MNF-1 GEN. PETRAEUS MEETING WITH TURKISH D/CHOD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000957 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER IZ TU SUBJECT: MNF-1 GEN. PETRAEUS MEETING WITH TURKISH D/CHOD GEN. SAYGUN Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: MNF-I Commanding Gen. David Petraeus met April 22 with Turkish General Staff (TGS) D/CHOD Gen. Ergin Saygun at Incirlik Air Base to discuss Iraq. Saygun stressed Turkey's strong interest in Iraq's success and in putting past US-Turkish differences behind us. He expressed misgivings about the Iraqi leadership, complained about KRG leader Masud Barzani, and urged that PKK freedom of action in northern Iraq be curbed. Gen. Petraeus described the situation on the ground in Iraq and his past efforts to help promote Turkish-Iraqi/Iraqi Kurd cooperation. On the PKK, Petraeus flagged the importance of a serious amnesty for dividing the hard core from those who are not, urged the closing of Makhmour, and appealed for no surprises -- to which Saygun responded positively. There was some discussion of improving US-Turkish exchanges of information on Iraq, and Petraeus agreed to Saygun's suggestion that he visit Ankara at some point in the future to continue the dialogue. Coming on the heels of S/I Ambassador Satterfield's visit here April 20 (septel),this meeting helped update Turkey on Iraq matters and established a personal TGS/MNF-I connection that we may need if/as PKK violence and pressures for a Turkish cross border operation increase in the weeks and months to come. Specific follow-up items are noted in paras 8-10. End Summary. ¶2. (S) Gen. Saygun reviewed recent US-Turkish history on Iraq. He said both countries need to get over problems arising from the March 1, 2003 refusal of permission for a US invasion from the north and the seizure that July of Turkish special forces in Suleymaniye. Our interests in Iraq to some extent diverge. We need to identify areas where we don't agree and work hard on realizing common aims. Sooner or later, the US will leave the region, and Turkey will have to continue living with Iraq as a neighbor. It wants to contribute to peace and stability there and to support a strong central government. ¶3. (S) Taking a hard line on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, Gen. Saygun urged that KRG leader Barzani "shut his mouth" for a while and complained about reported Barzani plans to convene a 'greater Kurdistan' conference that would draw Kurdish figures from Turkey, Iran, Syria, etc. Saygun declared that the Turkish forces stationed in northern Iraq have no secret agenda and that if Gen. Petraeus should hear otherwise, he should be in touch immediately. He also cautioned against the use of Peshmerga forces to provide security in Baghdad. Gen. Petraeus responded that the Iraqi armed and security forces include Kurds recruits, and they are part of the Iraqi Army. These soldiers wear Iraqi, not Peshmerga, uniforms. ¶4. (S) Gen. Saygun urged a declaration by the Baghdad government that the PKK is a terrorist organization. This would show goodwill toward Turkey and help to normalize relations. He complained about the operational freedom the PKK enjoys in northern Iraq that has allowed it to build permanent barracks and to train hundreds of people openly and without fear. He noted the reciprocal rights Turkey and Iraq enjoy under 1926 and 1946 agreements with respect to security 75 kilometers on either side of the border. CHOD Gen. Buyukanit had spoken of the military necessity of action to strike at PKK bases across the border, but decisions on this are the responsibility of Turkey's political leaders. Saygun lamented that after eight months work, Gens. Ralston and Baser have produced nothing. ¶5. (S) Gen. Petraeus recounted his own work in northern Iraq following the 2003 invasion and the importance he placed at that time on facilitating cooperative relations with Turkey, particularly trade and the smooth functioning of the Habur Gate border crossing. He noted continuing delays there despite infrastructure improvements and urged the stationing of additional Border/Customs guards to improve throughput. Gen. Petraeus spoke several times of the unrealized economic benefits that could come to both countries should cross-border traffic increase. ¶6. (S) Regarding the PKK, Gen. Petraeus acknowledged Turkish concerns and difficulties. He pointed to a strategy that has worked in Iraq of seeking to drive a wedge between the true irreconcilables and those who are not in the struggle against al-Qaeda and insurgent groups. Turkey could take a similar approach by passing a more genuine amnesty law that could ANKARA 00000957 002 OF 002 similarly separate the PKK hard core from those who might be prepared to disengage. He also urged the closure of Makhmour by enticing the refugees there to return to Turkey under conditions of a true anmesty. Getting Turkish Kurds out of the camp and closing it to deprive the PKK of a sanctuary would be beneficial. Gen. Saygun stated that the problem is that the Kurds were demanding that those people in Makhmour who did not repatriate to Turkey must go to Kirkuk. He also noted an alleged appeal by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Makkmour residents to move to Badakshan (phonetic),reportedly to provide them better protection from attack by local Arabs around the camp. ¶7. (S) Gen. Petraeus also described the current state of play in Iraq as a whole and as concerns the Baghdad Security Plan,s (BSP) implementation. The current government,s divisions along sectarian and party lines make working with it exceedingly complex and prevent it from being a true national reconciliation government. PM Maliki,s position is very difficult and complex. Petraeus described efforts to go after death squads and bomb makers, changes in the pattern of sectarian violence in Baghdad, signs of progress there and elsewhere in the country, and the large-scale role of foreigners passing through Syria as suicide bombers in Baghdad and elsewhere. Asked about our timeline, Petraeus said that by about September, he and Ambassador Crocker will need to assess whether the BSP and Coalition efforts to provide space and time for progress on reconciliation are working. He noted domestic pressure in the US, as well. Follow-Up Issues -------------- ¶8. (S) Syria: Gen. Saygun stated that the Syrians are ready to discuss how to have a more constructive relationship with the United States. He suggested an intelligence exchange on information regarding the flow of foreign fighters through Syria. He noted a recent, successful Turkish-Syrian joint action against PKK figures in Syria that suggests Damascus wants to be helpful. Gen. Petraeus agreed to see what can be provided. ¶9. (S) Habur Gate/Border Trade: As noted above, Gen. Petraeus urged efforts to accelerate traffic through the Habur Gate and to resolve issues between Turkish authorities and SOMO that have complicated fuel deliveries. Gen. Saygun agreed to see what he can do. He also offered to help with any other US/Coalition maintenance, repair and logistics needs that Turkey might be able to fulfill. ¶10. (S) Information Sharing: Gen. Saygun plugged for a stronger liaison between TGS and MNF-I, perhaps through ODC Turkey. Gen. Petraeus agreed to look at improving the exchange of information, urged Turkey to put a defense attach in Baghdad, and pointed to the Ambassador/Embassy Ankara as they key TGS interlocutor on Iraq matters. Saygun indicated that the Turkish MFA is working on the DATT issue, and he subsequently told Ambassador that a TGS request to put a DATT in Baghdad has been held up due to space limitations at the Turkish embassy. Separately, the Embassy has informally passed a recent TGS suggestion that it would like to post a J-2 staff officer at MNF-I HQ to complement the J-3 officer presently there. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON