PKK VIOLENCE MAGNIFIES TURKISH ANGER AT IRAQI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000812 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2027 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS TU IZ SUBJECT: PKK VIOLENCE MAGNIFIES TURKISH ANGER AT IRAQI KURDS; CROSS-BORDER OPERATION BACK ON THE TABLE? REF: A. ANKARA 805 ¶B. ANKARA 663 ¶C. ANKARA 686 Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A sudden spike in Turkish casualties in operations against the PKK -- along with mounting anger at what is seen here as increasingly provocative rhetoric from KRG President Barzani -- have likely combined to put the possibility of a Turkish cross-border operation back on the table. End summary. Barzani -- and Myers -- Rile the Turks -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Two press interviews over the weekend from two very different sources combined to create a swift and strident reaction in the Turkish press. First came an April 6 VOA interview of retired CJCS Gen. Myers in which he said the PKK was not a U.S. priority and that any Turkish cross-border operation (CBO) could result in an unintended clash between Turkish and U.S. forces. Then on April 7, KRG President Masoud Barzani warned Turkey that "there are 30 million Kurds in Turkey. If they interfere in Kirkuk over just a couple thousand Turkomans, we will interfere in Diyarbakir and other cities in Turkey." ¶3. (SBU) All print and broadcast media were quick to condemn both comments. A few outlets even implied that Myers' interview actually emboldened Barzani to come out so strongly on the Kirkuk issue. Almost all media noted Myers' reference to the July 4, 2004 Suleimaniyah incident in which Turkish special forces were captured and hooded by U.S. soldiers. ¶4. (SBU) What truly set Turkish press and officials teeth on edge this weekend, however, were Barzani's comments. The quasi-state wire service, Anatolia Agency -- usually a primary source for transcripts and international news -- refused even to carry the transcript of Barzani's interview on its service. Unnamed government sources were quick to express their irritation in an assortment of comments. Several outlets quoted MFA sources as suggesting that Barzani was led to make such comments because of his "panic due to the international community's increasing awareness of what is going on in Kirkuk." Nationalist Cumhuriyet carried speculations, also from MFA sources, that Barzani was distressed by lack of support from the U.S. on Kirkuk and by the fact that Turkey had established direct contact with President Talabani instead of him. Even more worrisome, the same source was quoted as saying that "Barzani is sitting on a pile of dynamite." Turkish Deaths in PKK Violence Up the Ante -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkish anger at Barzani (and Myers') remarks is magnified by the death of nine members of the Turkish security forces (and 14 wounded in action) in PKK-related violence since April 6. This sudden increase in casualties (according to GOT estimates, only seven soldiers had died in previous PKK-related violence so far in 2007) will likely intensify calls for a CBO to destroy PKK camps near the Turkey-Iraq border. Press reporting suggests that the nine soldiers died as a result of intensive Turkish counterinsurgency efforts (i.e., not as a result of direct PKK attacks). This distinction will likely be lost on the Turkish public, however, and politicians will ignore it. ¶6. (SBU) The press reported April 9 that 20,000 attended one Turkish soldier's funeral in Erzurum, and the CHOD and service chiefs attended another in Ankara. President Sezer will also chair his last National Security Council meeting April 10; press speculation is high that the PKK and Barzani issues will be front and center. The press also reported that GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Celikkol will take a simple ANKARA 00000812 002 OF 002 message when he travels to Washington this week: Do something about Barzani, or we will. ¶7. (C) Politicians will likely use these deaths to jockey for advantage as the April 16 kick-off for the selection of Turkey's next president approaches. The opposition, which has been goading the Erdogan government to take military action against the Iraqi Kurds over both the PKK and Kirkuk issues, will soak itself in martyrs' blood in an effort to portray the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as failing to defend Turkey's national interests, thus trying to render any AKP candidate, Erdogan or not, unfit for the presidency. "It's All the Kurds" -------------- ¶8. (C) Turkish frustration is heightened even further by the GOI's decision to ask Egypt to host the "neighbors-plus" ministerial, which the Turks had fully and publicly anticipated would be held in Istanbul. As reported ref a, senior Turkish officials told us they believe President Talabani and FonMin Zebari -- i.e., the Iraqi Kurds -- were behind the decision to move the meeting. Comment: Moving Backwards -------------- ¶9. (C) We have moved several steps back from a situation only a few weeks ago where PKK casualties (and thus the likelihood of a CBO) were low, FonMin Gul was planning to meet KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani in the near future, and Turkey was confidently planning for the "neighbors-plus" ministerial in Istanbul. ¶10. (S) Military and civilian contacts have repeatedly identified a significant increase in deaths attributable to the PKK as a possible trigger for a CBO. When 16 soldiers were killed in PKK attacks over one week of July 2006, pressure for a CBO mounted quickly; it was likely only averted by GOI pledges to curtail PKK activity in Iraq, and by our appointment of a Special Envoy for Countering the PKK. However, many senior Turks -- including the GOT's own Special Envoy, GEN Baser -- believe neither of these steps has yielded sufficient concrete results. ¶11. (S/NF) The most likely scenario for a CBO would be air and/or artillery strikes, perhaps backed up by an air-mobile operation which would be relatively brief in duration and would seek to avoid confrontation with peshmerga and -- above all -- coalition forces. The Turkish military could conduct such operations with forces already deployed,whioch would give the Turks the element of surprise (and give us little advance warning). The Turkish military leadership has told us that it would prefer to "consult" with us before launching a CBO (cautioning that it is up to the GOT whether or not to do so),though such consultation could be simply informing us in order to ensure Turkish-coalition deconfliction. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ WILSON