KRG MAY BE PONDERING DELAYED KIRKUK REFERENDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000663 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PREF PGOV TU IZ SUBJECT: KRG MAY BE PONDERING DELAYED KIRKUK REFERENDUM REF: A. ANKARA 560 ¶B. ANKARA 465 ¶C. GENEVA 700 ¶D. ANKARA 548 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Iraqi Kurdish leadership is weighing political modalities for a delay in a Kirkuk referendum, visiting KRG foreign POLICY adviser Dizayee told us March 20. KRG-GOT dialogue is continuing, even though a meeting at the political level may not occur until after Turkey's mid-May presidential elections. Dizayee agreed to discuss with his government local integration in Iraqi Kurdistan for Makhmour camp refugees who do not return to Turkey, as well as again posting a substantive KDP representative in Ankara. End summary. ¶2. (C) At his request, we met March 20 with KRG President Barzani's foreign POLICY adviser, Safeen Dizayee. Dizayee admitted that the Article 140 process on the future status of Kirkuk is proceeding slowly, which will in turn make a referendum by Dec. 31 difficult. The problem, he stated, is how then to deal with a delay politically. One solution he floated -- but said "we are not there yet" -- is for the Iraqi parliament to handle the issue "in a technical way," but not by changing the constitution, which he said would require a nationwide referendum. (Researchers from the Turkish think-tank SETA recently visited northern Iraq, and reported that a number of KRG officials echoed Dizayee's thinking.) He worried that increasing violence in Kirkuk will make implementation of 140 even harder. Finally, Dizayee asserted that he has consistently been urging the Kurdish leadership to reach out more meaningfully to the different communities in Kirkuk to persuade them that they would be better off under the KRG than otherwise. ¶3. (C) We emphasized that we are pushing at the highest levels here for KRG-GOT dialogue, including the oft-postponed Nechirvan Barzani-FonMin Gul meeting (see refs a and b). However, KRG rhetoric in general and in particular President Barzani's Feb. 26 interview on Turkish television have made it hard for the GOT to proceed before May 15 presidential elections. Dizayee took the point (he was the KDP representative to Turkey from 1992-2003). In the meantime, dialogue will continue: Dizayee planned to meet with PM Erdogan's foreign POLICY adviser, Ahmet Davutoglu, later this week, and probably Gul as well. ¶4. (C) We urged that the KRG agree to integrate -- with UN and international donor support -- refugees from Makhmour camp who do not return to Turkey (see refs c and d). Dizayee argued that the refugees do not have a clear picture of what is on offer in Turkey, and that the KRG has its own IDP problem. We reviewed what the draft Tripartite Agreement on voluntary repatriation lays out for returnees both in terms of legal and financial issues, adding that suggesting third country resettlement for non-returnees is unrealistic. We also described how the GOT would prefer refugees be settled in northern Iraq. He thought this was not unreasonable, and that the KRG would not want to settle people in Kirkuk and Mosul anyway ("we're having enough trouble with the Kurds who are there now"). Dizayee seemed unaware of the specifics of the Tripartite Agreement, and said he would discuss the issue at home. ¶5. (C) Finally, we suggested to Dizayee that the KDP should once again assign a substantive representative in Ankara, which they have not had since he left four years ago (the current representative is not strong on POLICY issues, and usually handles logistics such as visitors and procuring visas). He understood, and thought this could be a good if modest deliverable from an eventual Nechirvan Barzani-Gul meeting. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ ANKARA 00000663 002 OF 002 MCELDOWNEY