ambassador that a TGS request to put
a DATT in Baghdad has been held up due to space limitations
at the Turkish embassy. Separately, the Embassy has
informally passed a recent TGS suggestion that it would like
to post a J-2 staff officer at MNF-I HQ to complement the
J-3 officer presently there.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON